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*THE PROPHECIES OF ISAIAH.**

II.—THE CAPTIVITY.

THE literary phenomena of the book of Isaiah are, perhaps, even more perplexing than those of the Pentateuch itself. It has long been recognised that the so-called Books of Moses are composed of elements of very various dates, that their narratives bear the marks of different hands, and that their groups of laws were reduced to writing at widely separated eras; and the last ten years have witnessed the growth of an important consensus of critical opinion, under the leadership of Graf and Kuenen, on what may be called the stratification of the Pentateuch. It would, indeed, be premature while eminent scholars like Dillmann still adhere to some modification of the view so profoundly impressed by Ewald upon Old Testament study, to assert that the relations of the several documents can be defined with substantial accord. But on the constituent portions of these documents there is less divergence. The evidences of language and style are, for the most part, so decisive as to leave no doubt to which general group any

* The Prophecies of Isaiah; a new Translation with Commentary and Appendices. By the Rev. T. K. Cheyne, M.A. Vol I. 1880; Vol. II. 1881. See also the *Modern Review* for January, 1881.

particular passage must be referred ; and further inquiry is continually yielding new evidence concerning the order of time in which they took their rise.

The questions which confront the student of the Book of Isaiah are at once broader and more delicate. They are concerned not only with modes of expression and with the circumstances of history ; they deal with the minutest considerations of the form of the prophetic discourses—whether given by the hand of author or editor, and they lead up to the most subtle and searching of all psychological problems, the nature and limits of the action of the Spirit of God upon the human soul. It is plain that a discussion which has so wide a range cannot be adequately conducted within the limits of a single paper ; and I shall attempt nothing more than to review some of the principal points of the problem which Mr. Cheyne has presented with such fulness and care. My purpose must be not to contribute anything fresh to the solution, but to exhibit to the general reader the grounds and methods by which a solution must be sought.

A very cursory examination of the Book of Isaiah as it stands in our Old Testament reveals at once a number of peculiarities in its composition. In the earlier part of the book a series of prophecies succeed each other, falling into narrative only at one or two points, such as chaps. vii. and viii. The first twelve chapters deal entirely with the people of Israel. These are followed by a group of oracles on foreign affairs, after which the topics of the national life are for a short time resumed again. At the end of chapter xxxv. the stream of prophetic utterance is arrested, and four chapters follow (xxxvi.—xxxix.), in which history, prophecy, and psalm are all blended. The historian gives place in his turn, at the opening of chapter xl., to the prophet, and the strain of comfort with which the new discourse begins passes in the rest of the book through almost every note of divine promise and human entreaty, of hope and fear, of

encouragement and denunciation. Its fresh themes at once arrest attention. It holds up a picture of Israel all unlike that which has gone before; and if the reader pauses to think, as the rapid flow of high-wrought appeal or tender expostulation or scornful rebuke hurries him along, he finds himself in another land, amid new scenes, and listening, so it would seem, to a very different voice. Does he cast back his glance over the previous portions of the book to reassure himself? He discovers that the collection through which he has travelled so lightly is not really homogeneous; he is bewildered by finding amid the oracles dealing with Assyria and Sennacherib utterances that claim close kindred with Babylon and Cyrus. No less than three little groups of chapters (xiii.—xiv. 23, xxiv.—xxvii, xxxiv.—xxxv.) must be ranked with the great series that continues without interruption, save in the successions of its own matter and style, till the last words of the book are reached. What is the meaning of this strange arrangement? Whence these sudden dislocations of thought and language? these unexpected reappearances of seemingly different prophetic personalities? Are they in reality all one? Is there but a single speaker, though in many tones? or have we here a sort of anthology of prophecies collected at some later date, and ascribed with loving reverence to the great master of the elder time? A brief consideration of the circumstances revealed in the last twenty-seven chapters may, perhaps, help us to a reply.

I.

One of the first things that strikes the reader is the entire change of scene and thought. The great objects of Isaiah's ministry, the powers with which he dealt, have passed away. The whole of the busy life of Jerusalem has vanished. The king, his court officers, and his harem, the

wealthy nobles and the military chiefs, the extravagant fine ladies, the drunken priests, the necromancers and false prophets, the suffering poor, waiting in vain for justice at the hands of their oppressors, all these have disappeared. No more do Moab and Ammon harass; no more do the Philistines watch for revenge. No more does Assyria threaten; no more does Egypt tempt. Has, then, the day of Yahveh come? Has nature yielded herself to its vivifying power? Have the people submitted to the awful process of chastisement and purification, and emerged into the new glory of a life divinely quickened and sustained? Have the great highways been constructed from the Tigris and the Nile, linking the two mightiest powers of the world along with Israel in faithful service to Yahveh of Hosts? No, the day of Yahveh has not come! The king is no more the object of the prophet's hopes, for he has been dethroned, and his dynasty is at an end. The proud city has been laid waste. Famine and the sword wrought on her their deadly work; her most valiant sons perished in her defence, caught at the street-corners by the conquering foe "like an antelope in a net."* The land, instead of yielding its marvelous supplies, lies desolate; only here and there to the enemy do its fields bear grain, and its grapes yield their juice. So long have the cities stood in ruins that they seem already to belong to "antiquity;" they fell in the days of "the forefathers," they are the monuments of the sorrows of "past generations."† Where, then, are the people? They are in exile, far from their former homes. In vivid language the prophet paints them as "snared in holes, and hidden in houses of restraint; they are become a prey, and there is none to rescue, a spoil, and none that saith, Restore."‡ Jerusalem sits in the dust, with the yoke of bondage upon her neck.§ With the destruction of the capital, and the captivity of the nation, the sanctuary has perished—the

* *Is. li. 3, 17—20.* † *lxii. 8; lxi. 4.* ‡ *xliv. 22.* § *lii. 1, 2.*

sanctuary which Isaiah declared to be inviolable, for Yahveh himself would defend it. Alas! the staff of doom which he would swing against the Assyrian availed not against the new invaders. "Our adversaries," cries the prophet, "have trampled upon thy sanctuary;" nay, with a last entreaty of despair, "Be not wroth, Yahveh to the uttermost, and remember not iniquity for ever; lo! do but look, we are all thy people. Thy holy cities have become a desert; Zion hath become a desert, Jerusalem a desolation. Our house of holiness and splendour, where our fathers praised thee, is burned up with fire, and all our delectable things are laid waste."* With the fall of the temple the ritual has ceased. The punctual celebration of the new moons by greedy priests, and the solemn assemblies of the violent and extortionate, no more wake the prophet's wrath. The annual circuit of the feasts is suspended; the choral song is hushed. The afflicted nation has no other ordinances than the Sabbath and the fast.†

Is it possible, however, that this time of sorrow is the chastisement of captivity which Isaiah had himself predicted as the indispensable discipline for the regeneration of the people? It was, perhaps, with this in his mind, that he laid on his sons those significant names "A-remnant-shall-return," and "Haste-spoil-speedy-prey." A glance at our prophecies shows us that the age and the power have changed. Isaiah beheld the forces of Assyria closing round the little kingdom of Judah, and serving as the ministers of Yahveh's penal justice. But the oppressions of Assyria are now in the remote past. The historic eye travels back to them through the generations as to the bondage of the forefathers in Egypt.‡ The conquering might of Nineveh has been overthrown, and the sovereignty of Western Asia has passed to imperial Babylon. Proudly does the splendid city rise enthroned in her

* Is. lxiii. 18, lxiv. 9—11 (Cheyne).

† lviii.

‡ lii. 4.

wealth and state. There are the great bronze gates of her vast walls ; the broad quays thronged with ships that lined the river banks ; the huge warehouses with their secret vaults, where the hidden treasures of her merchants were safely stored away. Amid the crowd of deities the figures of Bel and Nebo, connected with the planets Jupiter and Mercury, loom dimly into view.* The spells and enchantments of the ancient magic that had been practised possibly for millenniums, the observations of the official astronomers embodied in the monthly reports forwarded to the king from the several stations on the great plain†—these appear in the prophet's pages almost as clearly as in the brick calendars of lucky and unlucky days, and the clay summaries of the events of the heavens, which it is the triumph of modern enterprise and scholarship to have rescued and deciphered.

It was under the rule of Babylon, then, that Jerusalem was in ruins, and her people helpless in captivity. Yet they are not wholly without hope. Israel's Holy One, who guides the destinies of the world, does not forget his children. Are they weary of waiting, do they complain that their way is hidden from Yahveh, and he has let slip their right?‡ The answer is ready : Yahveh has even now called from his distant home the deliverer who shall set them free.§ He comes from the North and from the East, for the powers of Media and Persia are united in him.|| Sometimes his victorious approach seems near, sometimes it appears as though unexpected delays intervene, and the sufferers grow sick with hope deferred, question the divine purposes, and mutter in despair that they have lived in vain.¶ But as the prophet follows the conqueror on his rapid marches, all roads, even the farthest, wind round at last to Babylon. His triumphs have a deep religious significance, though he knows it not. They will be the means

* Is. xlv. 1.

† xlvii. 12, 13.

‡ xl. 27.

§ xli. 2.

|| xli. 25.

¶ xlix. 4.

of the liberation of Israel, of the restoration of Jerusalem. And so the great announcement is made of the rebuilding of the temple and the return of the exiles to their own land.

Thus said Yahveh, thy Goel, and he that formed thee from the womb ; I am Yahveh, the maker of everything, that stretched forth the heavens alone, that spread forth the earth—who was with me? that bringeth to nought the signs of the praters, and maketh the diviners mad, that turneth wise men backward, and proveth their knowledge to be folly, that maketh his servant's word to stand, and accomplisheth the counsel of his messengers, that saith of Jerusalem, Let her be inhabited, and of the cities of Judah, Let them be built, and her desolate places will I raise up ; that saith to the flood [the Euphrates], Be thou wasted and thy streams will I dry up ; that saith of Cyrus, My shepherd, and all my pleasures shall he accomplish, even saying of Jerusalem, Let her be built, and of the temple, Let thy foundations be laid. . . . It was I who stirred him up in righteousness, and all his ways will I make level ; he shall build my city, and mine exiled ones shall he send home, not for price and not for reward, saith Yahveh Sabaoth.*

And so, through many alternations, rising at times into the most exulting joy, as in the great ode on the glory of the New Jerusalem, or sinking into a wail of lamentation over the fierceness of Yahveh's chastisement, the prophetic discourses flow on, till they close with the gathering of the nations at the holy mount, and the awful picture of the undying worm and quenchless fire to which the enemies of the righteous are consigned.

Had we met with this book (xl.—lxvi.) by itself, we should have had no doubt to what period the bulk of its contents, at any rate, belonged. We should have judged unhesitatingly that whatever may be the occasional indications, here and there, of the scenery of Palestine, the chief portions of the oracles belong to the locality and circumstances of the captivity.

* Is. xlv. 24—xlv. 13 (Cheyne).

The foremost of the scholars and critics who have most earnestly pleaded for the unity of authorship of the book of Isaiah, expressed his opinion twelve years ago that "there is not a single passage of the book (Is. xl.—lxvi.) which betrays that the times of the exile are only ideally and not actually present to the prophetic writer." Not even the qualifications which Dr. Delitzsch has since introduced into this admission can destroy its value as evidence that it has been at least possible to interpret these wonderful oracles as the living utterances of comfort and hope to contemporary suffering. Even Naegelsbach, who courageously declares that "one might as well maintain that the writer had stood beneath the cross of Christ and read the letters of Paul, as that he lived in the exile," is compelled to surrender the name Cyrus, and the lament over the burning of the temple. "If some passages in the last chapters show unmistakable traces of exilic origin, they must be later additions to the original work of Isaiah."* But if the sketch that we have given be correct, it will be seen that the "traces of exilic origin" are not scattered through a few pages in the last chapters. They are the very tissue and substance of the book (xl.—lxvi.) itself. Remove them, and you remove the foundation on which it rests; the whole fabric of the prophetic thought will fall in ruins; and there will be left only consolations for disasters which have not happened, promises of deliverance to a free people, hopes of restoration for a city that sits unharmed upon its sacred hills. If any language is clear and explicit, the language of this book is so. If ever it were possible to gather from an ancient document the circumstances under which the greater part of it was written, the origin of this document may be determined.

* *Der Prophet Jesaja*, in Lange's *Bibelwerk*, 1878, pp. xxiii.—xxv.

II.

The question, as we have said, would have been perfectly simple, had it presented itself alone. No one would have dreamed that the descriptions of the Captivity were written while the kingdom of Judah had yet a hundred years or more to live. But their connection with the acknowledged discourses of Isaiah has of necessity somewhat altered the case. The continuity of authorship, assumed with only an occasional doubt till the revival of Biblical criticism, grew almost into an article of faith; and a multitude of critical inquiries must be made and answered ere it can be adequately disproved. For example, what are the relations of language between the two groups of discourses? Do the peculiarities of the one reappear in the other? Can we recognise in the second the clear signs of the author of the first? We cannot think so, and we are glad to fortify our own judgment with the corresponding conclusion on the part of Mr. Cheyne. It is true that Mr. Cheyne adds a qualification which must be taken into account—"Not that I suppose this conclusion to carry with it the non-Isaianic origin of the later prophecies. If on general grounds it is probable that Isaiah, in his old age, entered on a new field of prophetic discourse, it will appear natural to suppose that new forms of expression should have met the promptings of his intellect."* We are inclined, however, to dwell not so much on the repeated occurrence of specific phrases,† or the appearance of new words, as on the different character of style which must be felt rather than analysed. Compare the short, nervous, pregnant utterances of the first part of

* Vol. II., p. 230.

† Such as *I am Yahveh, and there is none else; I am the first and the last; who declared these things from the beginning; fear not, I am with thee, or I will help thee; break forth into a shout; and others.*

the book with the long, rolling sentences spreading through verse after verse in the opening chapters of the second. Consider the accumulations of descriptive clauses to unfold the wonderful works of Yahveh in a manner wholly new, or the detailed elaboration of ideas elsewhere summed up in an epithet. Put side by side the pleading of Yahveh with his people in ch. i., and the arguments addressed to the nations in chaps. xli., xlii.; or the scornful denunciation of the idolaters in ch. ii., and the lengthy description of the manufacture of idols in ch. xlv. Have we not here two modes of presentment widely different? This is, perhaps, seen with peculiar effect in the use which II. Isaiah (to adopt Mr. Cheyne's notation) makes of I. Isaiah. But on this topic a few preliminary words must be said.

The subject of quotations is a notoriously difficult one. The parallels which may be drawn between books of certain date and books of uncertain date are almost always liable to be read both ways. And even if a strong affinity can be established between particular passages, there is a constantly recurring danger of attaching undue weight to such resemblances. Thus, for instance, Mr. Cheyne sets down Isa. xii. 26 as a quotation from the Song of Moses, Ex. xv. 2; and finds evidence in Is. i. of acquaintance on the part of the author or editor with the book, or a portion of the book, of Deuteronomy.* These evidences do not seem to us by any means decisive. On the other hand, it

* We may note, in passing, that, while commenting on the language of the prayer of Hezekiah, xxxvii. 15 (Vol. I. p. 207), Mr. Cheyne remarks *à propos* of its fervent monotheism, that "it seems a natural supposition that the more developed faith of the later writer has here given a colouring to his language." But what was the great literary expression of this developed faith? It was the book of Deuteronomy. And even if Mr. Cheyne limits his parallels to Deut. xxxii., from which most of his instances are taken, and which can of course easily be detached from the main work, we find in it that same emphatic utterance which he characterises as the sign of a later age. Comp. ver. 39 with Is. xlv. 6, 8; xlv. 5, 7, 18, 21.

cannot be doubted that the following passages are very closely related :—

ISAIAH lii. 7a, 1b.

"How beautiful upon the mountains are the feet of him that bringeth good tidings that publisheth peace."

"Henceforth there shall no more come into thee the uncircumcised and the unclean."

ISAIAH xlvii. 10.

"For thou hast trusted in thy wickedness; thou hast said, None seeth me. Thy wisdom and thy knowledge it hath perverted thee; and thou hast said in thine heart, I am, and none besides."

NAHUM i. 15.

"Behold upon the mountains the feet of him that bringeth good tidings that publisheth peace. O Judah, keep thy solemn feasts, perform thy vows; for the wicked shall no more pass through thee; he is utterly cast off."

ZEPHANIAH ii. 15.

"This is the rejoicing city that dwelt carelessly, that said in her heart, I am, and none besides."

Which of these is the original, and which the reproduction? In spite of Naegelsbach's emphatic assertion that no lover of truth can possibly doubt that the passage in Nahum is an enfeebled conglomeration of the clauses in Isaiah, we take leave to say that the question must be determined, so far as it can be determined at all, on more general considerations. Let the following circumstances be taken into account. Whatever may have been the influence of the undisputed prophecies of Isaiah upon later generations, of actual and positive quotations we believe that subsequent writers present but a single instance.

ISAIAH xi. 9.

"For the earth shall be full of the knowledge of Yahveh, as the waters cover the sea."

HABAKKUK ii. 14.

"For the earth shall be filled with the knowledge of the glory of Yahveh, as the waters cover the sea."

But the prophecies of the Captivity exhibit an unusual number of connections not only with the oracles of Nahum and Zephaniah, but with the writings of Jeremiah and the book of Job. Mr. Cheyne's judgment of the priority of the

wonderful figure of Job to the Servant of Yahveh is clear and unhesitating; and equally decided is his ascription of Job to the period of the Exile. Now, if the prophecies of the Captivity be referred to Isaiah, it will be seen that numerous writers have borrowed from this source, and left his other discourses alone. Of all his utterances, these only so spoke to the heart of his people as to supply his successors with new thoughts. Is it not, on the other hand, more reasonable to argue that the author (or authors) in Babylonia was a man of large literary culture, thoroughly familiar with the works of his forerunners, so that their expressions sometimes blended with his own? This appears to us to become almost a certainty on comparing the new variations which he introduces on the older themes of Isaiah himself.

ISAIAH xxiv. 16.

"O your perverseness! Should the potter be accounted as clay, that the work should say of him that made it, He made me not? and the thing formed say of him that formed it, He hath no understanding?"

ISAIAH xlv. 9—11.

"Woe unto him that striveth with him that formed him, a potsherd among potsherds of the ground. Doth the clay say to him that formed it, What makest thou? or thy work, He hath no hands? Woe unto him that saith to a father, What begettest thou? or to a woman, What bringest thou forth? Thus saith Yahveh, the Holy One of Israel, and he that formed him, Concerning the things to come will ye question me? Concerning my children and the work of my hands will ye lay commands upon me?" (*Cheyne.*)*

It is difficult to believe that a prophet would thus reproduce himself, with such amplification, and such curious correspondence, in the midst of so much divergence; and a purely literary judgment must, we are convinced, assign the

* Want of space prevents us from setting forth two pictures of the ideal future, xi. 6—9, and lxxv. 17—25, where lxxv. 25 brings together a number of features in the earlier passage.

two groups of oracles thus curiously related to different hands.

More delicate still, perhaps, is the question of the unity or variety of authorship within the last twenty-seven chapters. The peculiar recurrence of phrases, the iteration of epithets, the accumulation of predicates, which seem so far from the manner of the earlier prophet, are much less prominent after ch. lii., and there are no doubt passages like lvi. 9—lvii. 10, which betray the imagery of Judea rather than Babylon. For once, however, Mr. Cheyne seems to throw off his usual caution in the remark that "from ch. liii. onwards it is the exception to find a chapter which is not studded with passages by no means easy to reconcile with the unitarian theory." We cannot see adequate reason for withdrawing liv., lv., lvii. 12—21, lviii., lix., lx.—lxii. from the discourses which precede, with which they are connected by many subtle links; while the concluding chapters, diverse as they are, present some striking affinities of thought, which indicate that they proceed at least from the same general school. With this reserve we gladly accept Mr. Cheyne's suggestion that "the latter part of II. Isaiah was once [much] shorter, and that the author, or one of the *Soferim*, enlarged it, by the addition of passages from other prophets."

III.

But the criticism of the Book of Isaiah cannot concern itself with style alone. It must deal with something more than words: it cannot escape the larger question of the nature and aims of the prophetic teaching. It is to be regretted that Mr. Cheyne, in his anxiety to confine himself to the duties of a commentator, has somewhat ignored this side of the question. The essays in his second volume might well have found a place for the

consideration of the relation of the ideas of the Assyrian and Babylonian eras. It is true that this involves nothing less than the history of the religion of Israel during the two most important centuries of its development; and our author may perhaps plead that this theme belongs rather to the general treatment of Hebrew literature, which we may look for some time at his hands. But it is really essential to the just appreciation of the arguments on behalf of the later origin of the prophecies of the Captivity that their leading motives should be compared with those of the prophet of Hezekiah's reign. Some hints on this topic must be briefly supplied.*

Isaiah's anticipations of the future centred in the general conception of Yahveh's Day. They were founded on the intense belief that a holy God could only be rightly served by a holy people. But Israel was not holy, and imposed on its Divine Lord, therefore the necessity of chastising it, to bring back some at least to the way of righteousness. The great instrument of discipline, the rod wielded by Yahveh's mighty hand, was the Assyrian power. Time after time, as invasion was seen at a distance, or actually swept through the land, did Isaiah announce that an inner purpose impelled the troops, a higher call had summoned them to execute the mandates of heaven on a corrupt and sinful nation. But the flood of war should be suddenly rolled back. Out of uttermost woe and desolation should grow up a purer society, beneath the guidance of an ideal king sprung from David's house. High on the mountains should a banner be set as a signal for the exiles to return from the far-off land of their dispersion. The people, divided and despised, should rise in union to its ancient power; hereditary enemies should be once more subdued beneath its victorious might, and universal empire should secure universal peace.

* Students must consult Duhm's admirable work, *Die Theologie der Propheten*.

In the Babylonian exile, however, all was changed. The future no longer rises in glory after the Assyrian overthrow. The Assyrians had been overthrown; Israel was saved; but the people had not been purified, the ideal king did not come, righteousness and sovereignty were not established in the land. It was noted with bitterness by the prophets of the next century that sin was added to sin, till the measure of Yahveh's indignation was full. The house of David, instead of giving birth to the sovereign on whom the sevenfold spirit might rest, sank into ruin; and the remnant of the people from which the Ten Tribes had been already rent, passed into captivity and despair. The exile was the awful price which Israel paid for its guilt. But at last the price was paid; and the time came when its warfare was ended and its iniquity pardoned. Yahveh's Day, therefore, is no more to come as a day of humiliation on its proud and lofty things, Lebanon's cedars, Bashan's oaks, the towers and fortresses and ships of a wealthy and powerful nation.* It is to be a day of deliverance for the afflicted and suffering, and a day of vengeance on the oppressor.† Jerusalem, which Isaiah had declared Yahveh would leave his heavenly throne to defend, had long lain desolate. It should now be rebuilt, and thither should the captives return with songs of joy; but the new community would need no king to be the organ of the divine purpose for it: the society of the future is no longer conceived under the form of monarchy. Its officers would be peace, and its governors righteousness,‡ for some civil constitution it must have. But this is all subordinated to the profound conception of the relation of the whole people to Yahveh, won out of the deep experiences of its recent history. It had been among the hopes of Isaiah that the coming age would witness an outpouring of the divine spirit from on high, which should work a miraculous

* Is. ii. 12—17.

† xliv. 8, lxi. 2, lxiii. 4.

‡ lx. 17.

change in the land and its inhabitants, bringing to the soil a marvellous increase of fertility, to the dwellers thereon justice and righteousness, with the fruits of peace, security, and ease.* It is impossible to ignore the national and local elements of this anticipation, and the external character of the expected grace. From these limitations the prophets of the Captivity are free. No doubt the restoration of the sanctuary is one of their cherished hopes. No doubt the exultation of approaching release beholds the dreary way of the desert which the returning exiles would have to traverse beneath the burning sun, shaded with trees and sweetened with bubbling springs, which should burst forth at Yahveh's word from the barren ground. Not here, however, lies the essence of their religion. It is in the higher spirituality, the peculiar inwardness, which reveal a new stage of advance. It is not only local, it is universal. It is more than the collective attitude of a people to the disposer of its destiny; it is the soul's own consciousness of communion with the infinite and eternal. Yahveh is still, as in the language of the older prophet, the "Holy One," the "Strong One" of Israel. But he is something more. He is the "high and lofty one who dwelleth for ever," whom no house can be built to contain, the place of whose rest is no lower than the immensity beyond heaven and earth, but who dwells also with the contrite and the lowly spirit.† Suffering has done its work: it has produced an individual as well as a national religion.

The sense of the individual character of religion was not indeed wanting to the prophets of the eighth century. It receives its most elevated expression in the declaration of Micah, "He hath showed thee, O man, what is good, and what doth Yahveh require of thee but to do justice and love mercy and walk humbly with thy God." But the

* Is. xxxii. 15 sqq.

† lvii. 15, lxvi.

prophecy of this age is far from having definitely worked out the idea of the relation of the soul to God. Religion still remained a national service, the bond of mutual obligation, between Yahveh and his people. While the Deuteronomist gave to it on one side a new significance, by insisting with reiterated earnestness on the need of individual love for Yahveh, he insisted with equal force on the covenant made by Yahveh with the fathers of Israel, on the oath which he had sworn to fulfil, the pledges which he must redeem. In undertaking to reproduce the law though from a higher point of view, the Deuteronomist could do no more. The law was necessarily social rather than spiritual. The Deuteronomist put the law to a large extent on a new basis, that of personal relationship between the Israelite and Yahveh. But it was still only with the Israelites that it dealt; and while religion was being individualised among them, it was only open to them, so to speak, through membership of the nation.

The writings of Jeremiah show that prophecy was slowly rising above these restraints. The circumstances of the time compelled him to loosen the strictness of the national bond, and retreat for the primitive elements of religious consciousness within the heart. He saw that Jerusalem must fall before the Babylonians, that the centre of Yahveh worship, which Isaiah had regarded as inviolable, would be overthrown. Would this be the end of the religion of Yahveh? When the ritual was suspended, when the temple had perished, would this be the ruin of all that the community had been intended to realise and represent? Not so; a new outlook begins to open before the prophet. The catastrophe of his nation and his own sufferings lead him to retire into the sanctuary of his own soul. The older prophets had awaited the judgment on the people collectively. Jeremiah now sees it in perpetual process within each conscience. "I, Yahveh, search the heart; I try the

reins, even to give to each man after his ways, after the fruit of his doings." * As Yahveh thus discerns and knows the inmost mind, so it is the true glory of the soul to discern and know him. "Thus saith Yahveh, Let not the wise glory in his wisdom, nor the valiant glory in his valour, nor the wealthy glory in his wealth; but let him that glorieth glory in this, that he discerneth and knoweth me, that I, Yahveh, do mercy, justice, and righteousness; for in these things do I delight, saith Yahveh." †

This transfer of the seat of religion to the inner heart necessarily led to the rejection of the doctrine of any peculiar sanctity in the temple or the city which it consecrated. Yahveh was not pledged to defend the place where his name was called against an unworthy people; what he had done to Shiloh he would not hesitate to do to Zion. Vain was it for men to cry, "Is not Yahveh in Zion; is not her king in her?" His presence would be a presence of vengeance and punishment, not of protection.‡ Yet the vengeance would not last for ever; the punishment would cease when it had done its purifying work. As Isaiah had predicted a return of the exiles from the Assyrian captivity, so Jeremiah sees afar off the Babylonian power brought low, and Israel released. The same hand which had watched over them to pluck up and break down, to destroy and afflict, would watch over them to build and to plant.§ Once more should the ancient fertility of the land reappear, and Yahveh's good things—corn and wine and oil, the flock and the herd—should refresh the wearied and the suffering.|| But there is more than this. The establishment of the restored community will be signalised by a new covenant marking the new order of spiritual relations. It is the sign of the eternal love, of the father's care which yearns over his children.¶ This covenant will secure for every soul the

* Jer. xvii. 10, cf. xx. 12. † Jer. ix. 22, 23. ‡ Jer. viii. 19; vii. 3—15.

§ Jer. xxxi. 28.

|| xxxi. 12—14.

¶ xxxi. 1, 3, 9.

possession of the highest spiritual privileges. Isaiah had declared that the earth should be full of the knowledge of Yahveh as the waters cover the sea; but he had indicated no means for its diffusion, save the resort of the nations to Zion. Jeremiah, however, deals not with collective and general terms, but with the specific experiences of individuals. Not only the people as a people, but each man as man, shall realise the relation which the soul bears to Yahveh. "After those days, saith Yahveh, I will put my teaching in their inward parts, and write it in their hearts, and will be their God, and they shall be my people. And they shall teach no more every man his neighbour, and every man his brother, saying, Know Yahveh; for they shall all know me, from the least of them to the greatest of them, saith Yah; for I will forgive their iniquity, and remember their sin no more." * The social side of this picture of the restoration of Israel includes the re-establishment of the Davidic house, under whose last princes Jeremiah lived. But that which is chiefly prominent in his mind is the great spiritual renewal. And, as though the disasters and corruptions of the present seemed to throw some doubt on the divine faithfulness, it is enforced with the more earnestness by Jeremiah that the future of Israel is assured by the same order as that which keeps "the most ancient heavens fresh and strong." † There is no need of any further display of Yahveh's might. Jeremiah wants no moon bright as the sun, no sun of sevenfold glow, to assure him that the world is already divine. He has withdrawn within the soul, and found there the true scene of God's dealings. If he looks to the outer world, it is not to suggest expectations of marvellous transformation, but to appeal to its settled usages as the perpetual witness of Yahveh's faithfulness. The glory of Yahveh, which was present to the mind of Isaiah with such overpowering awe, is revealed

* Jer. xxxi. 33, 34. † xxxi. 35 cf. xxxiii. 20.

to Jeremiah rather in the inner relations of the heart. *There* is wonder, mystery enough. What are the multiplied splendours of the heavens, or the magic suppression of all natural hostilities beneath, beside the ever-recurring marvel to the devout and humble spirit that the Lord of righteousness should love him, and make himself known to him in tenderness and peace?

IV.

This great change in the essential conceptions of religion could not but have most important consequences. In particular, it imparted immense expansion to the view of the relations of Yahveh, and of Yahveh's people Israel, to the heathen. It had been the favourite hope of older prophets that in the later days all nations should stream towards Zion, to receive there the teaching of the truth. Isaiah had seen the Ethiopians sending gifts to the sanctuary, he had looked for a highway from Assyria and Egypt to the very heart of Israel. But now there was no sanctuary. The service for which Israel was appointed was higher than that of priest and sacrifice. At any place, in any land, Yahveh might give the new spirit; and though he did not cease to be "Israel's Holy One," he was the God of the whole world. Could he, then, remain unknown to the peoples whom he had set thereon in life and thought? Impossible; there must be provision for spreading far and wide the sublime truths of his universal being. Among the figures delineated by the Prophet of the Captivity, is the ideal of the ancient nation, which had seen so many vicissitudes, and sustained so wonderful a discipline at Yahveh's hands.

But thou, O Israel my servant, O Jacob whom I have chosen, the seed of Abraham that loved me, thou whom I have fetched from the ends of the earth, and from its outlying parts

have called, and I said to thee, Thou art my servant, I have chosen and not rejected thee ; fear not, for I am with thee.*

Chosen, fetched, called ? For what purpose, then ? One of the objects, at least, of the divine plan, is that he may be the great missionary to the heathen of Yahveh's truth.

Behold my servant, whom I uphold, my chosen in whom my soul is well pleased. I have put my spirit upon him, religion to the nations shall he carry forth. He shall not cry nor clamour, nor cause his voice to be heard in the street ; a crushed reed he shall not break, and a dimly burning wick he shall not quench. He shall not burn dimly, neither shall his spirit be crushed, till he have set religion in the earth, and on his teaching shall the countries wait. †

Here is a nobler destiny for Israel than the restoration of its former sovereignty. But it is a destiny that involves peril of suffering and danger and death. For it cannot be forgotten that Israel is still captive, and ere it can step forth to convert the world, must first be set free itself. And here the servant-Israel seems to part company from the people-Israel ; for Israel the servant is summoned to take part in the deliverance of Israel the people, to bring out the prisoners and superintend their settlement in their own land.

Hearken, ye countries, unto me, and listen, ye far-off peoples. Yahveh hath called me from the womb, from my mother's lap hath he made mention of my name ; and he made my mouth as a sharp sword, in the shadow of his hand he hid me ; and he made me a polished shaft, in his quiver he covered me ; and he said unto me, Thou art my servant ; (even) Israel with whom I will beautify myself. But I had said, I have laboured in vain, for nought and for a breath have I spent my strength, but surely my right is with Yahveh, and my recompense with my God. And now Yahveh hath said, he who formed me from the womb to be a servant unto him, that I might bring back Jacob unto him, and that Israel may be gathered unto him (for I am honoured in the

* Is. xli. 8, 9 (Cheyne).

† xlii. 1—4.

eyes of Yahveh, and my God is become my strength)—he hath said, It is too light a thing that thou shouldest be to me a servant, to raise up the tribes of Jacob, and to restore the preserved of Israel; so I appoint thee the light of the nations, to be my salvation unto the end of the earth.

Thus saith Yahveh, the God of Israel, and his Holy One, unto him who is despised of souls, abhorred of the people, a servant of rulers; kings shall see and rise up, princes, they shall bow down; because of Yahveh, in that he is faithful, and of the Holy One of Israel, in that he chose thee. Thus saith Yahveh, In the season of favour do I answer thee, and in the day of salvation I help thee; and I keep thee and appoint thee for a covenant of the people, to raise up the land, to assign the desolate heritages, saying to the bondsmen, Go forth, and to those who are in darkness, Show yourselves.*

The personality of the Servant, it would seem from this passage, is inseparably connected with the captive Israel. His first duty is to take part in the restoration of the exiles, of which Cyrus is to be the immediate instrument; his next and infinitely larger is to preach the truth to the whole world. But there is a strange contrast between his condition and his calling. Those who see him now, despise him; tyrants rule over him; nay, in the language of the subsequent description (lii. 13—liii.) he is so disfigured, he has so completely lost the outward aspect of humanity, that his appearance excites a "stupefied surprise," and even his own countrymen hide their faces in disgust. But there is a deep meaning in these sufferings. The sickness with which he had such sad familiarity, the pains that destroyed all outward grace, were in reality not his own. He bore them, but he had not deserved them; they were the awful penalty of a nation's guilt, but he endured them as a sacrifice on its behalf. He suffers unto death, he is buried, but he still lives. He lays down his life as an offering for guilt, but it is nevertheless prolonged, that he may receive a glorious reward. And so the Servant who was cut off out of the land

* Is. xlix. 1—9 (Cheyne).

of the living, stricken for the rebellion of his people, emerges from the tomb to "receive a portion among the great, and with the powerful to divide spoil."

Those who approach the picture of the Servant first suffering and then triumphant, along the line of previous passages delineating his character and functions, cannot help carrying to it the conception which they suggest. They find evidence that the various classes of the exiled people could by no means all rise to the height of their great destiny: and they see reason for believing that the faithful had sometimes to endure no little persecution at the hands both of their fellow-Israelites and their heathen conquerors. It is to these faithful few, who were the real representatives of the ideal Israel in the midst of ignominy and violence, that the prophet points, borrowing, perhaps, a trait here and there from the pathetic picture of some earlier sufferer, and gathering up into one sublime figure the woes and the sins, the patience and the trust, of a whole generation.

With this method of interpreting the prophecies by themselves, however, Mr. Cheyne is no longer satisfied. We can only adequately comprehend the Old Testament, he warns us, when we have first accepted a particular theory founded on the New; and the way to the understanding of the Servant in Isaiah lies through the "God-man" of the Gospels. It is not unnatural that those who accept this doctrine, who see all previous history leading up to it, and all subsequent history pointing back to it, should look for anticipations, premonitions, even for explicit announcements, of so stupendous an event as the incarnation of God the Son in the person of Jesus of Nazareth. Our author, indeed, does his best to minimise this expectation and bring it within reasonable limits. "Not that the laws of human nature were violated, nor that Christian interpreters are to explain the prophets unphilologically; but that God overruled the actions and words of his servants, so as to cast a

shadow of the coming Christ."* Mr. Cheyne's loyalty to the first duty of a critic makes him scrupulously anxious to avoid taking the least advantage of his text, or trying to wrest from it a meaning which it will not bear: and he will admit, we presume, that even the passages which he selects either as foreshadowings of special circumstances in the life of Christ, or as distinct pictures of the suffering Messiah, had a significance which rendered them intelligible and appropriate at the time to the persons to whom they were addressed. That this is the case with the prophecies of Immanuel and the birth of the Wonderful Child, Mr. Cheyne has himself shown: their relation to the contemporary events cannot be mistaken. Mr. Cheyne has, indeed, a theory that "the contents of the prophetic revelations of the Messianic period are unconditioned by time." But Isaiah plainly expected the advent of the Hero-King to follow the overthrow of the Assyrian invaders: the Prophet of the Captivity announces the foundation of the New Jerusalem, and the establishment of the ideal community, in immediate sequence on the liberation by Cyrus. So far are these expectations from being unconditioned by time, that the conditions of time are most strictly defined. The fact is, that Mr. Cheyne does not feel free to deal with the prophetic utterances as they stand. He cannot estimate the aims and forces of prophecy by themselves. He is bound, he conceives, to interpret the Old Testament as Jesus himself interpreted it; the God-man cannot have been fundamentally mistaken in the Messianic character of psalms and prophecies. This position betrays a confident assurance concerning the view entertained by Jesus upon these passages, which we cannot share; and it is noteworthy that three out of four of Mr. Cheyne's specific references are to the comments of the evangelists, and not to the words of Jesus himself. The excep-

* Vol. II., p. 174.

tion is the ascription to Christ (Luke xxii. 37) of a quotation from liii. 12, "And he was numbered with the transgressors." "The prophet merely meant," observes Mr. Cheyne, "that the servant of Yahveh was regarded as a transgressor: but by a providential 'pre-established harmony' the coincidence with facts is even literally exact. Such honour does the Hand which moves the world put upon the spirit of prophecy."* Are we, then, to understand that the spirit of God deliberately suggested to the prophet's mind two Hebrew words in the middle of a verse to bear a double meaning, of which the second should not be realised for five hundred years? Surely it cannot be permissible to pick out a phrase here and an expression there. Prophecy cannot be made up of fragments. Is inspiration held in suspense, while the inappropriate passages are written, to descend again with some fresh and pregnant utterance? If the fourth clause (of liii. 12) is to be referred to Jesus, then also the first and second, "Therefore will I give him a portion among the great, and with the powerful shall he divide spoil"—which occasion the Christian interpreters no little trouble.

We differ with reluctance from so accomplished a scholar, whose love of truth cannot be questioned, and whose religious confessions are marked by a simplicity which must needs win them respectful sympathy, even when they cannot command assent. But we are strongly persuaded that Mr. Cheyne's present position is really untenable. Its essence lies in his view of the person of Christ. The subjective justification of this view he is of necessity unable to communicate. Its objective justification lies in some vague and indefinite conception of the authority of the Bible. "The editors of the Scripture," he assures us,

* Vol. II., p. 184. Mr. Cheyne also refers to Mark xv. 28, "And the scripture was fulfilled which saith, And he was numbered with the transgressors" but he does not notice that this verse is omitted by all the best MSS.

"were inspired; there is no maintaining the authority of the Bible without this postulate."* We do not know what precise ideas Mr. Cheyne attaches to the terms *inspiration* and *authority of the Bible*. But it is in the last degree unsatisfactory to be told that the authority of the Bible—one unknown quantity—rests on the inspiration—another unknown quantity—of a body of men whose character, principles, and methods of literary treatment are so many more unknown quantities. The Bible, we have all heard, is not one book: it is a collection of books; and there is really no middle course between taking it as it stands and believing it all through from cover to cover, and dealing with it as we should with any other collection of ancient literature. Mr. Cheyne has no hesitation in freely criticising the form of the prophetic discourses, and suggesting an omission here and a gloss there. He recognises with equal candour some of the prophetic limitations. He sees in Isaiah's hopes of revenge on the hereditary enemies of Israel the wishes of a "less advanced stage of morality;" he corrects the views of the Prophet of the Captivity about the religious character of Cyrus by the inscriptions which reveal his concessions to idolatrous polytheism. Surely by so doing he indicates unmistakably that he regards the authority of the Bible as depending on something very different from the inspiration of the Soferim. Its vaticinations must be surrendered if they do not accord with history; its ideals must be condemned if they do not harmonise with the highest witness of the conscience. The authority of the Bible really consists in the repeated verification of its teachings by experience. It reposes on the multitudinous testimony of all those to whom in succeeding generations it has spoken for rebuke and comfort, in whom it has quickened aspiration, or nourished peace and trust. The theory of the "God-man Jesus Christ"

* Vol. II., p. 205.

we believe to be out of the reach of verification in this manner. It does not lie among the perceptions of the soul, so far as we can discern, to distinguish the persons in the Deity, or to detect the union of two natures in one person. But the value of the prophetic teaching is not, therefore, impaired for us. The forms of their expectations change; the conditions of their realisation pass away; but the mighty truths of the moral government of the world, of the righteousness and love of God, are reiterated to us in myriad ways as the life of humanity advances; and faith, once led into the sanctuary of holiness, recognises them as a possession for ever.

J. ESTLIN CARPENTER.

THE OBLIGATIONS OF DOCTRINAL SUBSCRIPTION:

A DISCUSSION.—II.

NONE of those who have preceded me in this discussion allude to the judicial decisions in the various ecclesiastical cases. Yet some of these are of primary importance. Any one signing a bond would naturally ask, *not* "What do these words appear to me to mean?" but rather, "What is their legal significance, and is this significance clearly understood by the parties with whom my contract is made?" The opinion of a law-court upon a theological question is of little or no value, but on the interpretation of a contract it is of prime importance.

Thus a low churchman who believes that *only some* of the baptised are "regenerate" might hesitate to "assent" to the Book of Common Prayer, which applies that epithet to them *all*. But he knows that the Gorham judgment has plainly declared his views not to be inconsistent with the ordination contract. He knows that this judgment has been tacitly accepted by the Church and by the nation. He makes no secret of his opinions, and it would be absurd to charge him with dishonesty.

Similarly the high churchman who believes in the objective presence of Christ's actual body and blood in the Sacramental elements, need not trouble himself to reconcile his views with the black rubric or the Article on Transubstantiation: for the Bennett judgment has authoritatively declared such an opinion not to be inconsistent with his contract; and those who deny his right to make an honest

assent are setting themselves up as supreme interpreters, with a more than papal infallibility.

So again, the judgment in the "Essays and Reviews" cases is sufficient justification to a broad churchman for not letting his disbelief (for instance) in the infallibility of Scripture prevent his signing the solemn contract which a candidate for ordination is required to make.

My first proposition, then, is this. Our assent as clergymen is given to the Doctrine of the Church of England, as this Church and Realm have received the same, and not as we (still less as Mr. Crosskey) might interpret it.

But there are many points on which no judicial interpretation of the contract has been given. The position of those who dissent in any direction from the popular theology is in these cases a more delicate one. A candidate for ordination seems to me bound (in such cases) to make his opinions known to the Bishop. No honest man would wish to sign a bond which should be differently understood by the contracting parties. Now, the bishop is the representative both of the State and of the Church. Wisely or unwisely, he is the official appointed to inquire into the opinions of those who seek Holy Orders. He is, therefore, the interpreter, in the first instance, of the *animus impo-*
nentis, and would, I suppose, be liable to prosecution if he betrayed his trust.

There still remains the case of a clergyman whose opinions have changed since his ordination. Such an one is not, in my opinion, under any obligation to secede unless his new views are either such as have been condemned by a judicial decision (*e.g.*, by that in the *Voysey* case), or such that, so far as he can judge, they would prevent a bishop from accepting him as a candidate if he were still a layman. No doubt, a man is a bad judge in a matter where his own interests and position are concerned. But it must be remembered that he is always liable to a prosecution for

heresy; and if he makes no secret of his opinions, and honestly believes that the law-courts would sustain him in his position, and would affirm that he was not violating his ordination contract, it seems to me absurd to charge him in any way with dishonesty.

Let me next say a few words on the other and wholly distinct issue which has been raised in this discussion, viz., whether it is desirable to maintain any (and if so what) system of Subscription? Mr. Sarson and "A" agree that a religion should be based not merely on exalted aspirations, but on something of the nature of a fact. But the latter would limit this basis to the two facts—"Man craves for intercourse with God," "God enters into communion with man." Every theist would, I suppose, recognise these two facts as fundamental. But an overwhelming majority of those who call themselves Christians place a third dogma theoretically almost and practically altogether on a level with these two. I allude, of course, to the doctrine that God has manifested Himself in Christ. If Christ ceased to be an object of worship, the practical religion of most Christians would be revolutionised. Mr. Stopford Brooke at once resigned his position in the Church when he found himself out of harmony with this doctrine, and though there may be a few broad church clergymen who do not believe in the Incarnation, the majority make it the very centre of their theology. If Parliament were to declare this to be an open question in the National Church it would be soon seen whether the "loaves and fishes" of the establishment are really the things which keep the clergy in it.

A defence of Subscription (either in its present or in some other form) will, perhaps, be thought the logical outcome of my argument. But, for reasons which I will now indicate, this is not my own conclusion. No Subscription could keep out a dishonest person who wished to be ordained, and the case of honest candidates seems to me to be best met by (a)

the exercise of the Bishop's discretion ; (b) the answers in the ordination services ; (c) the obligatory use of the Liturgy ; (d) the possibility of a prosecution for heresy.

Believing that the Divine Spirit is leading the Church into all truth, I consider it a matter of regret that a formal assent should be required to certain fixed propositions. If an honest candidate can satisfy the bishop of his fitness ; if he is ready to answer such very general and yet very solemn questions as these (from the Ordination Service) : " Do you think that you are truly called according to . . . *the due order of this realm*" (and in the ordination of priests "*according to the order of this Church of England*") " to the ministry of this Church ? " ; if he remains in sufficient harmony with the spirit of the Liturgy to be honestly able to use its services day by day—his intellect or his conscience must be of an eccentric kind if an assent, declared at his ordination, to the doctrine of the Church, would afford any additional security for his orthodoxy. The abolition of the present Subscription would, I suppose, afford some relief to a very few tender consciences. It would remove some of the scandal caused (whether justifiably or not) by the fact that men of divergent views declare their assent to the same Articles of Belief. But it would not, unless accompanied by other and far more sweeping alterations, have any appreciable effect upon the latitude of opinion tolerated in the Established Church.

J. E. SYMES.

LIMITS of space compel me to concentrate my attention on the position of one only of the two very different schools of " Broad Churchmanship " which have been represented in this discussion. Mr. Sarson and Mr. Symes consider that their opinions are really in harmony, in a general way, with the true meaning of the formularies

to which they have assented, and only plead that those formularies ought to be interpreted in such a way as to be self-consistent, and have, in fact, been so interpreted partly by the Civil Courts, and partly by the Bishops, in their examinations of individual candidates. They emphatically repudiate the notion that the Church of England either is, or ought to be, a creedless and colourless body; and Mr. Symes even appears to intimate that he should himself leave the Church if Parliament were to declare the Incarnation an open question. For the sake of clearing the main issue between Supernaturalism and Anti-Supernaturalism, I should have been rather glad than otherwise to be convinced by their arguments that the Church on whose side they would naturally fight had really been wise enough to include them. I cannot say that their arguments have had that effect with me, but I must leave it to others to give them that careful consideration which they certainly require, while I confine myself to the simpler, but also far graver, issue raised by Mr. Haweis and Mr. Voysey.

Mr. Haweis disapproves of a clergyman's resigning his position in the National Church who asserts the incredibility of miracles in general, and of the Gospel accounts of the birth of Christ in particular, and who denies the exclusive authority of Church or Bible, the Divinity of Christ, and the doctrine of the Atonement; while Mr. Voysey takes credit to himself for having, while still a beneficed clergyman, contrived "to preach a religion which could dispense with the intervention of Jesus Christ, without verbal contradiction of a single line in the legal formularies" (No. V., p. 86). We have here an issue of almost startling plainness, and it really does seem important that it should be disposed of finally and completely before proceeding further.

But we are met at the outset by a plea on the part of Mr. Voysey, which I am not quite sure that I rightly

understand. He tells us that "this question is so entirely one for individual consciences to decide, that we have no right to decide it for them;" and that "if a man . . . feels it to be his duty to stay and do his best, no one should dare to impugn his integrity, on the ground of some abstract theory, which is upset by actually existing conditions;" those conditions being the self-contradictory nature of the formularies subscribed, the indulgent construction put upon them by the living representatives of the body which imposes them, and the fact that the alleged obligation is equally disregarded by other parties in the Church. If this merely means, that each man must ultimately decide for himself what is his duty under these or any other conditions, and that it behoves bystanders who are disposed to condemn his conduct to recognise their own fallibility, and give him all reasonable credit for good intentions, this is, of course, very true; but how does it distinguish the case from others in which people in general think it right to contribute their confessedly fallible judgments towards the formation of a collective public opinion? If there be any reason why we should be more reticent about the ethics of Church Conformity and doctrinal subscription than about the ethics of the Stock Exchange, I fail to gather it from Mr. Voysey's remarks. If he means that this particular question of morality is peculiarly doubtful and difficult, more difficult (say) than the question whether the directors of a company are justified in issuing a false balance-sheet in order to tide over a financial crisis, that is a matter which I must leave to the reader.

The real simplicity of the question is somewhat obscured by the terms in which it has been here proposed for discussion. "The obligation of doctrinal subscription" would naturally suggest the notion that the duty of a clergyman to retain or resign his position depends upon the interpretation of the so-called contract which he made with the State

by subscribing the statutory declaration under 28 and 29 Vict., c. 122. In point of fact, this subscription is the very smallest element in the case. Mr. Symes has seen this, though Mr. Voysey apparently has not; and I have the express permission of the Editor to direct attention to the points at which the shoe really pinches. These are (1) the Ordination Service, and (2), principally, the use of the Liturgy.

The Form for the Ordering of Priests is strangely quoted by Mr. Voysey as favouring his contention that a clergyman is justified in preaching a religion without the intervention of Jesus or the authority of Scripture. If your readers will refer to the questions and answers, still more, if they read them in connection with the preceding exhortation, I think they will agree with me that a person could hardly pledge himself in a more solemn and absolute manner to a belief in Christ as the Divine and only Saviour of mankind, and in the Scriptures as the supreme and exclusive authority in matters of faith. It will hardly be contended that these principles are unmeaning or contradicted by other parts of the formularies, nor that the adjurations, "Do you think in your heart?" "Are you determined?" &c., mean only that you will not directly contradict them in a way that a court of law can take cognisance of. The whole tenor of the service refutes the notion that the priest's commission is to teach truth in the abstract as it may appear to himself.

Will it be argued that, however absolute these pledges may have been as to the candidate's then present state of mind, he cannot without absurdity be supposed to have pledged himself never to change his mind; that it would be a cruel mockery to confer on him what purports to be a benefice during life and good behaviour, if it were really liable to be forfeited in consequence of a change which he could neither foresee nor control; consequently, that it

must have been intended that he should retain the emoluments notwithstanding his inability to do what was expected of him, especially as, under the old law, his orders would have been indelible, and would have precluded him from secular employment? I answer; this might be a reason why the law should allow the clergyman who has become a rationalist to retain his benefice, paying a properly qualified curate to do the duty, just as if he had been incapacitated by ill-health; it could not possibly justify his doing, in his official capacity, the very reverse of what he was commissioned to do. Since the law, unfortunately, does not take the indulgent course here suggested, but treats his heresy as a crime, there is nothing more to be said than that it is a hard bargain, which a young man should consider well before entering into.

But even if we were to get rid altogether of the notion of plighted faith, a far deeper obstacle would remain, in the obligatory use of a fixed Liturgy. We have here no mere question of contractual obligation, but of irreverence towards God, and trifling with the best feelings of presumably simple and confiding people—men, women, and children—who have been directed to you for spiritual guidance. Either public worship is the expression of sentiments profoundly felt by those who take part in it, or it is a worse than frivolous waste of time. A minister who invites his congregation to join him, or to use him as their mouth-piece, in addressing to the Almighty language which to him is fundamentally false, is surely doing them a wrong for which nothing that he can say in the pulpit or do out of doors can possibly compensate. If he shows by his sermons that the previous performance was to him a sham, he has done his best to destroy for them whatever comfort there is in genuine worship; it is, of course, still worse if he suits the sermon to the prayers, and plays the hypocrite in both.

I am careful to say "fundamentally false," because I am aware that a Liturgy prescribed by the State cannot possibly be an exact reflection of the sentiments of all who are to use it, and I cannot now examine the questions, whether such fixed Liturgies are necessary in a State Church to protect the laity against the caprices of ministers who are independent of their congregations, and how far, if so, that ought to tell against the principle of Establishment. It is sufficient for the present purpose to point out that all untrue language uttered in devotion must have a more or less demoralising effect, but that an elaborate worship framed throughout to express a theory of God's relations to man which the worshipper entirely rejects, must be worse than no worship at all. Now, to me, at least, it seems abundantly manifest that the intervention of Jesus, under the miraculous circumstances recorded in the Gospels and summarised in the Creeds, is the very thread on which the whole series of services is strung, and that to one who disbelieves these facts the greater part is little better than a senseless mummary. It is implied throughout that to commemorate this stupendous mystery is the main reason for the worshippers coming together, and that it is this, and this alone, which emboldens them to address the Almighty as their Father. The exclusive authority of Scripture, as the source of information concerning matters necessary to be known but inaccessible to the unassisted human intelligence, is also assumed throughout, in a manner equally unmistakable. The Apostles' Creed in the ordinary daily services, the Nicene Creed in the Communion Service, are made as distinctly the central points of the whole, as the show of hands on the principal resolution is the central point of the proceedings at a public meeting.

ROLAND K. WILSON.

AS a layman, and looking at the matter with the plain, straightforward common-sense that is supposed to belong to my class, I fail to appreciate the difficulty which Clerical Subscription appears to be once more causing. To hear persons talk, it might be supposed that the clergy were the only members of the community of whom the thing was required; whereas the simple truth is that Subscription, or its equivalent, is demanded of almost every one at some period or other. The Coronation Oath of the Sovereign, the oath of allegiance which is required of every recruit who enters her army, the marriage vow, the temperance pledge—to mention no other examples—include the greater part of the body politic, from its lowest strata to its culminating point. It is quite true that moral and social duties do not spring from the actual or implied promises which people make; but a universal instinct has taught mankind that a person will be more likely to realise the obligations which rest upon him, if he be called upon to recite them and to declare that he will fulfil them to the best of his ability.

If this be so, why should the clergy, whose responsibilities transcend those of almost any other class, and who are less amenable than any other to an exterior forum—why should they be an exception to the rule? I see but one answer to this question—that of Mr. Crosskey, who says that “Subscription presents the greatest of all obstacles to the existence of a broad, comprehensive Church in this country;” that it “drives many of the ablest from the ministry”; and that “it checks the free study of theology, restricting, as it does, the pursuit of that sum of all sciences by conditions which neither astronomer, nor chemist, nor any other student of nature, would for one moment accept.”

If this be really true, the cause is finished, for it would be impossible to conceive a more unanswerable case than

is here made out for Subscription. It must be remembered that the Church is not a *Phrontistêrion*, or "thinking-shop," nor a *dépôt* for the manufacturing or vending of subtleties, nor a scheme of endowed research. It is, and always has been, a divine institution for teaching a definite creed, divinely revealed, and for the pastoral care of the flock of Christ. "O Timothy, keep that which is committed to thy trust, avoiding profane and vain babblings and oppositions of science falsely so-called," has always been, and always will be, the charge which the Master gives to the stewards of His mysteries. If, then, Subscription has the effect of keeping the Church of England and her clergy to their work, it is the most admirable invention that could possibly have been devised. And as for the "able men" whom it excludes from the ministry, surely if ever the well-worn saw, "*Non tali auxilio*" applied, it applies to them. We do not want teachers, however gifted, who have themselves to learn the lesson they profess to impart.

But it is said that Subscription is "futile," because while it may keep out honest doubters, it is useless as a defence against dishonest men who are seeking holy orders for an improper purpose. Even then it would be a standing call to the offender to repent, and a standing warning to the community against his teaching. Shakespeare speaks of

One

Who having to untruth by telling it,
Made such a sinner of his memory
To credit his own lie ;

and it is quite conceivable that a man may cherish a craze till he is convinced that it is not merely true, but a truth of surpassing importance. It is only in this way that I can account for the extraordinary notions which Mr. Haweis has lately published on the obligations of the clergy with regard to the Book of Common Prayer. I cannot pretend within the

space at my disposal to touch in the lightest way upon more than one detail ; but his congregation have the volume in their hands to which he has pledged his assent ; they can look at the Apostles' Creed wherein every man, woman, and child declares his belief in the resurrection of the " body "—or " the flesh "—as it is in the Baptismal Office, and the service for the Visitation of the Sick—they will see that the reverend gentleman is bound a dozen times every year to recite the words :—" At Whose coming all men shall rise again with their bodies ;" and they know that when he attends a funeral he has to read St. Paul's great exposition in 1 Cor. xv. When, therefore, he tries to make them believe that he is pledged only to admit the immortality of the soul, they will know what to think of him. If Subscription be " a life-long trouble and torment to the most delicately conscientious souls," it is just what was intended ; for the Church never meant her ministers to be comfortable while they were holding the reverse of what they had contracted to teach. As for Mr. Voysey's " contradictory propositions," if they are like the example he gives, namely, " the presence in the Creeds and Articles of both Monotheism and Tritheism," they are too ridiculous to call for refutation. Every time he looks at an object he has a practical demonstration of the fallacy on which he relies ; for each eye has presented to it a perfectly distinct and independent spectrum, and yet he sees not two spectra, but one spectrum ;—" one, not by confusion of the images, but by unity of perception." Thus even in the order of nature, it cannot be said that there is necessarily any contradiction in the statement that a thing is at once one, and more than one.

As regards schools of thought, they may, no doubt, at times appear to break away from their engagements ; but they fare as the mighty salmon which has fallen into the hands of a skilful angler. They may rush hither and

thither in the wildest freedom ; but the hook is in their jaws, and the line of an honest intent holds them fast. Their Subscription may appear for the moment to be powerless, but sooner or later it will bring them to bank ; for there is the patent fact that they made the profession to which they have set their hand, and people will ask them—nay, they will ask themselves—"Is the gloss which you have put upon it really what the words imply?"

But here, I suppose, I shall be met with a *tu quoque*. I may be asked, "Is it not notorious that your friends, the Oxford Tract-writers, invented the doctrine that the Thirty-nine Articles might be taken in a 'non-natural sense' ? And is not, then, the very existence of your school a *reductio ad absurdum*, on the largest scale, of the whole system of Subscription?"

My reply is a very simple one : What the Tractarians did was not to introduce a non-natural, but to restore the natural, sense of the Articles. In *Tract XC.*, Cardinal Newman made an honest and successful attempt to set forth their true meaning ; but he put it forward only as a possible interpretation, and there is always something that grates upon one's moral sense, in attempting to place upon an engagement any construction but that which it was originally supposed to have. The truth, however, is, that, without knowing it, the Cardinal had hit upon the very *animus imponentis*.

For just look at the facts. The Articles must be considered virtually to have synchronised with the Liturgy of Queen Elizabeth, and as they are declared to have been framed "for the avoiding of diversities of opinion, and for the establishment of consent touching true religion," it is clear that their object must have been to establish peace, not between different schools of the New Learning, but between the New Learning and the Old. It should also be borne in mind that 98 per cent. of the Marian clergy had

accepted the Prayer-Book in 1559, and that in order to bring this about, important changes had been made in the Second Book of King Edward VI., which was the one substantially revived. Thus the deprecation, "From the tyranny of the Bishop of Rome and all his detestable enormities," was omitted from the Litany; the ancient words at the delivery of the Sacrament were restored; and the Ornaments Rubric was enacted, which in effect directed that nothing should be changed in the apparatus of Divine worship, provided always that nothing which would have been illegal when the Prayer-Book of 1549 came into use, should be held to have been authorised by the new Act of Uniformity. To suggest that, while all this was done to conciliate the men of the Old Learning, a set of Articles conceived in the spirit of the Church Association was forced upon the clergy, is ridiculous. Nay, more:—Article XXXVI., which every clerical member of the "Persecution Company, Limited," has signed, declares that the Ordinal of the second year of King Edward VI. contained nothing "superstitious" or "ungodly"; and this is equivalent to saying that all the practices revived by the Ritualists, whatever may be thought of their legality, are in themselves innocent.*

But I must not attempt to go through the "anti-Roman Articles," or say more than that it is a pure mistake to suppose that there is anything in them at which the Highest Churchman need stumble. What they do is to condemn palpable errors and abuses, which the Council of Trent also did its best to put down, or to substitute new and, as it was believed, more expedient, definitions of old truths.† The

* For the details see a leaflet, "Neither Superstitious nor Ungodly." (G. J. Palmer.) The same publisher has also issued a small volume entitled, "Words for Peace," to which I must refer my readers for a High Church exposition of the Articles generally.

† The only expression in the Anti-Roman Articles which perplexes me is the statement in Art. XXV. that the "five commonly called sacraments"

Church of England speaks with no stammering lips upon any point of vital doctrine, but it is both her pride and her wisdom to have abstained from unnecessary refinements, where neither the Word of God nor Catholic antiquity has spoken.

What I have advanced respecting the Thirty-nine Articles applies with equal force to the Prayer-Book at large. The notion that it is a compromise in the sense that one party gives up a little of what it believes to be true, and the other admits a little of what it thinks to be false, is quite unfounded. Protestants who know nothing about Primitive Christianity, see that the Prayer-Book is almost all Bible, and fall into ecstasies over "our beautiful and eminently Scriptural Liturgy." On the other hand, Catholics are not less delighted to find that the Church passed through the cataclysm of the sixteenth century without suffering material loss; but these two feelings do not involve any sacrifice of the truth on either side. It is natural that the sudden revival of unfamiliar tenets, ornaments, or practices, should make a prodigious ferment; but the number of once hotly-contested points which have already settled themselves is remarkable, and the impossibility of keeping up the old partition-wall fills the small handful of "irreconcilables" with rage and despair. There is some-

have "grown partly of the corrupt following of the Apostles," for it so happens that the Church of England retains four of them, and has never condemned the fifth. It seems to me that this Article must have suffered in committee like the Act of Parliament which ordered an offence, previously punishable with a money fine, to be visited with a whipping, but which neglected to remove the direction that half the penalty should go to the Queen, and half to the informer. To make sense of it, we must understand the statement to refer only to what is peculiarly Romish, and in that case I should have no hesitation in saying that Confirmation had been corrupted by Rome in her substitution of a slap on the face for the laying on of hands; Penance by her system of Indulgences; Orders by her invention of Papal Supremacy; Matrimony by the introduction of frivolous impediments to marriage whereby the rich might get the *vinculum* dissolved under the false pretence that lawful wedlock had never existed; Unction of the sick by converting it into the unction of the dying.

thing wonderful in the promptness with which the Public Worship Regulation Act has been followed by the recent debates in Convocation, by the *articulus cleri* of the Lower House, and by the resolution of the Bishops. In fact, we are infinitely nearer a realisation of the theory which the Reformers of 1559 proposed to themselves, than Archbishop Parker could ever have supposed possible. But if we had not had a Liturgy, and if Subscription to it had not been rigidly enforced, would there ever have been that substantial unity which already exists amongst Churchmen, and the prospect there is of a yet more assured peace?

A HIGH CHURCH JOURNALIST.

INTERVENING, as I do, at a somewhat late stage of this discussion, I should like to state clearly the particular part of the subject on which I shall try to throw some additional light. In the paper that opened the debate two questions were raised [which, I think, should be kept quite distinct; (1) whether it is desirable that Subscription to articles of faith should be imposed on the ministers of the Church of England, or of any other religious body; and (2) what is the precise nature of the obligations that such Subscription involves? It does not seem to me that the former of these points is one on which persons who diverge widely in theology can hope to come to an agreement, until they have first reconciled their theological differences. That Subscription is in many individual cases both a source of painful and perplexing struggles, and a snare to weak consciences, few reasonable persons will deny; but the question whether these evils are not more than counter-balanced by gain in other ways is one which we can hardly help answering differently according to the view we take of the importance of the traditional dogmas of Christian theology to religion and morality. When, however, we pass to

consider what, assuming Subscription and recital of creeds to continue, is the precise duty of an individual subscribing or reciting, we are dealing with a far simpler and narrower issue, which seems to admit of being determined by the application of principles generally accepted by conscientious persons, whether within or without the pale of our existing Churches.

It may, indeed, be said that there are as many and various schools of ethics as there are of theology; and that the duties of veracity and good faith are inculcated with very different degrees of stringency by different moralists. And this is doubtless true; it has been held, for example, by writers of repute (other than Jesuits) that these rules ought, under certain circumstances, to give way to maxims of superior obligation; that, for instance, falsehoods may be told to criminals, or to enemies, or in defence of secrets, and that promises made to robbers may be broken; and even—what has, perhaps, a closer analogy to the case under discussion—that at a crisis of national existence an oath of allegiance may be taken with the conscious intention of violating it when a fitting opportunity occurs. But moralists of all schools will, I think, agree that an unvarnished declaration, solemnly made, as a means of obtaining or keeping a post of trust and responsibility in any society, is a procedure, morally speaking, of a revolutionary character,—which can only be justified, if it can be justified at all, by showing very important results of general advantage to be obtained in this and in no other way. And in a state of society like our own, in which there are so many other means of influencing human opinion on the most important subjects besides those afforded by the pulpits of the Church of England, if the question is fairly faced, whether the danger of excluding a certain number of thoughtful persons from these pulpits constitutes an emergency so grave as to justify an admitted violation of

the rules of veracity and good faith, few, I think, will be found to reply in the affirmative. Indeed, I do not perceive that such an answer is ever expressly given by Mr. Haweis, Mr. Voysey, or any other thoroughgoing defender of what has been called the "Loose Church." In what they say there is often the suggestion of such an answer; but the suggestion is generally blended with an endeavour to show that the ordinary rules of veracity and good faith, as applied under the peculiar circumstances of Subscription to articles and recital of formularies, necessarily become so lax as hardly to hamper the freest theological thought. That there are certain peculiarities in the application of these rules under the circumstances in question is undeniable; and I think that if we can make clear what these are, and what is the reasonable method of dealing with them according to the received principles of morality, though we shall not (in my opinion) have completely solved the ethical problem presented, we shall certainly have gone a long way towards solving it.

The peculiarities of the case are tolerably obvious. Generally speaking, in the use of language either for affirmations or for promises, a man is free to choose his own words; he can vary them or add to them as much as he pleases, until they seem to him to express with sufficient exactness what he believes, or intends to undertake. In some cases, no doubt, he has to adapt his thoughts to words selected by others; as when a set question is put to him to be answered, or a set promise to be taken. But, even so, if he finds any ambiguity in the words proposed to him, he has, generally speaking, no difficulty in getting it removed by an interpretation of the person who addresses him. Now in the case that we are considering, individual choice of words is, of course, absent; and at first it does not seem easy to obtain an interpretation of phrases whose meaning we find ambiguous. The statements made are

addressed to society at large; but how are we to know how society understands them, as many members of it have obviously never thought about the matter, while many others give evidence of holding very diverse opinions about it?

Here, however, I quite agree with Mr. Symes that the difficulty is removed by judicial decisions, so far as these go. The Subscription, and the recital of creeds, being imposed by the law of England must be taken as addressed to the people of England as politically organised and acting through their Government; and of the intentions of Government in all its legislative acts the courts of law are the recognised interpreters. There seems to me, therefore, no doubt that, as is often said, "the legal obligation of Subscription is the measure of the moral one."

In applying this maxim, however, there is danger of a confusion of thought, to which I wish especially to direct attention, because many writers appear to me to fall into it. It is only incidentally, and often only by implication, that an ecclesiastical judgment answers the general question, "What doctrine a subscriber to the articles is bound to hold": what it primarily decides is "whether A B can be proved to have violated his obligation." It must be evident that the two questions are quite distinct; that the answers to them are determined by quite different methods of reasoning; and that it is the answer to the former and not to the latter question which is reasonably held to supply a measure for the *moral* obligation of Subscription. The ecclesiastical courts have given no support to the view that a man who solemnly declares his "assent" to articles or his "belief" in creeds should be taken to mean no more than that he *consents* to have his teaching tried by the standard of these articles: in fact, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council has by implication denied this paradoxical position, in laying down that the words of any test imposed are to be

understood in their "literal and grammatical sense,"* since there is no doubt that, according to the ordinary usage of language, the phrase, "I assent," applied to an aggregate of propositions, imports a mental acceptance of these propositions; no less than the words, "I believe in Jesus Christ, who was born of the Virgin Mary," import a mental conviction as to a certain historical matter of fact. This being so, to maintain that the *moral* obligation of a man who has declared his "assent" to or his "belief" in statements of doctrine† is merely to avoid furnishing adequate evidence that he has advisedly contravened them, is exactly as absurd as it would be to maintain that a man must be innocent of a murder, if it cannot be shown to the satisfaction of a jury that he has committed it, especially since the evidence of his contravention is properly estimated according to the lenient principles of the administration of criminal law, so that the person accused gets the full advantage of any vagueness or uncertainty in his expressions.

Hence, though I quite agree with Mr. Symes that the decisions of the Privy Council, especially in the case of Dr. Williams and Mr. Wilson, have had the effect of relaxing the *moral* obligation of Subscription—since the most scrupulous man need not now have any fear that in assenting to the articles and creeds he will be understood to pledge himself to a belief in verbal inspiration or everlasting punishment—I yet think that the relaxation, when fairly estimated, is much less than what loose Churchmen have often loosely inferred from the failure of the prosecution of the two clergymen.

* Cf., Judgment in the case "Gorham v. The Bishop of Exeter."

† I ought to say that it seems to me a doubtful point whether assent to articles morally obliges to more than *present* belief. The point, however, is not of much practical importance as regards all of such doctrines as are contained in the creeds, in which persons performing clerical functions are obliged continually to *reassert* their belief.

Finally, so far as doubts may remain with regard to points that the ecclesiastical judgments have not particularly dealt with, the best way of healing them is for each individual to apply to the best of his ability the general principles laid down in these judgments for interpreting the legal obligation of Subscription. The statement of these principles (see especially the case of *Gorham v. the Bishop of Exeter*) is too long to quote; but, apart from their judicial authority, they seem to me intrinsically such as would be adopted by a fair-minded man who was considering without bias the question of moral obligation. If any candidate for orders found a difficulty in applying them, it would doubtless be wise for him to consult his bishop, as has been more than once suggested in the course of this discussion. But when Mr. Sarson commends this course on the ground of the superiority of a "living man" to "written formularies," his language is dangerously liable to suggest that the "living man" has some authority to dispense from the moral obligation which the formularies, interpreted according to the ordinary rules for interpreting legal documents, would impose. Now the law gives a bishop no such dispensing power; and therefore if any bishop has exercised it, this can only have been by a usurpation manifestly illegitimate and, in my opinion, demoralising. All the bishop can lawfully do is to assist the candidate to a faithful—though not over-scrupulous—interpretation of the articles and creeds,* taken in their "literal and grammatical" sense.

HENRY SIDGWICK.

* Throughout this paper I have used the phrase "articles and creeds" instead of articles and liturgy, because I conceive that—at any rate, since the judgment in the case of *Gorham v. the Bishop of Exeter*—the rules of interpretation of devotional expressions must be understood to differ considerably from, and generally to be less stringent than, the rules for interpreting formal statements of belief.

THE writers who have preceded me have confined their attention to the Subscribing Churches, but the problem emerges in still more subtle and interesting form in connection with the Non-Subscribing Churches. All of these feel the difficulty more or less, but it is in my own denomination—the Independent—that its pressure is becoming most severe. The tendency of the officials, and of the able and popular men who represent the body most conspicuously, is to minimise any variety of opinion which threatens to destroy that organisation which is fast becoming their religious ideal. Nevertheless, few outside that circle can avoid seeing that we are on the verge of what may be a very serious conflict between the free and spiritual genius of Independency, and a doctrinal orthodoxy which produces and supports for its purpose an organisation foreign to that genius. The question of the relation of Independency as a spiritual principle to a doctrinal basis of union has never yet been fairly raised or faced. When the great triumphs of Independency were gained, the doctrinal basis was universally accepted, and the variety of opinion amongst those who held it was of a type that now seems very mild. But the idea (for it is in the true and explosive sense an idea) of Independency is now, in the general disintegration of theological belief, beginning to emerge naked and radiant from the foam of subsiding systems. And to many the vision is a terror. Like the Protestantism whose true voice it is, it is beginning to be felt charged with a promise and a potency of life undreamt of by its founders and eulogists. The Independency and the orthodoxy which used to be synonyms are slowly settling into alternatives, and some have already made their choice. By the organised portion of the body—i.e., by the majority—Independency has been surrendered in favour of an imperfect presbytery, and there

seems little doubt that this is welcomed, if it is not originated, in the interest of theological orthodoxy. "Protestantism dreads its own logic."

The present writer is a believer in theology and in the necessity for a theological system as the sustenance of religious thought, and, in the long-run, life. If we discard a divine synthesis, we shall but sink to the other sea of Mr. Harrison's human synthesis. If we cannot co-ordinate humanity with God, we shall co-ordinate Humanity into a God. So, in my own view, for a Church to dispense with a theology is both suicidal and absurd: But that is not the question. The question is, What position in a Church is the theological system to hold? Is it to be a bond of comprehension or is it to be the outcome, flower, and scientific fruit of a community permeated with the Christian consciousness? Is it to be the germ or one of the blossoms of the mind of Christ?

Now Independency has held, and still mostly holds, that doctrinal unity or correctness of system, in a more or less modified sense, is the condition of comprehension. The theology of Independency is not its product simply, but of its essence. It is a test, not a culture. But the Independent spirit has asserted itself thus far, that it shall be left to each one to discover for himself what the theology is which while in the denomination he can honourably hold. So that we have this state of things. The comprehension of the body is defined by a doctrinal bond which, however, is undefined. It is left for adjustment to what is known as the "tacit understanding." The difference between the Subscribing and the Non-Subscribing Churches, therefore, appears to be that, while both insist on a doctrinal rather than a sympathetic bond, the former define it more or less clearly, the latter, with a curious bourgeois mixture of shrewdness and timidity, refuse any definition to which they can be pinned, and leave the taciturnity of their

understanding to be interpreted according to the associations or prepossessions of this or that local gathering or set.

Strange as it may seem, the Congregational Union has of late years devolved its powers in a way that must act most injuriously on the freedom it is understood highly to prize. It has placed its comprehension entirely in the hands of the local associations. But it has not supplied these smaller bodies with any theological instructions to guide so great a power, or to protect applicants on the side of freedom in time of panic and prejudice. It has even, through fear of presbytery, disclaimed the function of a court of appeal, so that *the smaller bodies are totally irresponsible for the use of this power*, except to public opinion. And as much of the business is conducted by private committees, public opinion has no access, and officialism is secure. Some things, no doubt, are better discussed in private; but cases of comprehension are certainly not. The committee may be small in numbers, or local in mind and prejudice. The proportion may be large of the lay element, whose judgment in such cases is as secondary in value as for mischief it may be primary. And generally it may be said that a local majority is one of the worst depositaries for religious freedom that could be devised. Whereas, except in the interest of religious freedom, Independency has no separate call or special facility for existing.

Such a state of things is in unstable equilibrium. The movement is a half-measure which it is as necessary as it is dangerous either to reverse or develop. It is due to able and honourable men who, however, as reorganisers of a Church have fatal defects. They have never claimed religious genius or philosophic breadth, or any profound acquaintance with constitutional history, with the theology of the past or with the thought of the present. I believe in Independency, but I do not see how it can live in these conditions. If there is a doctrinal basis,

it ought to be, it must be, distinctly formulated, and not merely declared, but authoritatively adopted. A doctrinal basis which is incapable of statement is a contradiction. It is its spiritual halo that cannot be defined, the actinism of the dogmatic spectrum. To refuse to define it for the sake of a reputation for freedom is not quite fair, either to the world or to its own adherents, especially the young, to whom is denied the first condition of honesty. A doctrinal basis implies, unless wholly mystical, a creed, and a creed implies Subscription. Adoption which is not authoritative and binding is futile. It is "playing at Church." We must, therefore, pass from a creed to an organisation, which shall see that the creed, as its palladium, is held. If the Church is built on a system, it must, by the inexorable dialectic of history, issue in a system. Institutions are but thought visualised. Their wreck is but their internal self-contradictions made audible. If political history be a vision of moral judgment, constitutional history is a process of logical exposure. An organised theology, where it is the staple, means an organised Church. If theology, therefore, is the bond, Independency is impossible. And the mistake we are making is to suppose that it is possible. And we let ourselves be blinded by the gleam of freedom in the words "tacit understanding" till we lose sight of the thing in its hollowness, weakness, and readiness for abuse.

I say little here about the claim to spiritual freedom made by a body whose oldest pulpits, including nearly all that are over forty or fifty years, are hampered by trust deeds with ponderous doctrinal schedules. But the late Huddersfield case has made one thing terribly clear. *There is not a single occupant of a pulpit swathed in such documents, whether he has signed them or not, who, if he depart from the least of their commandments, does not owe his position to immoral connivance and breach of faith on the*

part of his trustees—men whom it is his duty week by week to rouse to a moral state that would shoot him from his place. He is like a man sitting and hammering on a lump of dynamite which he takes to be a fragment of stony heart.

But this matter has been elsewhere sufficiently discussed. I return to the unwritten formulary. This, it is said, guarantees doctrinal unity, not spiritual or merely Christian unity, but substantial theological unity, coupled with true Christian freedom. I have already said that a doctrinal basis of communion, and such an understanding, are in the logic of the thing incompatible. An organisation based on distinct articles or doctrines ought to schedule them and exact them. But, in actual fact, it may, in the first place, be doubted, whether this tacit understanding really exists and is not deceiving itself and others. Space alone forbids my entering on facts that would give grave ground for such a doubt.* Conceding, however, that it does really exist, it is still more doubtful if it does virtually, owing to the difficulty of discovering what it is with such exactness as becomes imperative when it is employed justly to define comprehension. For this purpose the *Year Book Declaration* is, by its own words, put out of court. So that if such understanding exist in the integrity ascribed to it, it seems much in the position of the Agnostic's Deity, which is said to be the surest of realities, but the most inaccessible of mysteries. Pursuing the defects of such a system, it is, farther, easy to see what a powerful instrument of tyranny and obscurantism is by it placed in the hands of officials and of the local presbyteries above referred to. They have, for their own area, a monopoly of interpreting the terms of this vague entity, and are, within their local limits, and for purposes of comprehension, the sole and irresponsible "hier-

* Two of the best-known men in the body are asserting at this moment, one that we are, the other that we are not, essentially Calvinists.

phants of its unapprehended inspiration." This power is often wisely and liberally used; but there is no standing guarantee that in any particular case it will be. In a season of theological change and passion it probably would not be. And this opens still another defect in the system. A tacit understanding on a subject so intricate and yet so exciting as theology is safely workable, if at all, only in a body which, throughout its entire membership, has the flexibility and the sympathies bred by a severe education and a high culture *in the subject*. It is only thus that it works in the Commons or the Cabinet. It will be a failure if worked by men who not only do not allow, but who do not know, much less feel, the force of the best that can be said against their own position. Without going into the condition of education among Congregationalists, it may safely be said that there is no religious body in the world which is in the desiderated position. If an approximation were selected, it would not be Congregationalism. We are still the victims of our past exclusion from the great Universities and of our present cram for the secular degrees of Burlington House and the worldly degrees of the City and the Senate. We are too little cultured in theology, and in too deadly personal earnest about it, to be able safely to commit its power to the hidden, cross, and uncontrollable currents of a tacit understanding. It is not our grand science, but our personal salvation. A discussion on the subject is too like what a budget night would be in Parliament if proposals were introduced which were believed to threaten the personal fortune of half the members.

The state of things represented by the "tacit understanding" can hardly go on. The tendencies of thought are not towards greater unity but greater variety, and this understanding must grow more and more hollow unless defined into something else. Efforts will be made by "declarations" and the like to be orthodox and yet indefinite, to run with the hare of freedom and hunt with the

hounds of propriety. Organisation will draw a tighter cordon round itself for protection. There will be more organisation, if only to divert the local conscience: that means more definition of doctrine as a basis for one party and a refuge for both. Ecclesiastical and theological organisation always have gone, and must go, hand in hand, wherever the articles of association are theological. In either case, Independency goes to the wall. It develops or degenerates into Presbytery, and there is the old call for an exodus and new swarm from the hive of 1662.

What, then, has the future for us? It may be asked, if a Congregational Union is proposed, to include every congregation, of any creed, that claimed the name. No one in his senses would make such a proposal. It may strike many that a union is not an absolute necessity for the kingdom of God, as it strikes others that a powerful Church is not quite indispensable. It may be true that a Church, in the usual sense of the word, cannot exist without a doctrinal bond, which must really bind by being really defined and enforced. I believe that is true. But it may not be quite necessary for the purposes of God that such organisms should exist, or, at any rate, that they should absorb all Christians. Many will meet in congregations round a centre of work, or round some personal centre, who breaks to their longing souls the bread of life; and outside the creaking organisation of Congregationalism will spring slowly the tap-roots of a newer and truer Independency, which will seek not organisation, but simple fraternity as in the days of old.

But there may also be a great field and future for something else than this. There is reason to believe that if the present Congregational Union were delivered from the "tacit understanding" and its inseparable abuses, if it had the courage to take a more frank and decided position, if

it could be brought to adopt a brief creed, Subscription to which should protect men from private committees, unlearned officials, and passing prejudice; not only are there many who would welcome the benefits of association when joined with such a measure of freedom, but such a body might be of enormous service for a time to the religion of the country. Some of the older men would welcome it as a bulwark against what they take to be the Universal Abolitionism of the juniors. And the juniors would find it a covert from the tempest of suspicion and the violence of contempt which they sometimes experience from the senior quarters. An abbreviated form of the Apostles' Creed might serve the purpose. It would contain the historical facts. The great speculative facts would mostly take care of themselves. The first clause, of course, would stand, and the retention of the words "only Son" to describe Christ might be trusted to repel pronounced Unitarians. All else of a purely theological nature might be left to the free action of the mind and the spirit on what the Church at large already possesses. Such a creed would be understood to deny nothing outside its direct words. It would not profess to include all precious Christian truth. It would be understood simply as a *modus vivendi*, a symbol of unity, not a confession of faith. It would exist only for the sake of the outward association for work. No formal creed seems called for now as a condition of personal salvation. It should, therefore, while truthful, be as brief as consists with its end. Indeed, by many Mr. Baldwin Brown's model Trust-Deed would be thought sufficient. Say, "this association exists for setting forth the Gospel of Jesus Christ, the Son of God," let these words alone determine status, and then leave speculation and Bible criticism free so long as they were subscribed. Any such creed would, of course, provide for its own periodic revision. This would not be pure Independency, but the only step towards it that suited the time.

It would provide a habitation to receive many when the forces at present working to the surface in Independency have visibly, and perhaps volcanically, emerged, and it might have a long and far from fruitless career. At any rate, it would be preferable to the taciturnity of an understanding which is so hard to understand, to a bond which is itself unbound, whose vagueness cloaks bewilderment as well as agreement, and whose contents are in danger of becoming like the sound of a sacred name that once made a people great, but whose true pronunciation has by disuse become lost.

P. T. FORSYTH.

REJOINDER.

IT has been justly pointed out by Sir R. Wilson that Subscription to the statutory declaration of assent to Articles of Faith required from a clergyman as a condition under which alone he can hold office, constitutes neither the whole problem under discussion nor its greatest element. The fetters upon a clergyman's limbs are far heavier than those imposed by the performance of this one act, serious and solemn as I contend that that is. An ordination service has to be submitted to, and in this service a profession must be made of unfeigned belief in "all the canonical Scriptures of the Old and New Testament." The Church does not accept a doctrinal declaration from her ministers simply upon their entrance into her service, giving them permission to be silent during all coming days.

Whenever the Almighty is worshipped in public, a creed must be repeated, and the minister must declare that he personally believes ("I believe") that Jesus Christ was born of a virgin, and descended into hell. Whenever the Holy Communion is celebrated, a profession of personal belief (for again the words are "I believe") must be made, involving opinions regarding "the substance" of Christ and the procession of the Holy Ghost.

The broad question, as brought out in this discussion, therefore, is, What obligations are incurred in making such doctrinal statements as are demanded by the Established Church upon entrance into its ministry, and in the conduct of its various offices?

Except for one or two phrases used by Mr. Sarson, I should not have thought it necessary to repeat what I stated in opening this discussion, that no charge of personal insincerity is made or insinuated against those who interpret the obligations of Subscription in this broad sense far more laxly than others deem justifiable.

Mr. Sarson scarcely describes my arguments correctly when he speaks of them as "directed against the immorality of clergymen who assent to articles which they believe to be untrue." No blinding mist of imputations upon personal character ought to be flung over the question at issue.

Many devout and honourable men claim freedom of opinion on points which appear to others to *be decided for them* by the Articles to which they have subscribed, and the creeds which they are compelled constantly to repeat. Every one must, of course, determine for himself what his duty is; but the facts and principles, of which account must be taken in the formation of a judgment, are surely subjects for fair and frank discussion.

Save on the general principle that a Church ought not to impose a creed at all, as a condition of membership, I have no controversy with those who subscribe the Articles and use the Prayer-Book, avowedly accepting the doctrines contained "in their literal and grammatical sense" within the limits of judicial decisions as to their precise meaning. I do not believe, as Mr. Symes implies, that any individual can override the law with his own private interpretation of the doctrine of the Church. It is precisely *against* this position that I am contending.

Mr. Sidgwick's argument upon the amount of relaxation given by the decisions of the Privy Council appears to me unanswerable.

In no sense whatever, I may add, has it been legally decided that the Articles may be questioned or denied, or shorn of one iota of their strict meaning. On the contrary, the

duty of every candidate for orders carefully and thoroughly to examine whether he can honestly and honourably accept the Thirty-nine Articles as the Articles of his own personal faith, is emphasized and not lessened by the Judgments of the Privy Council. He is proposing to join a Church in which the highest Court has declared that it can exercise no dispensing power in doctrine, and that the Articles to be subscribed and the formularies to be used must be taken "in their literal and grammatical sense." In the judgment in the case of "*Gorham v. Bishop of Exeter*," the following passage occurs :—

In all cases in which the Articles, considered as a test, admit of different interpretations, it must be held that any sense of which the words fairly admit may be allowed if that sense be not contradictory to something which the Church has elsewhere allowed or required, and in such case it seems perfectly right to conclude that those who impose the test command no more than the form of the words employed in *their literal and grammatical sense* conveys and implies, and that those who agree to them are entitled to such latitude or diversity of interpretation as the same form admits.

This is the *legal* measure of the freedom of thought enjoyed in the Church of England.

In the case of the "*Essays and Reviews*," the Court stated that it had "no jurisdiction or authority to settle matters of faith."

Its duty only extends to the consideration of that which is by law established to be the doctrine of the Church of England, upon the true and legal construction of her Articles and Formularies.

On a hundred propositions contained in the Thirty-nine Articles the Privy Council has given no decision, and with the individual who assents to them the sole responsibility of *decision upon their meaning* must lie. Even in the case of the "*Essays and Reviews*," the Court stated that only

"meagre and disjointed extracts " were before them, and that, on the whole Essays, they pronounced no opinion.

This being the state of the law, I submit that no one ought to enter the service of the English Church without being convinced of the truth of every single proposition contained in its Articles and Formularies.

It is replied by some that these Articles and Formularies are hopelessly contradictory, and that it is impossible for any one to make his teaching harmonise with the whole doctrine of the Church.

It may be so ; but the demand of a Church for an intellectual impossibility can be no reason for granting its claim. No man is compelled to become a minister of the Church of England. It is no defence for obtaining an office, by solemnly expressing assent to a series of contradictory propositions, to say that there was no other way by which it could be secured. In the administration of the world's affairs a higher price is asked for many an office than many men will consent to pay.

Mr. Sarson claims a broader freedom than the principle I have stated will allow, on the ground that the Church does not say "go to an office and subscribe that document;" but "go to your bishop and make your assent intelligible to him;" and he admits that, "if we had no administrative institution of living men and representatives of the living Church," my objection to Subscription would be unanswerable.

I submit that there is no administrative institution in existence, within the Church, of the kind necessary to give validity to Mr. Sarson's argument, and that, consequently, his whole case falls to the ground. No officer of the Church has any authority to alter its creed. A bishop is bound to respect the doctrine and discipline of the Church as by law established. He cannot assume functions beyond

those of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council itself. His decisions cannot overrule Acts of Parliament. He is the servant of the law, not its master. The plea that a bishop had admitted a clergyman whose opinions he knew to be more or less heretical, could not for a moment protect him from a prosecution for heresy. As Mr. Sidgwick has already pointed out, a bishop can do no more than assist the candidate in interpreting the Articles—the Articles themselves remain the absolute test by which his right to be a minister of the Church of England can alone be judged.

Mr. Sarson further contends that the assent asked for the Articles is not of the *kind* implied in the recital of a creed, and appeals to the Articles themselves for evidence, that they may be regarded as "directions and guiding lines." I confess myself quite unable to follow his argument. In Art. VIII., to which he refers, it is stated that "The Three Creeds, Nicene Creed, Athanasius's Creed, and that which is commonly called the Apostles' Creed, *ought thoroughly to be received and believed.*" And the reason given for this is, that "they may be proved by most certain warrants of holy Scripture."

There is nothing vague or general in these dogmas; as "directions and guiding lines" they are singularly clear and positive; they do not sanction any deviations on the right hand or the left.

Because in one Article certain homilies are commended, and ordered to be read, it in no way follows that all the other Articles are merely "lines of thought."

The Articles cannot, of course, be treated as intended to determine every question that the ingenuity of man can torture out of them; but they do contain a distinct set of theological decisions, drawn up for the express purpose of putting an end to differences of opinion on matters of reli-

gion, within the range of their plain and full meaning. In the case of "*Gorham v. the Bishop of Exeter*," the following principle is laid down:—

The Church having resolved to frame articles of faith as a *means of avoiding diversities of opinion, and establishing consent touching true religion*, must be presumed to have desired to accomplish this object as far as it could; and *to have decided* such of the questions then under discussion, as it was thought proper, prudent, and practical to decide, but it could not have intended to attempt the determination of all the questions which had arisen, or might arise.

In the Articles, therefore, the Church must be held to have laid down a number of definite dogmatic propositions as essential to its unity; and assent to them cannot be regarded as being *different in kind* on the part of those who make it, from their assertion of belief in the great facts on which their religion is based. The Articles have a larger meaning than Mr. Sarson ascribes to them when he terms them "*statements for our guidance*"; they are, as the quotation I have just given proves, *statements of doctrines to be believed*.

It is as necessary that a candidate for ordination should assent to the Articles, before he can become a minister of the Church of England, as it is that he should believe in the existence of a God; and I, therefore, conclude that no such assent should be given without personal persuasion of their vital truth. I am not, of course, speaking of Mr. Sarson's own position; he finds Subscription no bondage; but I am criticising his attempt to establish a distinction between the *kind of assent* required for the Articles and the assertion of great religious principles. Considering the nature of the Articles themselves, their legal authority, their origin, and the sacredness of the office to which they are the passport, I contend that no one ought to subscribe to them unless he can accept them as great religious prin-

ciples alike with the strength of his mind and the devotion of his heart, and is, at the same time, perfectly convinced that no point of his teaching will be opposed to the natural meaning of their words.

Another and a far bolder claim for liberty within a creed-bound church has been advanced.

To seek protection in the verdicts of "not proven," given in the two or three cases in which heretics alike on the ritualistic and the free-thinking side have been brought to trial; to depend upon the good will of a bishop; to rely upon a subtle distinction between the assent required for the Articles and the expression of heart-felt devotion, are small and insignificant matters compared with the assertion that the solemn declaration of *assent* to the Thirty-nine Articles and belief in the doctrine of the Church as agreeable to the Word of God *binds us to believe neither the articles nor the doctrine*.*

To establish this proposition, Mr. Haweis separates the clause, "I *assent* to the Thirty-nine Articles of Religion and to the Book of Common Prayer," from the clause, "I *believe* the doctrine of the United Church of England and Ireland, as therein set forth, to be agreeable to the Word of God."

The two clauses, however, refer precisely to the same points of doctrine. When it is said that to "assent" to the Thirty-nine Articles and to the Book of Common Prayer is not to believe in them, there is a suppression of the fact that it is expressly provided by the following clause that the doctrine "*therein set forth*" *must be personally believed*. Mr. Haweis's cause is not served by the plea that "doctrine" is not equivalent to "doctrines"; since his contention is that no strict belief at all is involved. He defends his case by an illustration.

* *Vide* "Freedom of Thought in the Church of England." By Rev. H. R. Haweis. *Contemporary Review*, February, 1881.

I have a Child's Bible, full of pictures, where Peter, James, and John appear in blue, red, and yellow. One is tall, another stout, another thin. I do not believe in the colours, and I do not believe in the portraits, but I agree to it all as a good method of teaching, and assent without a qualm.

* This is not, I think, the kind of assent legally involved in the act of Subscription. The Articles and Prayer-Book are submitted for acceptance *not* as containing "a good method of teaching," but as "agreeable to the Word of God." They form a code avowedly made for "avoiding diversities of opinion," and the doctrine of the Church is held by the Courts to be directly dependent upon their "true and legal construction."

Should the governing body of the Royal Academy decide that no artist should be admitted as an Associate who did not accept the pictures in Mr. Haweis's Child's Bible as *containing the truth in art* so far as understood by that academy, the cases would be more closely parallel. An artistic test on the lines of Mr. Haweis's illustration would run as follows :—

I, A. B., do solemnly make the following declaration :

I assent to the Child's Bible, and believe the coloured portraits as therein set forth to represent Peter, James, and John, as God himself made them ; and in no picture I paint will I give them any other features, or clothe them in garments of any other colour.

Mr. Haweis regards the pledge to believe the doctrine of the Church set forth in the Articles and Prayer-Book "agreeable to the Word of God," as of "no doctrinal importance whatever." The ground on which he maintains this opinion is that there is "evidently no quantity or quality of doctrine which cannot be shown, with a little judicious handling of texts, to be agreeable to the Word of God."

In this argument two distinct propositions are confounded together. To assert that a certain doctrine is to be found

in the Bible, is one thing; to assert that other students of Scripture come to a different conclusion, is another. Mr. Haweis treats the proposition that different minds draw from the Bible different conclusions, as equivalent to the proposition that the Bible contains no doctrine at all in which belief can be professed.

In place of the declaration, "I believe the doctrine of the Church . . . agreeable to the Word of God," Mr. Haweis substitutes the declaration, "I believe that anything and everything can be made out of the Word of God by the perverse ingenuity of man."

Suppose a traveller to report that he had seen upon the summit of a hill a large block of stone, perfectly round in shape. On visiting the spot, it is found to be square; and it is asked with amazement how it could possibly have been described as round. Would it be esteemed a satisfactory explanation if the traveller should reply, "Why, the stone could be cut and carved into the likeness of anything; a workman might make it a ball or a statue, according to his fancy; I was quite justified, therefore, in saying that it is round. The term round accurately describes one of the many forms that might be imposed upon it; I, therefore, call it round"? In the same way Mr. Haweis appears to contend that he is right in saying that the doctrine of the Church is agreeable to the Bible—because the Bible may be cut and carved into any shape.

Mr. Haweis justly states that, although Subscription were abolished, so long as the Prayer-Book is assented to and used, the question of belief in the Creeds and Formularies of the Church must be faced; and puts in a claim to separate "in each doctrine the *substance* from the *form*."

In this argument Mr. Haweis, appears to me, to claim the right to use words expressive of assent to a long series of propositions, while mentally he only yields assent to two or three of them. The Creeds and Formularies contain

hundreds of propositions not related to each other as *substance* to *form*, but absolutely needing separate lines of proof for their establishment, and only to be intelligently believed or denied on the evidence adduced in each separate case

Out of a number of independent statements, to pick out a few as credible and dismiss the others is not a process which can be called *re-statement*—it is rather the making a selection of doctrines for the satisfaction of individual scruples; a process altogether beyond the functions of a body of clergy who stand legally pledged to the whole of the Articles and Formularies of their Church. Let me give one of Mr. Haweis's examples with respect to the resurrection of the body; he distinguishes between belief in immortality as the *substance* and the resurrection of the body as the *form*, and thinks we may speak of the resurrection of the body when we mean the immortality of the soul, "if we *take care* to explain our meaning."

The two propositions are distinct; the one may be received without the other, and each must rest on its own evidence; we may, however, according to Mr. Haweis, assert that *both* propositions are true when only one is accepted.

Would any teacher of any subject, save theology, consent to do this?

Imagine the case of a professor of history bound, every day before commencing his lecture, to read a statement of his belief that Julius Cæsar visited the Hebrides. On the method elaborated by Mr. Haweis, he could, I think, easily justify himself in so doing. Let the question be put—*Do you believe that Julius Cæsar visited the Hebrides?* The answer, according to the method advocated for securing freedom of thought in the Church of England, would be, "I believe in Julius Cæsar; that is the substance; whether or not he visited the Hebrides is an accident. I am, therefore, perfectly justified in saying that I believe that Julius Cæsar visited the Hebrides, and no fault can be found with

me, now I have explained my meaning." It must not be forgotten, of course, that Mr. Haweis directs every clergyman to use the Formularies with openly declared reservations; but the fact remains that whoever recites the Apostles' Creed without believing in the resurrection of the body, does then and there, in the solemn hour of prayer, when the soul is confessing its sins, and placing itself before the awful eye of the Eternal, express opinions which he does not hold.

Practically, a clergyman in this position cries aloud to the Almighty, "*I believe,*" and half an hour after, when he speaks on his own account, says to his fellow-creatures, "To be quite sincere with you, I do not believe what I said just now to my Maker."

Such criticism as this, however, it is urged, is not sufficiently historical. As Mr. Haweis writes:—

I must look through the eyes of the past upon the statements of the past; then I understand them. They are not statements that we can make over again, but I see they could not be other than they are; perhaps could not have been better, for in their day, like Cimabue's colouring, perspective, and design, they were the most natural way of expressing the truth of religion and life.

Passing by the point that statements, which it is said cannot be made over again, are actually required to be made over again by every clergyman, Mr. Haweis's argument would, I submit, justify a professor of chemistry in yielding to a demand that he should profess a belief in alchemy as a condition of holding his chair.

In their day, like Cimabue's colouring, perspective, and design, the formulæ of the alchemists were the most natural way of expressing the facts of chemistry; they could scarcely have been other than they were, perhaps could not have been better. Why, then, should a modern man of science, carrying Mr. Haweis's reasoning to its legitimate

conclusion, object to "assent" to alchemy? He ought to look through the eyes of the past upon the statements of the past. He ought to import the historical method. To any one who might protest that he repeated in his chemical creed doctrines he could not verify in his laboratory, it would be enough to reply, if Mr. Haweis's argument has any validity—"Not more speculation, but more history is what we want."

No chemist would consent to occupy a chair in any University, however famous and however ancient, if he were compelled to employ in his lectures formulæ he distinctly regarded as obsolete and antiquated.

A line of argument which so completely breaks down when applied to the teaching of science, can hardly be sustained when the study of religious truth and the exercises of religious faith come into question; unless, indeed, the office of a clergyman is surrounded with responsibilities of a lower type than those of a professor, and what we believe concerning the everlasting God is of less importance than what we believe about the elements of which the worlds are composed.

I have left myself no space in which to examine the second question raised in this discussion—viz., the general question as to the necessity or advantage of a creed as a basis of Church fellowship. I may be permitted, however, in conclusion, to notice one or two points in which theories regarding the proper constitution of a Church come into contact with the obligations involved in Subscription.

Mr. Forsyth is, I think, entirely successful in demonstrating that if a Church have a doctrinal basis at all, it ought to be distinctly formulated and authoritatively adopted. No plan human wit could devise is calculated to engender more painful personal disputes, and to give freer play to pettier influences, than to exact "orthodoxy" from a minister of religion, and yet to furnish

him with no clear information as to what that "orthodoxy" is. A congregation, under such circumstances, readily becomes an assembly of heresy-hunters, while its minister has no fair chance of meeting the accusations levelled against his teaching. Better far to have Thirty-nine Articles, with an appeal possible to a Court of Law to determine their sense, than a "tacit understanding," with an appeal to a private committee.

But when Mr. Forsyth falls back upon a creed as a *modus vivendi* he enmeshes himself in the net of his own arguments.

Short as is the creed he would prefer to the state of things existing in his denomination, it presents every difficulty, theoretical as well as practical, of the "tacit understanding," which he so justly condemns. He wishes it to contain the great historical facts, and not the great speculative facts. Questions regarding the historical facts of the Bible, however, are the very questions on which, at this moment, there is the largest divergency of opinion, and the greatest necessity for a Church to prove itself possessed of an inclusive rather than an exclusive spirit. A Church that draws any sharp line at all about historic facts, excludes not only learned critics but devout Christians from its membership and ministry; and if the line be not sharply drawn the possibilities of endless controversy exist.

Another series of difficulties would arise from the "speculative facts" which are supposed by many to be intimately connected with the "historical facts" of Christianity; and a man could, with equal justice or injustice, be condemned as a speculative heretic on historical grounds, or as an historical heretic on speculative grounds.

Suppose the words which Mr. Forsyth states would be sufficient for many, "say, this Association exists for setting forth the Gospel of Jesus Christ, the Son of God," to be adopted; I ask, Would it mean, or would it not mean, that a

Unitarian could become a member of the Congregational Union?

Would not any doubt left upon this point call into activity the official committees, whose influence Mr. Forsyth so gravely deprecates? But Mr. Forsyth speaks of retaining the words "only Son" to describe Christ "to satisfy those who would exclude pronounced Unitarians."

As a Unitarian, I may be permitted to say that I can imagine no subject more laden with subtle issues, more perplexing, more intricate, than the determination of the exact points of difference between a pronounced and an unpronounced Unitarian.

My conclusion on the whole matter is, that the obligations of Subscription are the obligations of *bonâ fide* belief in any Articles of Faith presented for acceptance; and that the recital of a creed in the course of public worship ought to imply the personal acknowledgment of its dogmas. The claim for intellectual freedom in a Church which presents Articles of Faith as legal standards by which its clergy must be judged, and intermixes dogmatic utterances with its prayers, is altogether untenable. Those who believe in a non-subscribing Church have no fitting home within a Church based upon Subscription. There is no defence for freedom of religious thought except in the case of a Church which, from generation to generation, depends upon the living sympathies of its members.

HENRY W. CROSSKEY.

THE MEDICAL PROFESSION AND ITS MORALITY.

ONE profession amongst all those exercised in this country has importantly shifted its position during the past century. The Army, the Navy, the Church, and the Bar stand much where they stood in the days of the Plantagenets; but Edward IV.'s "Corporation of Barber-Surgeons" has made a wonderful ascent from its pristine *status*, passing up from Henry VIII.'s "Incorporated Society of Surgeons" to the "College of Surgeons," in the reign of Victoria.* A parallel elevation has taken place at the same time in the other branch of the medical profession which previously occupied (so far as its rank and file were concerned) a very humble position, even while a few eminent men in each generation rose to wealth and honour. At last the ignoble squabbles of the surgeons with the physicians, and of both with the apothecaries, are hushed, and the united professors of the Healing Art have lifted themselves as a body altogether to a higher plane than they ever before occupied. By dint of cohesion and generalship they form a compact phalanx, and have obviously suddenly arrived at the consciousness of corporate power. The

* The Incorporated Surgeons grew out of the Barber-Surgeons, and in its turn became the origin of the College of Surgeons. In 1797, Lord Thurlow, in opposing the Bill for the incorporation of the latter, was rude enough to observe that "by a law still in force the barbers and the surgeons must each use a pole," and that the pole of the surgeons must terminate in a gallipot and a red rag. He would be a bolder Chancellor than Thurlow who, in 1881, would not tremble on the woolsack ere he reminded the surgeons of our day of the pole and the gallipot.

Medical Council, already far ahead of Convocation, has become a little Parliament, destined soon to dictate to the larger Senate of the kingdom, not only concerning its own interior affairs, but also concerning everything which can by possibility be represented as affecting the interests of public health. As medical officers in parishes and unions, factory and prison surgeons, public vaccinators, medical officers of health, inspectors of nuisances, and very commonly as coroners, the doctors are daily assuming authority which, at first, perhaps, legitimate and beneficial, has a prevailing tendency to become meddling and despotic. In the Army and Navy, the surgeons, long unfairly deconsidered, now haughtily claim equally unreasonable precedence. Even the Government of the country appears unequal to the task of contending with the profession since Sir Richard Cross succumbed to the deputation which invaded the Home Office many hundreds strong, and reduced him to the humiliating concession of turning his own Vivisection Bill from a measure to protect animals into one to protect physiologists. The tone of bullying adopted by the medical Press when the same Government presumed at its own discretion to appoint a Registrar-General who happened not to be a doctor, was apparently intended to strike terror into the hearts of any Ministry which should venture again on such a step; and the same may be said of a more recent effort to overawe the present head of the Local Government Board when he desired to limit the penalties to be inflicted on the heretic victims of these modern Inquisitors, the parents who refuse to allow their children to be vaccinated. In all newspaper correspondence, indeed, wherein medical men express their views—notably in the grand battle which has raged for a twelvemonth round the walls of Guy's Hospital—a new tone of dominance, not to say arrogance, is perceptible; nor do many lay writers on the press or speakers in public meetings venture to allude to the

profession without a sort of rhetorical genuflexion, such as a Roman Catholic pays *en passant* in referring to the Pope or the saints. Literature, as usual, reflects in its waters the growth of the aspiring tower on its banks, and represents the heroines of at least half the novels of the last decade as passionately adoring their doctors, to the cruel disparagement of all the gallant soldiers and pious clergymen, who, in the earlier years of the century, were understood to command the affections of the romantic sex. As it will generally be admitted, even by those who most highly esteem the profession, that a lady's medical adviser is the last person with whom it is natural or desirable that she should associate the notion of love-making, this favourite modern legend of Doctor Cupid and Miss Psyche speaks volumes for the space now occupied by the professors of medicine in the popular mind.

This universal uprising of the practitioners of the Healing Art has naturally gone on *pari passu* with an increase among the laity of care for bodily health and ease. It would seem as if our ancestors scarcely realised how painful is sickness, how precious is life—so enhanced is our dread of disease, so desperately anxious are we to postpone the hour of dissolution! As old Selden said, "To preach long, loud, and damnation is the way to be cried up. We love a man that damns us, and run after him to save us." "To preach long, loud, and *sanitation*" is the modern doctor's version of this apophthegm, and we do "cry them up," and run after them to save us from "germs," and all other imps of the scientific imagination. No one can foresee to what lengths our poltroonery may go in this direction under the energetic preachments of such Boanerges as Mr. Huxley and Dr. Richardson. The thunders of the divines have long sunk to a far-off roll of old formulæ, reverberated down the ages and able to disturb us no more. But the claps of the sanitarians are fresh and strong, and we tremble

as we hear them; for, though we believe little concerning our souls, we have a lively faith in our bodies, and generally follow the example of the French lady whose epitaph records that she

Pour plus de securité
Fit son paradis dans ce monde.

In short, in every department of public and private life the doctors are acquiring power and influence, and coming to the front. They are new pilots who have boarded our ship and will shortly have a very large share of the handling of the helm. It is a matter of deep importance to us to know who and what manner of men they are and towards which point of the moral compass they will guide us.*

First, who are the Doctors of Great Britain in 1881? From what class of society are they recruited? Why do they choose their profession? What is their education and general moral status?

In America and in several countries in Europe medical men often belong, by birth, to the "Upper Ten." It is not uncommon for French nobles in these latter days to

* It may be suggested that another reason for the increased honour paid to doctors by our generation is due to the fact that they have ceased to be empirics, and become true men of science, and that they really are able to cure us better than their predecessors. Such is, of course, the common belief; but it would seem that the faith of each generation of patients in its own generation of doctors had been always as high as it could possibly be, whether those doctors were the veriest quacks or the reverse. Each one has seen new remedies puffed by the faculty, and old remedies falling into discredit; and we may say in our day as safely as Voltaire did in his time, that a doctor is a man who pours drugs of which he knows little into stomachs of which he knows less. If science, with all its boasting, and after its hetacombs of bloody sacrifices, had really made important advances in therapeutics, we should at least be able to point to some one or two unquestionable specific remedies for the most terrible scourges of mortality, such as cholera, or consumption, or cancer. Nothing of the kind, however, has been heard of, and it is even asserted, on respectable authority and with reference to registrar-generals' reports, that the mortality from the principal organic diseases is actually at a rate *far greater* in England to-day than it was thirty years ago. On this matter we do not pronounce an opinion.

be doctors, and we have lately heard of a German Prince adopting the profession. In Italy—ruled as it now is to a disastrous extent by “Professors” of all kinds—the doctors naturally take large share in the Government. In England, on the other hand (as is generally known, and as the Medical Directory proves), it has not been customary for men of the higher ranks to send their sons to King’s College or Guy’s instead of to Eton or Christchurch; and the Hon. Dr. Herbert, Lord Carnarvon’s brother, is mentioned so frequently in this relation that it would seem he must stand almost alone of men of his grade in the medical profession; while the Army and Navy and Clerical Lists swarm with the noblest names in the land. As a rule, it appears that the majority of British doctors are either the sons of men of the secondary professional classes or of tradesmen, and in some cases (especially in Scotland) of intelligent artisans. Much credit is due to them for the honourable ambition wherewith they have stepped upward; but it is well to bear in mind that they generally enter society (whenever they attain its higher levels) by right only of their personal and professional merits; and that they do not necessarily bring with them quite the same set of ideas on all subjects as are current among the young men educated in the great public schools or older universities. In no invidious sense, but as a simple matter of fact, they should be understood to be both collectively and (generally) individually a *parvenu* profession, with the merits and the defects of the class. Thus they are more apt to hang together, and make common cause against outsiders, than even the lawyers. That there are hundreds of medical men in the truest sense “gentlemen,” judged either by the most conventional or the loftiest standard, we all know from experience. But entry into the profession of medicine cannot be said (as Rochefoucauld remarked long ago happened in the case of the profession of arms) to make

a man lose his vulgarity or his coarseness, if he be originally coarse or vulgar-minded.

The motives which lead men to become physicians or surgeons are not far to seek. The preparatory education is cheaper than that for the other professions, and the average income of the British doctor is said to be £50 a-year higher than that of the British parson, and less dependent on the chance of patronage. The pecuniary prizes within reach of a successful surgeon or physician are enormous; and, though no peerage has yet been given to a doctor, the "Bloody Hand" of a Baronet is a considerable attraction. Finally, beside such mercenary reasons, there are two motives of a higher sort, which undoubtedly exercise great influence on the choice of able and good men. The first is the *Scientific interest* of medical work, wherein the profession stands almost alone, so as to become the natural vocation of a youth with scientific tastes. The second is the motive of pure *Humanity*, the simple desire to relieve the woes of suffering men and agonising women, to diminish the sense of pain in the world, and prolong useful lives. This is a noble, a divine motive for the devotion of a life; and it would be wrong to doubt that many a poor country practitioner and many a skilful London physician has been guided by this exalted feeling in his choice, just as truly as his brother has been led by genuine piety to enter the ministry of religion.

The fact, however, that there are many good men urged by none but the loftiest and purest motives, amid the thousands of whom the profession is composed, ought certainly not to make us leap to the conclusion that all doctors are pure enthusiasts of humanity. As a writer in the *Spectator* recently well observed, it is as absurd to predicate the same moral character for all men who enter the medical profession as for all men who pass over Westminster Bridge. There are, as we have just seen, sufficient

low motives as well as high ones to lead young men to such choice. It is the misfortune of the Clerical profession, that the performance of its ordinary duties requires an assumption of pious feeling which even sincerely religious men do not always hold ready at command. The consequence is (as Hume long ago explained) that genuinely good clergymen are often led into some sort of hollowness and affectation, while men who have entered the priesthood from merely secular motives are apt to degenerate into downright hypocrites. In an analogous way, it is the misfortune of the Medical profession that the performance of its ordinary duties involves the appearance of humane feelings, which may or may not be present on any particular occasion, but which the patient and his friends will usually expect to see exhibited, and the doctor be almost driven to simulate. Where the medical man is naturally kind-hearted, there is no incongruity between his beneficent act and benevolent sentiment, and no shade of hypocrisy tarnishes his behaviour. But where the doctor has adopted his profession as a mere *gagne-pain*, or from love of science rather than of humanity, there a certain affectation of sympathy with his patients and their afflicted friends is forced upon him, and we behold the not very rare phenomenon of a medical Tartuffe.

This matter is the more needful to be analysed, because the idle ideas current about the "kindness" of doctors make it seem, to not a few good souls, almost a sacrilege to question any of the abuses of the profession. These simple hearts totally forget that a patient is to a doctor what a rock is to a geologist, or a flower to a botanist—the much-coveted *subject of his studies*. If patients do not come to a doctor, the doctor must go in search of patients; and if he could not see them in the hospitals for nothing, he would pay to be admitted to see them and exhibit them to his pupils. Very often, when the sufferer or his friends

are with tearful gratitude thanking the doctor for having remitted some portion of his fees, the learned man inwardly reflects that he would have paid a good round sum rather than have missed so curious a case. Let any one try (as the writer has done) to remove to better quarters a pauper suffering from some "interesting" affliction, out of the reach of a doctor who was attending him for "charity," and the sentiment of pure benevolence will not be so manifest as might be expected. On the other hand, a display of sympathy is part of the stock-in-trade of a physician (especially of one who attends ladies), without which he could not hope for a large *clientèle*, any more than a grocer would succeed in business who failed in civility to his customers. Of course, there is much real, most disinterested kindness shown by medical men to their friends and patients. They would not be human if it were not so, and nobody dreams that they are insensible to the claims of charity or sympathy. But the everlasting "kindness" and "guinea-amiability" vouchsafed supremely to the wealthiest patients, is, as we have said, only part of the doctor's stock-in-trade, like the blue and red bottles in the chemist's shop.

Against the attractions of the medical profession now enumerated, sufficient to account for the adoption of it by so many thousands of youths, it is good to set the opposite circumstances, which deter from it a differently constituted order of minds. To begin with, no man of a poetic temperament is likely to become a doctor, for very obvious reasons. To make the weaknesses and maladies of our poor human frames the subject of a whole life's study and attention, so that a man should, as it were, live evermore in a world of disease; to pass from one sick-room to another, and from a distressing sight to a fetid odour, in endless succession; to acquire knowledge by the dissection of corpses, and employ it, when gained, in amputating limbs, delivering

women in childbirth, dressing sores, and inspecting everything ugly and loathsome to the natural senses,—this is surely a vocation which calls for either great enthusiasm or great callousness. The doctor is, in truth, at the very antipodes from the poet or the artist. It would seem to outsiders as if a year of his profession would suffice to blot from the mind all the beauty of the world, and to spoil the charm and sanctity of the sweetest mysteries of human nature. Everything which the painter, the sculptor, the poet touches with reverent and loving hands—the soul-speaking eye, the heaving breast, the lip which meets lip in supremest emotion,—all these are to the doctor the seats of so many diseases—organs where he may look for an amaurosis or a cancer. Of course, we know that men of great refinement of feeling are found to conquer all such natural repugnance, and suffering humanity may be grateful (so far as medical science brings it relief) that there are those who can do so, and even find the wards of a hospital quite as delightful, and much more interesting, than the terraces of a garden or the galleries of the Vatican. But it is not wonderful that Akenside should be the only man on record (except Erasmus Darwin) who united the professions of the physician and the poet, and proved an equally poor poet and cruel doctor.* To these æsthetic objections to the profession of medicine must be added another of a different but scarcely less effectual kind. Custom has settled that the mode of remuneration for the services of doctors (in the higher walks especially) should take the peculiarly awkward form of a direct transfer of coin from the hand of the private patient. This practice, even among well-bred persons, is liable to involve disagreeable

* His excesses of brutality to the poor patients in St. Thomas's Hospital, where he was physician, caused one of the governors, Richard Chester by name, to rebuke him, telling him, "Know thou art a servant of this charity." The reminder, perhaps, might not be inappropriate in some later instances of medical arrogance. (Jeaffreson's *Book about Doctors*, p. 95.)

incidents, and with vulgar and rude ones must cause to a physician of high spirit endless annoyances which are wholly escaped in those professions wherein service is paid by public salary or by fees which pass through an office.

We have seen who are our doctors, and why they choose their profession. Next we may note, in passing, as regards their education, that they commonly change in the transition from a medical Student to a full-blown Physician or Surgeon, in a manner quite unparalleled by other youngsters. The embryo parson, soldier, or lawyer, at Oxford or Sandhurst, or while "eating his dinners," is, indeed, usually a little less sedate than he becomes a few years later; but he only differs from his adult self as the colt differs from the horse, the playful puppy from the responsible mastiff. The medical student, on the contrary, undergoes a transformation like that of a larva, when it becomes a moth. One day we notice Bob Sawyer, as a rowdy and dissipated youth, with linen of questionable purity, and a pipe and foul language alternately in his mouth; the *bête-noire* of every modest girl, and the unfailing nuisance of every public meeting, where he may stamp and crow and misbehave himself. Anon, Robert Sawyer, Esq., M.D., or M.R.C.S., emerges the pink of cleanliness and decorum, to flit evermore softly through shaded boudoirs, murmuring soothing suggestions to ladies suffering from headaches, and recommending mild syrups to teething infants. His old celebrated canticle—

Hurrah for the Cholera Morbus,
Which brings us a guinea a-day,

has unaccountably been changed for such burning zeal to save humanity from disease, that he is ready to persecute anti-vaccinators to the death, or cut up any number of living dogs and cats in the most horrible manner merely on the chance of discovering some remedy for human suffering.

We now reach the most important feature of the subject, the general Moral Character of the profession; and here we must all thankfully recognise that medical men, as a body (after their studentship), exhibit many virtues, and comparatively few of the grosser vices. So far as the memory of the present writer extends, there have been no worse or more numerous scandals affecting doctors during the last twenty years, than affecting the clergy. They are industrious when poor, and often liberal when rich. In times of war, or epidemics, their devotion to their chosen tasks rises, not seldom, to true heroism. The ordinary English country practitioner, with his small pay, his rough work in all weathers, and his general kindness and honesty, is one of the most respectable and valuable members of the community. This and more may be said to the credit of the profession. On the other side there are grave charges and suspicions (chiefly attaching to the fashionable physicians and surgeons of the great cities and health resorts), which, though not often openly expressed or marshalled together, are yet sown broadcast through the minds of the laity, and which it is highly desirable should be fairly stated, and then either rejected as unjust, or allowed their due weight in the guidance of conduct between the public and the profession.

It would be exceedingly unjust to include among the elements of such a judgment as this the exceptional crimes—murders, adulteries, and seductions—which may be laid to the charge of individual offenders in every profession. The only point regarding these which here concerns us is the obvious fact that, *if* by any misfortune a man with criminal proclivities enter the medical profession, he possesses, as a doctor, unparalleled facilities for the commission and concealment of crime. A Prichard or a La Pommeray—handsome and gentlemanly—who may desire to remove a rich wife or mistress out of the way, either to inherit her money or marry another

woman, can scarcely find any difficulty in administering a slow poison, or so arranging things as that the victim shall swallow a rapid one by mistake. Even the purchase and possession of deadly drugs (in other men a damning evidence of guilt), scarcely afford ground of suspicion against a doctor. Of course, we know that not one doctor in 500 can for a moment be suspected of such crimes; but who will venture to say that not one in 5,000, or one in 25,000, doctors may prove another Palmer or Webster or Prichard, or such a reckless wretch as he who, three years ago, answered the advertisement offering £60 for a poison?*

It is a serious question whether, in the event of the commission of such crimes, we should find medical coroners alert and firm in dragging to light every suspicious circumstance and sending the case unhesitatingly to trial, or whether they would let down their colleague as easily as might be practicable, and direct their jury to find a verdict of "Misadventure." The same remarks apply to crimes of another cast—seduction, adultery, and offences committed on narcotised victims. Doctors are as little open to such charges as other men, but not *less* so; and again it must be borne in mind that they possess facilities for committing and concealing such offences which fall to no other lot. The writer who touches this subject labours under difficulties, since it is at once dangerous to be precise, and ineffective to speak in generalities; but probably the memory of more than one reader will supply food for reflection on this head, and possibly instances of medical men who, having notoriously abused their opportunities, instead of being scouted and disowned by their colleagues, have, by their influence, been allowed to retain their positions. No other profession deals thus with its *mauvais sujets*.

Leaving now this question of exceptional crimes, which

* In the Census of 1871, the professions of Physician, Surgeon, and Druggist are lumped together, and for England and Wales number 44,214 persons.

ought to be excluded from our judgment of the general character of the profession, let us inquire, first, what are the principles supposed to prevail amongst medical men? and then, secondly, what can we glean concerning their practice?

It has been long generally believed that while the profession on the Continent is almost to a man, Atheist, a milder and less defined Materialism is usually accepted by English medical men as their philosophy of the universe. Of late years the homage paid by the profession to certain eminent men of science has, rightly or wrongly, conveyed the impression that nine doctors out of ten, if they spoke out, would call themselves Agnostics. These gentlemen may perhaps say that it is no business of their patients to ask what are their private opinions on theology and morals so long as they administer to them the right drugs and set their bones, *secundum artem*. But, in truth, it is the business of everybody to learn what are the genuine beliefs of men who are certain ere long to leaven society therewithal. The doctors are now much more to us than drug administrators and bone-setters. Few prospects are more profoundly alarming than the advance to ubiquitous influence of an order of men who, as a rule, reject and despise those ultimate faiths of the human heart in God and Duty and Immortality, which ennoble and purify mortal life as no physiological science can ennoble, and no physical "sanitation" purify. It is a matter of importance to every individual amongst us to know whether the man who will stand by our death-bed and the death-beds of our beloved ones, will help us to look up beyond the gaping grave, or will throw the pall of his silence and disbelief over the flickering flame of dying hope and prayer.

There are missionary physicians now sent forth into many heathen countries (notably to Japan), where they effect more conversions than all the clerical missionaries

together. Who can help foreseeing that the converse will happen at home, if the doctors who come closest to every man and woman in the supreme hours of life and death should exhale their dead and hopeless materialism in every word and look? The man who thinks, like Professor Bain, that the tender emotions are merely glandular "affections," that (as the same Professor asserts) a mother's love, a poet's inspiration, a saint's prayer, are simply transformed beef and mutton, bread and beer—this man must, even if he be never so reticent, draw a trail of cold and slimy doubt over the fairest and noblest things in human life. There is, of course, a great and ever-present temptation to a physician to view things from the material, or (as our fathers would have called it) the carnal side; to think always of the influence of the body on the mind, rather than of the mind on the body; to place the interests of Health in the van, and those of Duty in the rear; to study physiological rather than psychological phenomena; nay, to centre attention on the morbid phases of both bodily and mental conditions rather than on the normal and healthful ones of the *mens sana in corpore sano*. All the more reason, then, is there anxiously to desire that the man subjected to such downward pressure should possess some faith on whose wings he may be lifted above the mire. Woe to him, and to all whom he may influence, who is at once in theory and practice, a Materialist and a Disease-monger.*

Be the principles and opinions of the medical profession what they may, we have now to consider their practical conduct. The observations to be made on this matter may fall under five heads.

* There exists a Medical Ritualistic Brotherhood, styled the Guild of S. Luke. Hopes were entertained at its formation that it would set itself to oppose the abuses of the profession; but they have been regretfully abandoned since the publication, in *Macmillan's Magazine*, of a paper by the secretary, defending Vivisection with the usual base appeal to human selfishness and cowardice.

1. The *raison d'être* of the medical profession is to cure the diseases, relieve the pains, and, when possible, prolong the lives of men. To attain these beneficent ends, Science must be the guide—Anatomical Science, Physiological Science, Chemical Science, and so on. Honour is justly due, then, to the physician who *studies science in order to cure his patients*.

But is it equally honourable to *study patients in order to acquire science*? Is it well to treat a suffering human being as a mere subject of experiment, and to consider hospitals as primarily existing, not that patients may be cured, but that doctors may be trained? Assuredly, whether it be, or be not morally justifiable to look on men and women in such a light, it is not to do so that *doctors are paid*, either by their private patients or by the public which supports the hospitals. The impression may be false, and is necessarily vague, but it is extremely strong and widespread that the primary beneficent object of the profession, its only ostensible object—namely, Healing—is daily more and more subordinated to the secondary object, namely, Scientific Investigation; in short, that the means have become the end, and the end the means. It is believed that patients having diseases scientifically interesting, are needlessly detained in hospitals, and, instead of being treated with a single-eyed view to restoration to health, are subjected to experiments calculated to elucidate pathological problems even at the cost of prolonged suffering or increased danger.*

Similarly, in private houses, if experimentation be rare, the physician yet often betrays that his interest centres on the purely scientific aspect of the case. He gives himself great pains to make "an accurate diagnosis," to be verified, perhaps, hereafter, by a "successful post-mortem;" but of

* The scandalous hydrophobia case in the Glasgow Infirmary two years ago was one of the (necessarily rare) instances when such doings find their way into the newspapers.

the means of *cure* he thinks so little that he has been sometimes observed to start, when asked by the not unreasonably vexed patient, what he recommends him to do? and to reply, "Oh, to be sure! you ought to do something; I will write a prescription." By-and-by, patients will begin to recalcitrate at paying heavily to afford their doctor another "case" to classify in the tables of his learned work on the lungs, the liver, or the brain, whereon he expects to found his claim to immortality and profit. They will say with Pliny, "*Discunt periculis nostris et per experientiam mortem agunt.*"

Nor is it only for the sake of acquiring knowledge, but also for that of imparting it, that medical men are believed to sacrifice their patients' interests. The poor sufferers who accept the charity of the public hospitals do so on the condition of allowing the students, as well as the doctors, to inspect their cases. But it is plain as daylight that this condition becomes morally abrogated when the patient's recovery would be postponed or imperilled by the distressing circumstances of exposure and bedside lecturing. Such limitation, however, is rarely, if ever, regarded, and decent women, afflicted with some of the most dreadful diseases of humanity, find, in these so-called charitable institutions, moral tortures of outraged modesty added to their bodily anguish. No doctor can be dull enough to ignore the fact that the feelings of a woman with a crowd of curious young students round her bed of agony must be almost worse than death, and must lessen her chances of recovery if any such there be. But when does one of these teachers and guides of youth spare the shame-tortured woman at the cost of Mr. Bob Sawyer's disappointment?

Again, patients are sacrificed not merely at the shrine of knowledge, but on the anvil of manipulative skill. That operations are performed for the sake either of acquiring

such skill, or keeping the surgeon's hand well "in"—as well as of earning enormous fees—we have the best evidence. The late eminent and honest surgeon, Mr. Skey, openly denounced this abuse, and said, "A man who has the reputation of a splendid operator is ever a just object of suspicion." Probably every reader will recollect cases where a leg or arm has been amputated, and after a time it was found that the frightful sacrifice might have been spared.* These are the men who, as Tennyson says, are

Happier in using the knife than in trying to save the limb.

When we think of the cruelty—as bad as that of any tyrant of old—of reducing a man or woman to the miserable condition of a one-armed or one-legged creature, and the selfishness which can make a surgeon, for the sake of either his skill or his fee, recommend an operation which might have been avoided, we have some measure of the hardness of heart which is at least *possible* in the profession, according to the testimony of one of its most honoured members.

And here we must recall to those who forget it, that this recklessness and pitilessness of medical men was betrayed forty years ago, when they permitted Burke and Hare to bring them corpses for anatomical study, which they could not doubt were those of foully murdered men. If *this* were possible among the first medical men to whom the "Burkers" brought their victims, it is idle to doubt that others may amputate limbs which might be saved, or detain interesting "cases" for years on beds of pain—"all in the sacred interests of science."

2. It is not only for the sake of science that the interests of patients are believed to be sacrificed by medical men. The

* A pair of the most beautiful eyes known to the writer were only preserved in the handsome head to which they belong, by the refusal of the young owner to profit by the urgent recommendation of one of the first oculists of the day to allow him to relieve her of one splendid orb, at the moderate cost, perhaps, of £50 or £80.

pecuniary interests, either of individual doctors or of the profession at large, seem to outweigh such considerations in numberless cases. To take a simple example. What are the motives of those luminaries who recommend all the bad wines and sickly beverages which we see advertised every day in the newspapers? A more certain way of promoting disease than the recommendation of some of this rubbish is scarcely conceivable. An American medical man was recently offered £1,000 to puff one of these drinks (by no means the worst) and act as its usher to the New York market. This doctor, being honest, declined the bribe. Are we to consider that others do not entertain similar scruples?

The same question may be asked respecting all the remedies which by turns come into fashion. We look back with amused disgust at what doctors have done in times past in the way of recommending useless and noxious nostrums one after another; but we forget that they are always at the same tricks, and that every year sees some new and costly *fad* of medicine solemnly adopted by all the lights of the profession, as surely as a new cut in dresses is adopted by the milliners, and just as certainly next year quietly dropped into oblivion.

The reckless multiplication of expensive prescriptions is another "bone" which patients with limited means may well pick with their doctors. Did any one ever rally from an illness, or clear a room after a death, without finding at least twenty half-used bottles of draughts and embrocations and gargles, and as many boxes of pills on the table? The *entente cordiale* between the physician and the chemist, and perhaps certain percentages, are not unconnected with these "untasted relics of the feast."

A much more serious matter, however, is the question, How far do medical men generally really and honestly strive to cure their well-paying patients? How far do they

deceive them about their ailments, and give them advice which, instead of restoring them to health and vigour, is calculated to keep them on the sick list? Medicine can, at best, not do much; some of us think it can do very little, and the great new sect of "Natural Doctors" in Germany are beginning to show cause for trusting nature to herself alone, without drugs or blisters or phlebotomy, and only securing for her the best conditions of quiet and air, warmth or coolness, at our disposal. But assuming that medicines can really cure disease, how painful is the doubt whether the doctor whom we employ to use them for our benefit may turn them to our hurt! To be robbed by the policeman, or to have our premises burnt down by the watchman, is a small vexation compared to being kept ill by the man we pay to make us well. But does this disaster never befall us, though, perhaps, we rarely recognise the humiliating fact? We have all read the mutual accusations of making business for themselves, which the lawyers have been bandying about; and we remember the good story of the old solicitor who received with horror from his son and partner (left in charge of his office during a trip abroad) the intelligence that the foolish young man had brought to a sudden conclusion a great Chancery suit which had provided an income for the family for ten years back, and might have done the same for ten years more. Similar grim jokes concern every profession and every trade. The difference in their application to the medical profession is, that much closer interests are involved, and the fraud practised is infinitely more cruel.

Let us consider what are the *presumptions* against the doctors, since of actual evidence, from the nature of the case, there can be little. Let it be granted that in cases of febrile and acute diseases there is reason to hope that they do their best to effect a cure. What of other and chronic diseases? What of the worst of all,—of Lunacy, for

example? Does the mad-doctor of the private asylum, who makes £200 or £300 a year by a wealthy patient, really lay himself out, with all his skill, to heal the poor bewildered brain? Does he never allow the patient to excite himself before the visitors, so as to bring on accesses of his disorder, and confirm the belief that he still requires incarceration when he might be set at liberty? A clear-sighted author talks of "unconscious bias produced by pecuniary interests;" and truly, human nature being what it is, nobody can think it otherwise than a misfortune that the interest of a physician in cases of such extreme doubt and delicacy should always be on one side, and the recovery of the patient on the other. The Press has pronounced again and again that lunatics ought only to be confined in public asylums, where the physicians should receive fixed salaries, and a *bonus on recoveries*,—not payment by the case. By such judgments they have tacitly avowed the belief that this most grievous of the woes of humanity is left, by the cupidity of the doctors, to press on many a soul from which it might be lifted off. To quote the direct evidence on the subject would involve endless controversy. It is well known to all interested in the subject.

And what of other chronic diseases—neuralgia, and gout, and heart-disease, and headaches, and all the nameless woes of rich and feminine mortality? We laugh at the legend of the physicians of the Chinese Emperor, whose salaries are stopped when their celestial patron is ill, and only run again when he is restored to health. But though we cannot copy this ingenious plan from the Flowery Land, we most of us believe that out of our twenty thousand doctors there are not a few (and they, *by the hypothesis*, among the rich and prosperous) who are far from insensible to the temptation of keeping a well-paying patient for months and years in a state of valetudinarianism. When we see a peevish

old man always in the gout, or a fine lady always stretched on her sofa smelling *eau-de-Cologne*, we may safely look out of window for the carriage of the unctuous doctor, whose yearly income would be considerably lessened by the restoration of the gentleman to the moors, and of the lady to the duties of her household and nursery. If we ask one of these poor medical *pièces de résistance* why he or she does not at least try fresh air, or riding exercise, or Turkish baths, it is singular how invariably they have been told by dear Dr. Hushaby that any such efforts would involve deadly danger to their "hearts."*

A medical treatise, intended only for the profession, contains these significant words:—"If cure be an object in the case, then" so-and-so is to be done. Apparently there are cases where cure is not an object! Plumbers are popularly believed never to mend one hole in the leads of a house without making another. The gentlemen whom we call in to tinker our internal pipes and gutters, it is to be feared, sometimes adopt similar tactics. Let us suppose a true specific remedy found for gout, neuralgia, or dyspepsia, which, by cheap and easy private application, would make every patient suffering from those diseases as sound as a trivet. What welcome would that blessed remedy receive from the medical Profession? When the news of its existence became irrepressible, how many rich patients would be assured that, for their particular case, a trial of it might entail fatal consequences?

3. Beside these matters, wherein the individual doctor's profits are in one scale and the patient's in another, there is a still more important class of cases, wherein the interests

* To the personal knowledge of the present writer, three ladies, after periods varying from six to fourteen years of the sofa, were roused to break their silken chains, and suddenly found they could get up and live like other people. In one case the poor dame, having renounced her doctor and all his ordinances, after long childlessness, became the joyful mother of a healthy little babe.

of the profession are on one side and those of the public on the other. In these latter there is reason to apprehend that a tacit trades-unionism exists among all medical men, whereby the interests of the laity are systematically sacrificed to those of the profession.

As a first example of this trades-unionism, let us take the case of Consultations of doctors, wherein it is obvious that some well-understood bye-law forbids the physician called in consultation to allow a suspicion to go abroad that his colleague, originally in charge of the case, has made a blunder and brought the patient to death's door. Proverbially, "doctors differ," and agreement under other circumstances is so rare that it may be dismissed from calculation. But let great Dr. A., from London, be summoned to Cornwall or Northumberland to consult with Dr. B., a country practitioner of respectable standing, about a case of imminent peril, and what becomes of the proverbial "difference"? Dr. A., with a solemnity which must tax his gravity and that of his colleague like the meeting of two augurs of old, assures the heart-broken mother, or wife soon to be a widow, that "everything has been done in the very best and wisest way possible, that the patient could not be in better hands than those of Dr. B.," and, finally (as if to save the appearance of utter inutility of the costly visit), that "the patient may now take a second tablespoonful of the same mixture as before." When this solemn farce has been played, Dr. A., who has eaten an excellent luncheon in the house of mourning, presses the hand of the miserable wife, pockets his magnificent fee, steps into the carriage waiting to carry him back to the station, and reads on his way up to town a charming article on that intense sympathy of medical men for suffering humanity which "makes them ready to sacrifice hecatombs of brutes to save the smallest pain of a man."

What has that smooth-spoken doctor done? In the sight

of God he has told a shameful and cruel lie, and has taken money from the very victim of his falsehood. He has betrayed the trust of loving and simple hearts, and left them to break, when with a word he might have done what in him lay to save their earthly treasure.

If doctors will do this cruel and wicked thing for their trades-union, what will they *not* do likewise? And who amongst the readers of this paper can recall any case where they have acted otherwise, and spoken the truth; except when the doctor, perhaps, whose patient they visited, happened to be of so humble a class, that the great man could venture to treat him as he pleased? *

Let us, for heaven's sake, know where we stand. Will the doctors tell us truth beside the sick-beds of our friends, or will they *not*? If they will not, then let us be

* An instructive episode, throwing light on the matter, is that of Sir William Gull's evidence on the recent trial of the Guy's Hospital nurse. The Court asked Sir William Gull, "In your opinion, should a skilful physician have known that brain disease existed?" Sir William replied, "There I must be careful. There is, no doubt, great difficulty in recognising brain disease at that stage . . . but I cannot doubt that suspicion ought to have existed." Later on, he refused to say, though pressed by Dr. Pavy's counsel, that suspicion was often very incorrect. For this breach of medical etiquette, Sir William Gull, a man at the very top of the profession, was actually complained against by Dr. Pavy (the physician who might have entertained the "suspicion") before the College of Physicians, and the President and Censors having solemnly deliberated on the matter, pronounced judgment on the 12th January of the present year to the following effect: That they "do not deem the character of the evidence which a member of the College has given on oath in a Court of Justice a proper subject to investigate when the Court has expressed itself satisfied in regard to the truthfulness and sincerity of the witness," &c.

In reviewing this decision, which truly to the non-medical mind appears a matter of course (the converse sentence being inconceivable) the *British Medical Journal* (Jan. 29, p. 167), says—"The evidence given upon oath in such cases is in the highest degree privileged. . . . But it must be a very delicate matter for a chartered body, such as the College of Physicians, having certain powers entrusted by law to its Board of Censors, to deal with a complaint against evidence given upon oath by one of its fellows in a Court of Law." Very "delicate" indeed! But what if the evidence were not "privileged," and only given at the bedside of a dying man, in return for a fee of a hundred guineas?

relieved from the monstrous cost and heart-breaking disappointments consequent on summoning them to consultations.

This question of the secret understanding and trades-union bye-laws among medical men rises to the level of political importance when we note that our coroners are now so generally taken from the profession. The particular duty of a coroner and his jury in scores of cases is to deal with charges directly concerning doctors, and to decide whether they have administered wrong medicines, or connived at child-murder before or after birth, or neglected to attend to a dying pauper patient, or discharged a patient from a hospital who ought to have been retained, or vaccinated in such a manner as to entail death. It is essential we should know what are the rules of behaviour for a medical coroner under such circumstances according to medical morality. What will his professional conscience require him to do as regards his colleague? Is he to act simply as an honest coroner in the interest of the public, drag every case fully to light, and send such as seem to deserve it to trial? Or is he to screen his medical brother by every available artifice and all the influence over the jury at his command, and never let any scandal come to light or any case go into court which he can by any means smother and suppress?

Reference to another evidence of the extent of the trades-unionism among medical men has been already made in speaking of the unanimity wherewith the profession as a body, having itself very little concern with Vivisection, has supported the handful of physiologists in their demand for a "free vivisection table." The memorial against Lord Carnarvon's Bill, presented to the Home Office on the 10th July, 1876, was signed by 3,000 medical men, and presented by such a crowd as never before invaded a Ministerial office, except, perhaps, in a revolution; and all this

excitement was drawn forth at a moment's notice.* Previous to the manipulation of their wire-pullers there were numerous medical men ready to denounce the abuses of the practice. Sixty of them at first signed the original Memorial to the Jermyn Street Society, and before the Royal Commission, eighteen of them gave the opinion that the practice ought to be placed under legislative restraint. The Bill introduced by their ordinary Parliamentary representative, Dr. Lyon Playfair, was entirely in the same spirit. But the stupid cry was raised that any restriction on the cutting up of live animals would be an affront to their profession (which had very cheerfully submitted to a similar restriction in cutting up dead men!), and from that moment there has been a closing of the ranks, from which only a few brave and self-respecting men have had the courage to come forth.

The Vaccination controversy is one on which it would be idle here to enter; but if the reader bear in mind the fact that between 1841 and 1871 the doctors received £1,647,000 out of the rates for vaccination, independently of private practice (See "Fashions of the Day," p. 30), the zealotry and cruelty wherewith this medical "rite" is upheld, will scarcely escape the suspicion of the before-named "unconscious bias produced by pecuniary interest." Baptism was never urged by those who believed that it could save souls from perdition, with such relentlessness as Vaccination is insisted upon by men who assume that it can save bodies from small-pox.†

* For a full account of the attitude of the Medical Profession on this subject, see a paper by Miss Frances Power Cobbe in the *Contemporary Review*, "Mr. Lowe and the Vivisection Act," reprinted by the Victoria Street Society.

† The trades-unionism, which commands at once the doctors who register deaths, the doctors who profit by compulsory vaccination, and the coroners who direct the juries in cases of alleged death from vaccination, is amusingly illustrated by such facts as the following, quoted by Mr. Peter Taylor in Parliament: Mr. Henry Hay, Health Officer to the Aston Union, Birmingham,

Beyond the demand for unrestricted Vivisection, and for compulsory Vaccination, there is another matter whereupon difference of opinion exists among medical men, and a few of them have honourably distinguished themselves by denouncing the abominable oppression. But as a *profession*, the guilt and shame of the atrocious Contagious Diseases Acts lie at the door of the medical men of England, and it is their gross materialism, their utter disregard for human souls when lodged in the bodies of the despised and wretched, which has made such legislation possible.

4. And now let us turn away from this last and darkest charge against medical men, and ask what truth there may be in the boast that they are the best friends of women, and that women may rightly trust them with grateful minds and unhesitating confidence? To the *fallen*

writes: "A death from the first cause (erysipelas after vaccination) occurred not long ago in my practice, and although I had not vaccinated the child, yet in my desire to *preserve vaccination from reproach*, I omitted all mention of it in my certificate of death." Again, the value of a medical coroner was exemplified at Leeds, where an inquest was held on a child who had died of the results of vaccination. The coroner declined to accept that statement as a verdict, and told the jury "there was no such thing known to the law as death from vaccination," and they must bring in "died by the visitation of God." Vaccination may be good or may be bad—the present writer offers no opinion on the matter; but if it be the worst thing possible, we shall never get at the truth in the face of the interests which support it. In the three years' epidemic of small-pox—1870-71-72—44,000 died of the disease in England in spite of compulsory vaccination. But whenever any vaccinated patients died, the doctors had two doors of escape from the arguments thus furnished against their beloved practice. The wretched patient had either not been efficiently vaccinated, or had not been sufficiently revaccinated. In short, by the hypothesis, it must have been one or the other, for if he had been efficiently or sufficiently vaccinated and revaccinated, then, as the whole profession proclaims, "he could not have died." It is truly insolent of laymen ever to question the validity of reasoning of this kind, or to notice that they are bidden to believe one *dictum* at one time and an opposite *dictum* ten years later all by the same authority, and with the same imperious demand for implicit confidence! Ten years ago the most eminent medical men pledged themselves that another most dreadful disease could not be communicated by vaccination. Now, they nearly all agree with Sir Thomas Watson, who speaks of the "ghastly risk."

we have seen they have gone out of their way to add a yet deeper degradation to their miserable fate, and long after the Contagious Diseases Acts are repealed, the memory of them will make the hearts of all women burn with indignation against the profession which first projected, and then dishonoured itself by carrying into effect, such odious legislation. Neither can the doctors boast that they can set against this any effort on their part to extend relief or comfort of any sort to well-conducted women of the working classes, and it has been left for a woman-doctor (Dr. Frances Hoggan) publicly to claim for such poor women their rightful share of the rates in the erection of resting-places for themselves and their young children as they traverse London. The male doctors have known all the sufferings and disease entailed on poor mothers by the lack of such temporary shelters, yet never have troubled themselves to say one word on the subject. Such are the doctors to women of the humbler classes. What are they to ladies? Undoubtedly they know their interests too well to fail to ingratiate themselves with them. But for real help what have they to show? Did they ever make any serious effort to stop the senseless and health-destroying fashion of women's dress, the reckless dissipation and late hours which have sent thousands of thoughtless girls to their graves? A few Eli-like words of mild advice was all they ever uttered against these deadly and wicked follies.

The case was reversed, however, when there was a movement for the Higher Education of women, and it became obvious that one of the aims of that education would be to fit lady doctors to enter the market as competitors with the men who had hitherto monopolised the profits of the profession. Then, indeed, the doctors grew earnest and made a grand discovery—namely, that mental labour is peculiarly injurious to the weaker sex—much worse, it

would appear, for their feeble constitutions, than any amount of ball-going and dissipation; and that, in short, a term at Girton was worse than five London seasons. Women would perish, and the human race cease to multiply, if female intellects ascended from gossip to Greek! This spectre is nearly laid after ten years' exorcism, but women should not quite forget to what order of men they owe its humiliating introduction.

But, in spite of these solemn warnings, the ladies insisted on reading both Greek and Latin, and eke all the learned treatises on anatomy and physiology and chemistry where-with the intellects of doctors are supposed to be as full as a doll is of bran. Then came the tug of war! Should ladies be admitted, first to medical tuition and then to medical degrees, and licence to practise? The remembrance is fresh in all our minds of the struggle in Edinburgh and elsewhere, and the chivalrous conduct of the doctors and medical students on the occasion. Never, indeed, has there been a more absurd public manifestation of trades-unionism than this effort to keep ladies out of the lucrative profession of physicians, and crowd them into the ill-paid one of nurses—for which (they were assured with the most eager iteration) they were specially and solely qualified.* At last Nemesis sent a bevy of lady nurses to Guy's Hospital; and the doctors will probably in future find infallible physiological reasons why they should no more be nurses than physicians.

5. We pass lastly to the outlook for the public in future years supposing the ambition of the medical profession to proceed at its present rate of growth for another half-century. It is obvious that Acts of Parliament, of which the

* For a history of the long struggle of the lady doctors and the behaviour of their opponents, see an article in the *Contemporary Review* by Right Hon. James Stansfeld, M.P.

Compulsory Vaccination Act and the Contagious Diseases Acts are the preludes, will then be multiplied till it may be hard to name the department of human existence—birth, marriage, education, employment, sickness, or death—in which a doctor's certificate, a doctor's attendance—in short, a doctor's well-paid sanction, shall not have become imperative, and the power of the profession to intrude and trammel and interfere and enforce its exactions rendered practically boundless. As a single specimen of what is already contemplated in this way, we will only cite the correspondence which has been going on in the *Times* respecting the horrible proposal to compel parents, children, husbands, and wives to submit to be separated from their beloved ones in cases of infectious disease, and to send them to be treated at the discretion of a medical man. The day when this atrocious scheme is legalised, either in Switzerland (where it has made some progress through the Legislature), or here in England, will be "the beginning of the end" of all family happiness. Cowardice is always cruel, but the cruelty of this proposal to tear asunder the holiest ties in the hour when they ought to be closest drawn, is a surprising revelation of the poltroonery to which we are advancing in our abject terror of disease. Better would it be that pestilence should rage through the land, and we should die of "the visitation of God," than that we should seek safety by the abandonment of our nearest and dearest in the hour of mortal trial, and leave them to the tender mercies of the men who could call on us for such a sacrifice of affection and duty.*

* And while the laity are patiently listening to this vile project, the men who propose it are themselves running about with the utmost carelessness between infected and non-infected patients. Are doctors, forsooth, of different flesh and blood from other men that infection does not cling to them and they cannot convey it, since no one thinks of them as the ever-active

Space forbids that we should proceed further now in pointing out the many lines of legislative interference which the medical profession is sure to try, and which it will behove the public to watch with closest jealousy. It must suffice if we have here succeeded in placing before the reader some solid grounds for accepting the following conclusions:—

1. That the proper beneficent objects of the medical profession are being daily supplanted by the ardour of purely scientific investigation.
2. That the pecuniary interests of the profession continually override the interests of patients.
3. That a trades-unionism exists in the profession which militates against the proper performance of the duties of medical men in various public and private offices.
4. That the profession has proved doubly treacherous to women.
5. That the further increase of the power of the profession holds out a serious threat to the personal liberties of all the lay members of the community.

Should these conclusions seem just, it will remain for the reader henceforth to watch wakefully and resist steadfastly the ambitious advances of this formidable order, and (as reforms rarely proceed from within) to bring public feeling to bear from the outside world to recall medical men to their proper beneficent and disinterested work. There is yet disseminators of zymotic diseases all over the country? *They* have never been required (as they ought to be) to abandon one or other half of their practice, and confine themselves either to infectious or non-infectious cases. *They* are not even bound by any custom of their own to take the trouble to go home and bathe or change their clothes before they pass from a small-pox patient's death-bed to the bedside of a woman giving birth to a child! *They* must be asked for no such sacrifice of profit or time; but they call on us to sacrifice what is infinitely more precious—our fondest affections and the most sacred duties which Providence has laid on us between the cradle and the grave.

reason to hope that by such means the practice of the Healing Art may become really and in truth, what it ought unquestionably to be, but is now only in the language of conventional adulation—a "Noble Profession."

It is not without a grave sense of responsibility that we publish the above article from the pen of an esteemed contributor, who prefers to withhold his signature. Our contributor has laid a heavy indictment against a profession that has ever been jealous of its honourable name. Yet our duty has seemed to us very plain. Without committing ourselves to every view or statement to be found in this elaborate criticism, we hold with our contributor that public opinion has been too timid in its attitude towards the great Profession of medicine, and that it is of vital moment that it should become both informed and pronounced. Hitherto a silent convention has protected the Physician and the Surgeon from the wholesome play of criticism. Language which has been common with regard to lawyers, and still more common with regard to clergymen, has been held a mark of ill-breeding if applied to doctors. It has been essential on the platform and in the magazine to allude to the latter as this noble or honourable profession, while their legal and clerical compeers have been subject to every kind of derogatory reference. Now few will deny that criticism has done the clergy a world of good. Why should it do their medical brethren any harm?

All sweeping charges against a community, however carefully guarded, must appear unjust. Nothing could seem more unfair than the assaults of Jesus on the Pharisees of his time. Many of them were upright and pious men. But

the better individuals had not stood out against the worse or made protest against their self-seeking and hypocrisy. So came the condemnation which the Galilean pronounced to be divinely just. It is so in other cases. There are the best of men among the physicians and surgeons of England. But all are held together with tremendous force, by what some will call a fine *esprit de corps*, and others a pernicious spirit of trades-unionism. Hence they must be criticised as a class.

The parallel between the physician and the priest is close. In spite of the temporary revival of a sacerdotal party in the Church of England, the people of this country, broadly speaking, have made up their minds that the influence of the priest in the home is inimical to morality; and the pretensions of the spiritual adviser to enjoy the exclusive confidence of others men's wives and daughters can amongst us never be very widely revived. The power of priesthood is broken for ever. But in the doctors we have a class of men who are more and more gaining the confidence of the boudoir, and scrupulously honourable as multitudes of these men are, this growing social fact is pregnant with perils precisely parallel to those which are generally recognised among Protestants in the hold of priests upon the home. Nay, if there remains any truth in the proverb, *deux médecins, un athée* (and its truth increases rather than declines), the danger from the private medical director exceeds that from the spiritual.

But peril from the assumption of the office of private adviser on the part of the physician demands consideration most of all in the case of our youths. Any one who will make a few casual inquiries will be amazed to discover the frequency with which medical men of high repute—men who are admitted to the friendship of good and unsuspecting women—offer counsel to young men and even to boys which strikes at the root of all morality, and, indeed, can

proceed from nothing else than scepticism concerning the very possibility of morality itself. We speak what we know not of one, but of many, and what no medical man will deny, though many a medical man will revolt from the action of his fellow-practitioners as vehemently as we ourselves. What we ask of these purer spirits in the healing fraternity is that they will speak out on this and other matters of professional practice, and condemn their less honourable colleagues with no faltering tongue.—ED.

RELIGIOUS FORCES OF THE REFORMATION ERA.

THE ecclesiastical history of the last three centuries is for the church historian "the doom he dreads yet dwells upon." He is perfectly conscious that to us in modern times the study of the patristic and mediæval period is chiefly valuable as affording an explanation of present religious impressions. He is perfectly aware that to complete his task it will be incumbent on him to trace the principles of these earlier ages into their phases of latest development. And yet, with a full recognition of this fact, the church historian instinctively shrinks from these phases of latest development. He feels more at home in the past than in the present. He would fain linger with the Gnostics and the Montanists, with the Jews and the Gentiles, with the Dominicans and the Franciscans, with the forms of faith and practice which the nineteenth century has outgrown. With the facts of ecclesiastical history which are within the range of his own atmosphere he is afraid to deal; he touches them with caution, and abandons them without regret. At first sight this is very surprising. We should have expected that the church historian would have found most pleasure in recording those annals which he could trace to causes rooted in living experience. We should have expected that he would delight most to deal with events and with opinions commensurate with the intellectual sympathies of his own age. Nor can there be any doubt that, other things being equal, he would have been

greatly influenced by such a consideration. But, then, it so happens that other things are not equal. If we examine the question more narrowly, we shall find that the historian's objection to modern church history is not the unwillingness to trace the development of the modern church; it is the difficulty of finding any such development. Through the first fifteen centuries of the Christian era he feels himself guided by a golden thread. He can distinguish a clearly marked line of progress permeating all the struggles of the patristic and the mediæval church. He can detect in her incipient conflicts with Judaism and Heathenism at once a prophecy and a source of her future development. He can trace in her gradual approximation towards the empire the preparation for her coming triumph. He can recognise in the intellectual speculations which surrounded her a stimulus to her conscious appropriation of truth. He can determine, with unfaltering accuracy, those stages of advancing power by which she laid her hand upon the possessions of the world one by one, and successively claimed them for her own. Nor is it difficult for him to see a still further point of progress in that great reaction of individualism which culminated in the Reformation movement. Even this will not at first strike him as a necessary breach of Catholic unity, for he will find that the preparation for this movement has been laid in the ages of mediævalism and matured in the Catholic world itself. All this to the ecclesiastical historian is clear, and thus far he travels joyously. But after that is the deluge. The moment the Reformation ceases to be a movement, and becomes a fact, it forthwith seems to become a chaos. The golden thread is snapped in the centre, the line of progress seems broken, the course of Christian development appears arrested. The old landmarks are swept away, and there seem to be no new landmarks. Another creation appears to be rising out of the great deep whose connection with the

original creation is no longer visible, and history fears that it must seek in vain for the continuance of that principle of unity which has hitherto been the guide of all its way.

For let us remember that the one thing which above all others facilitates the ecclesiastical study of the first fifteen centuries is the unity of the study. The historian is never for a moment drawn aside—never for an instant tempted to diverge from the subject in hand. Strictly speaking, there is no room for divergence. Almost from the close of the apostolic age the line of demarcation between the church and the world begins to fade away; with the incorporation of Christianity in the empire it altogether disappears. Henceforth all history becomes ecclesiastical history; the church is a state, and the state is a church. The secular and the sacred cease to be two separate powers; all secular authority has a sacred side, and all sacred institutions have a secular arm. The kingdom of the church and the kingdom of the state represent themselves respectively in the pope and in the emperor, yet, to all intents and purposes, these two are one. The pope is a sacred sovereign endued with political power; the emperor is a political sovereign possessed of sacred authority. The result is that throughout the ages of mediævalism the entire mechanism of the world is essentially a church apparatus. There is nothing that can be called secular history; wherever secular history exists, it exists in the form of schism. The plan of the mediæval world is an ecclesiastical plan, and it moves upon a large scale. It is a world which exists not for the individual, but solely for the collective church membership. It assumes that the individual has no life, and no right to have a life, outside the community; that the personal will must be sunk in the universal will. The individual will, from being repressed, ultimately becomes suppressed. The varieties of personal life are lost in the life of the whole. The great men of each generation are rather the incarnations than the

leaders of their age : they lead because they follow. They do not originate movements ; they are themselves the originating product of movements which have already taken place in the life of the collective church, the individual manifestation of laws which are permeating the universal system. Accordingly, the historian has no need to study men in order to find the cause of things ; he has only to study the principle which regulated the movement of the life universal. When he has reached that, he has arrived at the secret of all. The actions of men are but the effects of this great, all-embracing atmosphere which assimilates everything to itself, and history moves along in an almost unbroken monotone obeying the majestic rhythm of an infinite sea.

But over this state of things the Reformation brings an entire change, a change amounting to absolute dissolution. It reverses the position of effects and causes ; it makes individual men the movers and universal laws the product of their action. The personal will which has been hitherto only a feeble manifestation suddenly becomes the primal manifester. The collective church ceases to be collective ; it breaks up into fragments, and each fragment claims to be a whole. The streams refuse any longer to run into the rivers, the rivers refuse any longer to mingle with the ocean ; the passion for unity has died away and the passion for isolation has begun. The ecclesiastical student is in a new world, a world more interesting, because more human, but on that very account more difficult to analyse. He is no longer confronted by the movement of one great dynamical law levelling down into uniformity with itself all the variations of human character and all the idiosyncrasies of human action ; he is confronted first and mainly by these very variations. The long repressed individual life comes up to meet him on the threshold of the new world. It appears before him in an attitude of antagonism to the old law of

uniformity, and for a long time he finds it hard to reduce it to any law. He sees men asserting their rights over humanity, refusing to be reckoned as the mere drops of an ocean, claiming an independent existence and seeking an independent course. He sees as the result of such a claim the tendency to lawlessness and anarchy, the breaking up of cosmos into chaos, the dissolution of the body into fragments, and he feels at the outset disposed to shrink from entering on a task whose materials are so unpromising, and whose scientific completion is so doubtful.

But now let us ask if the prospect of the modern church historian is after all so dark? We have admitted that the Reformation era is a dissolution of the body into fragments, but the very statement implies that it is dissolved into something. Dissolution is not annihilation in the social any more than in the physical sphere; it destroys the existing whole, but it only destroys it as a whole, it resolves it not into nothingness, but into its original component elements. The Reformation era broke up the unity of the mediæval world, but it did not destroy one element of that world; it simply disintegrated it, dissolved it, separated it into its natural parts. It annulled the union of those forces which for centuries had striven together, but it could not annul the forces themselves; it could only send them back to their primitive isolation. The Reformation, therefore, simply sends the historian back. It takes away from him none of those materials which he possessed at starting; it just requires him to begin again. It gives him the old materials in their oldest form, puts into his hand the original elements gathered from the broken unity, and tells him, if he can, to reconstruct them into a new unity. He is in reality in no worse a position than he was in studying the first century, in one sense in a better. In the study of the first century he had first to discover what were the existing forces of mental and social being, and afterwards to

follow these forces in their mutual approximation and union. Here the latter part of the task alone awaits him. The forces are already discovered, the elements are the same as those which met him in the primitive age; he has simply to find for them a new principle of union. The materials are ready to his hand, and in order to lay his hand upon them he has only to go back to the dawning life of Christianity, where the identical forces of the sixteenth century existed in the same disunion and exhibited a similarly hopeless antagonism.

What, then, were the religious forces of the first century? To this question the subject really narrows itself. They will be found to be three, which may be shortly expressed by the names Judaism, Romanism, and Hellenism. Judaism was essentially the secularising of the sacred. It was that force which strove to reduce everything within the limits of a theocracy, or reign of God in the world. All government was divine government, all education was religious knowledge, all law was the command of God. Secularism, strictly speaking, did not exist. Second causes were not. There was only one cause of all things—God. In all movements of nature he was still saying, "Let there be light;" in all movements of mind he was still proclaiming, "Let us make man." He was not only the primary source of everything, he was the only source of everything; all the laws of thought, all the laws of government, all the laws of society, were but forms and manifestations of the one great will of God—the law of righteousness.

The force we have called Romanism, from its highest and latest representative, was one which moved in a precisely opposite direction to that of Judaism. If Judaism strove to secularise the sacred, Romanism struggled to make sacred the secular. By this aim it did not mean the sanctification of outward things by an unworldly motive;

its aim was to invest the secular *as* such with a sacred character, to elevate the worldly principle itself into the rank of divinity. Accordingly it deified power in its most physical aspect; it worshipped an emperor in Rome as centuries before it had adored an emperor in China. It revered the form more than the spirit, it preferred the manifestation to the thought. Like Judaism it surrounded its religious services with a cumbrous ritual, but there the similarity ended. The rites of Judaism were only symbols whose observance indeed was necessary, but whose efficacy lay not in themselves; the rites of Romanism were contemplated by the worshipper as the actual source of religious benefit. Secularism remained true to itself; even in its devotions it never for a moment allowed the sense of the spiritual to absorb the value of the visible. If Judaism, in short, contemplated the reduction of the state into a church, Romanism had for its leading object the reduction of the church into a state.

Hellenism was in some sense a force intermediate between the other two. It was the attempt to substitute for the ideas of secular and sacred a third conception different from either, yet fulfilling some of the functions of each: that conception was the culture of humanity. The Hellenic mind contemplated the reverence for human culture in all its forms as a possible substitute for religion: it was the worship of something invisible, something ideal, something not made with hands, and as such it was fitted to awaken an emotion kindred to that which is stirred by the objects of the religious faculty. On the other hand, it was in the world though not of it; itself immaterial, it was yet the harmony of material things; itself supersensuous and spiritual, it was to be found in the contemplation of the seen and temporal. Here was an object which seemed to preclude any longer the necessity either for merging the secular in the sacred or for absorbing the sacred in the

secular, an object in which the distinction between secular and sacred was annulled, which was at once each and both and neither. Within this refuge congregated those spirits who were dissatisfied alike with the pagan and with the Jew, who had failed to find rest in the observance of a hollow ritualism and failed to meet satisfaction in the submission to an absolute authority; the enthusiasm of humanity presented itself to these as at once a religion and a life.

Into its all-absorbing bosom Christianity lifted these forces one by one. It took them up successively and assimilated to itself each in turn. It took up Judaism, and in the sense of a Messianic mission it found the stimulating power of hope. It took up Romanism, and in the construction of an imperial church it found the sense of regal authority. It took up Hellenism, and in the utilising of philosophic speculations it realised that the new religion was capable of union with natural culture. But although Christianity took up these forces into its bosom, it did not unite them there. It embraced them with a maternal fondness, but it did not induce them to embrace one another; they experienced their mutual antagonism and struggled to be free. Each took the name of Christianity, but each repudiated the Christianity of the other. The Judaic tendency was at war with the Gentile force, the Hellenic tendency was at war alike with the Jewish theocracy and with the efforts at ecclesiastical imperialism. It was only when Christianity became the religion of the state that the appearance of antagonism ceased. Mediævalism exhibited the semblance of a Christendom whose forces had been blended into unity. Judaism, Romanism, and Hellenism, seemed at last to co-exist without struggle. Judaism had her theocracy represented in the sacred sovereignty of the pope. Romanism had her ideal recognised in the regal sanctity of the emperor.

Hellenism had her claims admitted in the permission afforded to church believers to confirm their faith by Aristotelian philosophy. Yet even here it is manifest that there was no union in the proper sense of the term. The elements were not really blended: they were simply tied with a string. Their struggle was prevented by restrictions from without, not by union from within. The fact revealed itself repeatedly by unmistakable signs. So early as the twelfth century the mediæval forces were already in full antagonism; the empire was struggling with the papacy, the papacy was struggling with the culture of southern France. The schism for a time seemed healed, and the unity appeared to be restored; but it was only for a time, and it was only in appearance. In the fourteenth century we find that the regal has crushed the papal power; the pope is torn from his capital, and compelled to live a vassal at Avignon. The great western schism completes the prostration of the once triumphant papacy, and that barrier is broken down which mediævalism had opposed to the power of kings. Culture becomes more bold in its aims and more ambitious in its flights. It had never been attached to the church by anything more than an artificial bond—the bond of papal authority. The shaking of that authority looses the frail cord that unites them. The age preceding the Reformation is already an age of independent inquiry. Philosophy has separated its sphere from theology. Natural science, in its primitive forms of alchemy and astrology, has begun to seek a principle of unity in nature. Biblical criticism, stimulated by the treasures gathered from the ruins of the Greek empire, has initiated its career of study by examining the manuscripts of the New Testament. Mysticism, wearied with the long repression of the individual, has risen up in the soul of a Thomas à Kempis to claim for the heart of each man an immediate and personal vision of God.

Now let us distinctly understand how much this implies. It is frequently averred that the Reformation was not a united movement. It is not sufficiently considered that the Reformation, in order to be a reformation, could not be a united movement. The Reformation was not a united movement, simply because Catholicism was not a united church. It attacked the Catholic Church in three distinct lines; which became in the sequel three mutually conflicting lines; but it did so because, in the heart of the Catholic Church, there were already concealed three mutually conflicting tendencies. Beneath the semblance of outward unity there lay unreconciled in the bosom of mediævalism the antagonistic forces of Judaism, Romanism, and Hellenism, bound together by the strength of an external cord, but with their natural characteristics unsubdued and panting to be free. In order to attack Catholicism, Protestantism had to attack the tendencies of Catholicism, and these tendencies were opposite in their nature. It was impossible that the same movement which should crush Catholic Judaism would extinguish its opposing element of Catholic Romanism; it was impossible that either of the movements or the two united would suffice to extinguish Catholic Hellenism. These forces in Catholicism, which were naturally opposed to one another, could only be met by forces in the Reformation, which were also naturally opposed to one another. There was an element in the Reformation which attacked the Judaic force, and in the very act it became the Protestant Gentile tendency. There was an element in the Reformation which attacked the Gentile force, and in the very act it became the Protestant Jewish tendency. There was an element in the Reformation which attacked the old Hellenic force, and in the very act it became the new tendency of Protestant culture.

The anti-Judaic form of Protestantism was the movement distinctively called Lutheran. It considered the principle of

the Reformation to begin and end with the formula of "justification by faith." It found in that formula the assertion of the rights of the individual man against the authority of the collective church. It was the revolt from the principle that the soul was under law, the protest against the doctrine that the actions of the human mind should spring from no other source than obedience to a foreign command. Justification by faith, whatever else it may or may not have meant, certainly conveyed to the Lutheran the idea of a right to private judgment. It was to him the antithesis of Judaism. It told the human mind that its liberty lay in its individual humanity, that its reason for any hope must be a hope within it. It told it that, in order to find the reason for its hope, it must cease to consider itself traditionally, must cease to view itself as the mere member of a Jewish family, or even as the mere subject of a visible theocracy; must retire within its own being to discover the ground of its religious assurance. That was pre-eminently what the Lutheran saw in the Reformation—an emancipation from the mechanical obedience to law, a transference into the glorious liberty of individual sonship. In so far as the Reformation was an anti-Gentile movement it had for the Lutheran little interest; nay, it received from him much antagonism. He had no decided objection to the use of images; he had a very decided objection to the disuse of sacraments. He refused to strip the Lord's Supper of its inherent efficacy, refused to separate the spiritual benefit from the elements of the bread and wine. He was still under the dominion of the secular; the objective rite retained for him its primitive value; his antagonism to the Judaic element proceeded from his antagonism to the conception of a God who could only speak to him in the accents of theocratic command. He was weary of worshipping a Being who, by the law of his own righteousness, was rendered incapable of union

with the world of material things, and he strove to give stronger prominence to that Gentile element of the Catholic Church which recognised in the material symbol an inherent efficacy, and saw in the forms of worship the actual presence of the divine.

The anti-Gentile form of Protestantism was the movement which is generally considered distinctive of the Reformed as opposed to the Lutheran churches. Holding, like the former, the principle of justification by faith, it found its main sphere of action in the assertion of another principle. The chief force of its attack was directed against the Gentile element of Catholicism. That part of the Catholic worship to which it felt itself most allied was precisely the Judaic principle to which the Lutheran movement was most opposed. It was impressed with the idea of theocracy; it was eager to allow no intervention between the soul and its invisible king. On that very account it objected to the transmission of a pagan ritual into Christianity. It was unwilling to suffer, even for the sake of illustration, the presence in divine worship of any graven image, or visible pattern of heavenly things. It was resolved not to permit the ascription to the elements of communion of any natural power, or any inherent efficacy. Like the Lutheran movement it was opposed to Judaism on the question of a particular priesthood: but there its opposition ended. It took its ground on the fact that all men were potential priests of God, and that therefore each individual had direct and immediate access to the secret of his pavilion. But it still insisted on believing that his pavilion *was* secret, that it was invisible, intangible, a house not made with hands. It would not consent to enclose his presence in a rite, or ceremony, or sacrament. It would not brook to contemplate his enshrinement within the limits of a form which was incapable of transcending materialism. It would not submit to seek the avenue of communion with

him in the contact with purely secular appliances which had constituted at one time the materials of heathen worship. It was essentially a Judaic Protestantism striving to go back to its primitive Hebrew type, seeking to retrace its steps beyond the region of Mosaic ritualism and formalism into the atmosphere of that patriarchal age where the soul lived and moved in the sense of an invisible but all-compelling presence.

The Neo-Hellenic form of Protestantism was the movement of a new against an old culture. It was the assertion of the rights of reason against the scholastic dictum that "faith precedes the intellect." The Catholic Church had been allowed to exercise human reason to the extent of proving by argument what it believed by faith, but as in the Catholic Church faith meant submission to authority, the concession to human reason was rather apparent than real; the earth was allowed to rest upon the elephant, but the elephant itself rested upon nothing, and there was therefore no basis for either of them. It was to establish such a basis that the new Hellenism arose. Nowhere was the spirit of Protestantism more distinctly Protestant than in its assertion of the rights of reason. Here, if anywhere, it claimed for the individual life the privilege of initiating its own process of inquiry. It denied that faith in authority should be compelled to precede the intellect: it denied that any faith could exist which was not itself preceded by the intellect. It required that every branch of secular study should be thrown open to the human mind without restriction and without qualification—should be investigated for its own sake, and read by its own light. It asked that nature, philosophy and poetry should cease to be merely the instruments by which the church expressed its mind and will, but should become themselves expressions of the mind and will of humanity. And the answer to this demand will be found in the great intellectual movement of the sixteenth

and seventeenth centuries. That movement carried individual research into every sphere, approached every department of knowledge with a purely secular eye. In the critical labours of Erasmus it laid the hand of the Gentile on the sacred monuments of the Jew, and subjected to human analysis those Scripture oracles which the church had claimed as her peculiar property. In the imaginative theories of Paracelsus it began what may be called an independent study of physical nature. In the bold speculations of Bruno it initiated the birth of modern philosophy, and became the inaugurator of German transcendentalism. In the analytic researches of Bacon it pointed to the new as distinguished from the old method of science, and recognised the study of fact as the only legitimate road to the knowledge of theory. In the speculations of Descartes it carried into the sphere of mind that Protestant individualism which Bacon carried into the sphere of matter, and proposed to construct a metaphysical science on the basis of an investigation which disclaimed all past conclusions. Even in the dramatic poetry of Shakespeare it revealed the influence of the new spirit, for there for the first time it presented to the contemplation of the poetic eye the image of universal man, the thought of humanity in itself apart from creeds and symbols, apart from nationalities and ages, but bearing the features which mark it in all nations, which distinguish it in all creeds, which characterise it in all ages. The poetry of Shakespeare is essentially the poetry of the renaissance, for it seeks to represent the spontaneous instincts of nature unrestricted by conventionalism, and untamed by ecclesiastical domination.

These, then, were the three religious forces which permeated the Europe of the sixteenth century. Of that Europe, perhaps, our own country is the microcosm. In the heart of the English nation the religious forces of the age were focussed and concentrated, presenting a miniature

picture of the condition of Europe at large. There was one party which held by the Gentile tendency. It was opposed to the theocratic dominion of the papacy; but it desired to hold fast by the mediæval forms of ritual, to adhere to the inherent efficacy of sacraments, to recognise one necessary mode of visible church organisation. There was another party, whose attitude was distinctively Judaic. Like the former, it was opposed to the papal theocracy; but it was by no means disposed to set up in its room the theocracy of a visible church. Its desire was rather to go back to that primitive Judaism which endured as seeing Him who is invisible, to retrace its steps into the empire of the unseen God, to recognise itself as the member of a theocracy whose Head ruled from afar, above the possibility of visual representation, and above the efforts of man to question or modify his will. The germ of English Puritanism was the resurrection of ancient Judaism, the protest of the spirit against the form.

But in the heart of the English nation there remained yet another tendency, and a tendency which was destined to have fuller and larger developments. There was a Hellenic party in the British microcosm—a party nurtured by the influence and fired by the spirit of Erasmus. It valued the Reformation not so much for what it did as for what it made it possible to do. It hailed the new movement of the human mind because it *was* a movement of the human mind, and because it saw in movement the evidence of life. It was comparatively indifferent to the change from one creed to another; it was keenly alive to the import implied in the *fact* of change. The transmutation of systems was a small thing, but the power to transmute was a matter of vast importance. That power meant freedom, and the very thought of freedom was the new birth of humanity. It revealed an object for divine influence more worthy of the divine than incorporation in mate-

rial elements. The human soul itself opened its doors as the possible habitation of the theocracy, and man beheld a new fountain of sacredness in the potential greatness of his own humanity. It was the perception of this new fountain which refreshed the heart of Elizabethan England. Man felt himself to be free, and that feeling was like the breath of ocean; it gave him a sense of the infinite, it filled him with immeasurable hopes. It was this sense of boundlessness, or, which is the same thing, this sense of being unbound, which impelled the mariner to traverse unnavigated seas, and to seek undiscovered shores. It was this which inspired him with the hope of finding in some region of the earth a Utopian paradise, a land rich with unappropriated gold and luxuriant with ungathered fruits. It was this which gave wings to the new literary impulse, which led man to recognise the poetry of the human soul, the changeless in the mutable, the universal type surviving the individual variations. It was this even which prompted much of the recklessness of that age. Men played with freedom as the child with a new-found toy. It was a new sensation to feel one's self unbound; it was an unparalleled experience to see no barred gate on life's journey. It is hardly surprising that the sensation proved at first intoxicating; that the immediate effect of the experience was overbalancing. Yet the light which led astray was the same light which, in other departments, was leading the way to truth. Men had been called to freedom ere yet they had been trained to be free, and the chain which had bound them for ages had been suddenly snapped asunder. They were brought into contact with a force whose nature they had never studied, and whose powers they did not know. It was only to be expected that, for the moment, they should be unable to control that impulse which itself had made them free.

These, then, are the materials for the modern church

historian, the identical materials which met the historian of the first Christian century. His task is to recombine the elements which the spirit of the Reformation has dissolved, or, to speak more correctly, it is to show what law these elements should follow in their process of recombination. It is quite certain that their process of recombination is not yet completed. There has not yet been found that second Roman empire which is capable of blending into the outward unity the forces of Latin secularism, of Jewish theocracy, and of Hellenic culture. As we survey the ecclesiastical history of the last three centuries, we find that each of these forces has in turn borne the pre-eminence. The first period of Reformation history may be called the age of the Gentiles. It was the elevation of the secular into the place occupied by the papal power. The king aspired to be the head of religion and the head of the state at the same time. The one aim was furthered by the decline of the papacy, the other by the fall of feudalism. Yet the century had not closed till there began to appear the democratic or Jewish tendency—democratic because theocratic, unimpressed by earthly kinghood because overwhelmed by the sense of divine sovereignty. With the treaty of Westphalia in 1648 the power of this new force turns the scale, and for a period of fifty years the theocratic tendency wears the crown. Then opens the eighteenth century—essentially a century of destruction. The secular and the sacred forces are alike opposed by the third great force of humanism asserting that its time for empire now has come. Church and state crumble together beneath the assaults of this long-repressed spirit, and in the conflagration of the French revolution their ruin seems complete. Then humanism enters on its reign. The culture of humanity claims universal power and universal worship; philosophy aspires to know the absolute, and poetry to feel the life of God. For the first thirty years of the nineteenth

century the empire of the third force is supreme, the next twenty years reveal it on the decline, and the present hour exhibits its decay. Science professes to have shattered the hopes of human absolutism; positivism has denied the claims of philosophy; and agnosticism preaches to man the doctrine of humility. So far, we would seem to be on the return to Judaism, a Judaism whose theocratic law is built no longer on religion but on the principles of physical nature. Yet through all these shiftings of the balance one thing is evident—that beneath these tendencies there lies a common life. The very fact that none of the forces singly has been able for long to hold dominion is a proof that none of the forces singly represents the sum of human need. The constant action and reaction which for nearly four hundred years has been kept up between the forces of the Reformation proves that in some manner yet undiscovered they are necessary to one another. The discovery of that necessity shall be the day of their union, the birth of the new Roman empire, the revelation of that life which subsists by the combination of opposites. It shall be the accomplishment, in fact, of what Latin Christianity accomplished only in form—the amalgamation of the secular with the sacred, and the identification of the sacred with the human.

GEORGE MATHESON.

MONASTIC REMINISCENCES.

REQUESTED to give a few memories of bygone days, not without reluctance do I comply. I have to remind myself of ideal hopes and of their disenchantment. No thoughtful man, no woman refined by the sense of spiritual beauty, can suppose the monastic and conventual life to have existed for 1,500 years in Christendom, for 2,400 years in Buddhism, without containing elements of beauty and of truth. No great religion has existed solely through the power of its errors. No great system has ever flourished solely by means of its faults. It is possible to eschew an error whilst recognising in it a germ of enduring truth. Even a festering heap of corruption contains within itself a spark of light and heat. All forms of faith, all systems of life, being human, must embody elements of goodness, piety, earnestness, and beauty. If one of these, to any mind, has ever been a temple of hope, to revisit the temple bereft of its illusions is not without pain : as when a traveller returning to the home of his youth, revisits the ivy-covered tower, and, wandering round its staircase, finds it leading nowhere.

I shall be guided by my personal memories when describing the general tenor of life aimed at in well-ordered and fervent conventual institutions, and by established facts when very briefly touching upon the ethical and political side of the question.

In the year 1860, being Roman Catholic incumbent of St. Andrew's, I delivered a public lecture in the Town Hall of

Newcastle-on-Tyne, in presence of a great and mixed audience, wherein I gave a sketch of the Dominican Order, which I was arranging to enter that summer, after having made over to them my Parochial House, four schools, and two of the churches then under my jurisdiction. From that lecture I will presently quote a few passages, which still appear to me to be historically true, though truth becomes a lie, unless we also remember that there is another parallel line of truth. The Dominican Order has doubtless encouraged a finer moral type of character than the Jesuit, and a finer intellectual type than the Franciscan; it has in each country been more national than some Orders of later date, and has frequently done for Art what the Benedictines accomplished for Literature. But whilst all the best monastic Orders have claims upon our gratitude which result from the exercise of those human virtues which illustrate all religions and all sections of society and of thought; we must remember, on the other hand, that, next to the power of the episcopate, monasticism has ever been instrumental in the hands of the papacy in endeavouring by any means, physical, penal, and spiritual, to suppress all forms of science, of free inquiry, of free investigation, of mental, moral, political, and national liberty, likely to endanger the sole absolute supremacy of the Roman Church. Such procedure is essential to the theory of a Theocratic Infallible Church; it must be not only an *imperium in imperio*, but an empire over every other empire. However, the Roman Catholic Church and her monastic Orders belong to us as men and women of the nineteenth century; they form part of the complex action of human life, of the providential development of the cosmic growth. Thus we, standing on the platform of humanity, can, with sympathetic interest, with compassion, with regret, with a not inhuman censure, look round upon the diversified provinces of our *orbis terrarum*.

Here let me express regret as to a very important dete-

rioration pervading the entire Roman Catholic Church, and affecting all her institutions,—the mental and moral deterioration produced by the increased and increasing system of centralisation and personal absolutism.

The best days of the Dominican Order were the days of its greatest liberty. Each priory elected by ballot its own officers and governing body. Groups of priories elected their own Provincial. The representatives of the national priories elected their General. Pío Nono was the first Pope who interfered with this liberty, and forced upon the entire Order a creature of his own, who intruded upon individual priories foreigners obnoxious to the members and alien to the national sentiment. So complete is the bondage now accomplished over the whole of the Roman Catholic Church, that the Dominican, though the boldest of the religious Orders, has been compelled to a sullen submission. Another evil which has of late years permeated the whole of the Papal Church, is the deliberate introduction of the spirit of Jesuitry, and its odious system of "direction" and of espionage, previously confined to the Jesuit society, but now pervading the episcopate, ecclesiastical institutions, and domestic life. It is sad to witness the lessening of happiness, as well as of the best moral characteristics, induced by this deplorable change. To an old English Roman Catholic, it would seem like a new religion, with all the festering evils of episcopal despotism, servile submission, secret manœuvring, and in hearts noble but believing, suffering silent because without hope. The extent of this tyranny is quite unrealised by the English mind. To cite an instance, one of the most learned theologians of the Dominican Order is always appointed to the office of "Master of the Sacred Palace;" to him belongs the censorship of books and other functions of high trust. A few years ago, the friar holding that office expressed to Pius the Ninth his respectful objections to a course of action imposed upon him. Such

frankness of utterance was quite in harmony with the traditions and usage of the Dominican Order; but to the new *régime* it was intolerable, and the aged priest was, by order of the Pope, seized by two Papal guards and carried off to prison. Though Rome was at that time full of visitors, the incident never (as far as I know) reached the public ear, or got reported by the Press; it was communicated to me by a Dominican Father who was in Rome at the time.

The Bishops, acting as Papal Prefects, are now, far more than the religious orders, the powerful enemies of all national, domestic, and individual liberty; entirely subservient to the Pope, they have an otherwise irresponsible power, can suspend, remove, and punish. Thus, Sister Melainie, the foundress of the great Pilgrimage and Church of La Salette, was, as stated to me by a Roman Catholic bishop, imprisoned without trial, in a French convent, when doubts regarding her supposed miraculous gifts caused her to wish to leave the convent in England where she had been professed.

The picturesque beauty of monastic ruins must not cause us to forget that the monastic rules require that in each monastery and priory there should be a prison, and that the ecclesiastical authorities of those communities are enjoined to imprison therein any member of their body who violates specified rules, or is deemed unsound in his belief of any article of the Roman Catholic faith. These rules are still in force and studied by novices in their novitiate, as may be seen by consulting the approved rules of the Dominican Order; and the Roman Catholic Church teaches emphatically that when the State dares to interfere with her internal government, the civil law ceases to bind, and that, if yielded to, it is only temporarily, and for the sake of prudence. When the law asserts itself, troublesome ecclesiastics pose as martyrs, and not only in the Papal Church. These grave

and fundamental facts must be remembered, lest we should otherwise allow our judgment to be borne away to the encouragement of the injurious, under some aspect of beauty or beneficence. And it is still my opinion that, if we frankly own the evils and errors of Papal and Anglican monasticism, we might therefrom gather suggestions capable of beneficial realisation, in some modes bereft of all ecclesiasticism, absolutism, false asceticism, and superstition. Thus, I think, men or women when engaged on some literary or charitable or personal matter of importance, would feel it a great boon were there existing amongst us something analogous to the house for retreats built by the lay brothers of St. Laurent-sur-Sèvres, where, in a peaceful seclusion, in silence, unmolested by any household cares, without singularity, with cloister, gardens, and library, those plans which need tranquil thought could be worked out effectually. It was with some such idea that I said, in the lecture already alluded to, "Who has not sometimes in the midst of tempestuous years gone by, pictured to himself and tenanted in spirit those spiritual fortresses which have stilled so many passions and protected so many resolutions?" The courtyard, surrounded by its cloistered walk, in the middle of the court, the well emblematic of the living water of divine wisdom, the sacred inscriptions around the walls, the refectory, library, scriptorium, and church communicating with the cloister; up a flight of stairs the long corridor hung with its old pictures of miracles and of saints; the symmetrical range of doors all opening into the corridor. At the sound of a bell all these doors open with a kind of sweetness and respect. Then appear in long array to refectory or to choir old men with white hair, serene and benevolent; young men of early maturity, novices in whom youth and tranquil study blend into a shade of beauty by artists deemed almost peculiar to the cheerful, frank, active, social seclusion of the sons of St.

Dominic, called the "Angelic Order," in consequence of their white habit and supposed heavenly origin.

In many foreign countries the condition of the Monastic Orders is fearfully and hopelessly corrupt ; but no censure of that kind could attach itself to the novitiate at Woodchester. Its situation is singularly picturesque, being on the side of a hill adjacent to the beautiful park of its founder. We are probably all of us alive to what is unreal, untrue, detrimental, and dangerous in the tendencies of a life based upon a principle essentially erroneous ; but the honest inquirer ought to be made aware that those young men wending their way to the choir, whilst on one side humiliated by regulations worse than frivolous, are the conscious inheritors of many noble traditions. The Friar preachers were founded to be at once students and missionaries over the entire world ; they have produced four Popes, forty-seven Archbishops, and 2,150 Bishops. They have, in a special way, encouraged theology, philosophy, painting, music, and the fine arts. Fra Angelico has made us familiar with those countenances, crowned with stars and luminous with purity and tenderness, easily causing us to forget that the novice of seraphic face might, under the guidance of his Church, become a judge in the Court of the Inquisition. But, in spite of the connection of the Order with that suppression of free investigation demanded by the essential constitution of the Papal Church, the antagonistic fact remains equally true that, with the reserve just stated, the Dominicans were *otherwise* in all countries on the side of the oppressed. "The Indian, hunted like a wild beast, has found shelter behind their habit ; the negro still bears upon his neck the sign of their embrace ; the Chinese have sat down to listen to those wondrous strangers. The Ganges has seen them communicate the divine wisdom to pariahs ; the ruins of Babylon have lent them a stone whereon to rest for a moment and think on the ancient days. Every coast bears a trace of their

blood; the echoes of every shore have been awakened by their voice. What lands or forests have they not explored? What tongue have they not spoken? What wounded soul or body has not felt the pressure of their hand? And while some made again and again the circuit of the world under every flag, their brethren argued in the councils and assemblies of Europe; whilst others, blending genius with piety and taste, took in hand the pencil or the pen, the chisel of the sculptor and the compass of the architect, thus elevating to God both humanity and art."

The Chapter-house at Woodchester was decorated with frescoes by two of the novices. In that room each week the entire community assembled. After singing the invocation of the Holy Ghost in Latin, and a brief exhortation having been given, a monastic exercise called the *Culpa* took place. Each rose, and, after accusing himself of any fault he had committed against the Rule, or against fraternal charity, prostrated himself full length on the floor, whilst other members of the community rose, and assisted his memory by proclaiming any fault he had witnessed in his brother. Notice here the marked difference between the Dominican and the Jesuit Rule. Until of late, when some foreign superiors have, under the influence of the modern Papal system, endeavoured to introduce into all religious Orders an imitation of the Jesuit system, the proclamation of faults was, at least in the Dominican order, straightforward, in hearing of the accused and of the community. The Jesuit system constitutes every one a secret informer upon every one else. Every boy, especially if admitted into the "Sodality of our Lady" (a confraternity existing in all Jesuit colleges), is expected to be a spy upon every one else, and to go secretly and inform his superior as to even the smallest detail. This system of espionage is extended over private families wherein any member of the family or house-

hold is under Jesuit direction. When such statements regard persons of importance or priests of the Order, they are not only noted down, but handed on to a higher superior. The exceptional dislike with which the Jesuits are privately viewed by three-fourths of the clergy and educated men of the world is partly in consequence of this odious system, which, operating in secret and unexpected ways, drags so many into the entanglement of nets of exposure or of destruction. The Roman Catholic Bishops are compelled, by motives of prudence, to keep up a public appearance of cordiality towards the Jesuits, seeming to encourage their colleges and churches; but people behind the scenes know full well that most of them would be heartily glad to have the Jesuits out of their dioceses. The same sentiment of dislike, a similar want of confidence, has animated many of the Popes, including the present and the last. I know how opposed this is to the popular idea, as also to many external actions, such as Pio Nono placing the "*Civiltà Cattolica*" in the hand of some Jesuit fathers, after the Dominicans had refused to undertake it. If time permitted, the reasons might easily be given. Suffice it to say, that it is not convenient for rivals to be playing at the same game near to one another. The Roman Catholic Bishops are now Papal prefects, scheming against nationalities and opponents in the interests of the Papacy with which they are identified. The Jesuits are emissaries of a foreign General scheming against all opponents in the interests of their own Order. Hence the barely-veiled jealousy between Cardinal Manning and the London Jesuits; the open enmity which existed between these and the late Cardinal Wiseman. But to return to the *Culpa*. When the proclamations are finished, the Father presiding enjoins a penance. The penance is frequently only a prayer; but amongst external penances are the following:—To kiss the feet of all the community; to lie down on the threshold of the refectory

door, and let the community walk over you; to eat your dinner kneeling in the centre of the refectory; to wash some brother's room; to write out a full list of all your faults, and read it aloud; to wear the "catanella;" to use, give, or receive the discipline. The catanella is a chain with internal points, worn round the body or on one of the arms or legs. The discipline is a knotted hempen scourge of several lashes, applied to the bared shoulders, either by the person himself or by one of his friends. A not unfrequent penance is to go to another's room, kneel down, and kiss his feet, and ask him to give you the discipline, which he does during the recital of one of the penitential psalms. He then dismisses you with the fraternal embrace and kiss of peace. In Holy Week, the discipline is taken by the whole community together. Abroad, the laity are frequently admitted to a participation in that privilege. Such is also the case in London at the Oratory of St. Philip. In Holy Week, the ceremony of the washing of the feet of the community is observed; but that being a precept of Jesus Christ, is not peculiar to the Dominicans, and is practised throughout the Roman Catholic Church.

The Dominicans are not monks, but "Brother Preachers," "Friar Preachers." Though their habit is white—a white serge tunic and white scapular—yet they received popularly the name of "Black Friars," in consequence of the black cappa worn when walking out. When within the Priory, they take fish instead of meat. When meat is ordered, as very frequently it is for the sake of health, it is always served in a separate room.

During dinner and supper, one of the brothers occupies the refectory pulpit, and reads aloud. After a portion of the Vulgate and of the Martyrology, an English book of an edifying kind is read during the rest of the meal. After dinner and supper, there is recreation in the spacious gardens, the brothers mingling as they like with one another

in conversation, or joining in lighter games. Once a week the recreation is taken in country walks, or in the woods, or on the water of the lake. On other occasions a not severe silence is expected to be observed. At midnight and thrice during the day the community assemble for the divine office—viz., the recital of the Breviary in the choir of the church. The rays of the moon, falling on the windows of the cloister as the white-robed brothers pass along by the graves of their departed into the beautiful Gothic church, form a picture an artist or a poet might envy.

Each Dominican brother has a room to himself. It is called a cell, but is, in fact, a cheerful little apartment, with his bed, table, books, a few pictures, and window looking out upon the cloister court, or upon one of the fairest valleys in Gloucestershire. The Dominican spirit is essentially a free and cheerful spirit. The fathers and choir-brothers devote themselves to study and preaching. The lay-brothers, gathered from the class of rustics, are the servants and gardeners, the cooks, tailors, and bakers of the Priory.

The *Times* printing-office at Blackfriars is on the site of the old London Priory of the Friar Preachers. Some of the large halls still existing in provincial towns, such as St. Andrew's Hall at Norwich, were built by the Dominicans.

The Cistercians, to whom we owe some of the most picturesque ruins in England, are now chiefly known in their Trappist reform. My excellent deceased friend, De Lisle, of Grace Dieu and Garendon, erected a picturesque Trappist monastery in Charnwood Forest. With the exception of two or three priests and two or three others who have sought there a spiritual hiding-place, the Trappist brothers in Leicestershire are for the most part rustics of the simplest sort. In France and Belgium a considerable number of soldiers join that Order. The Carthusians, Trappists, and Carmelites are properly monks, being bound

to enclosure. Dominicans and Franciscans are not bound to enclosure, and therefore are fratres, not monks. However, in reading mediæval and monastic Latin, it should be observed that *Monasterium* signifies a "Religious" House of Women, *Conventus* a "Religious" House of Men. The Trappist Rule is painfully severe, and trying alike to mind and health, unless to those singularly constituted characters to whom silence, manual work, and choral offices can give peace and comfort. The trial is increased by the absence of any independent solitude. The Trappist, unless in authority, has no private room; he sleeps in a dormitory, he prays in a choir, when allowed to read for an hour it is again in public. He goes to his work in the fields along with others, but must only speak to others by signs, except when in Chapter. The Trappists are allowed one full meal and one very slight meal, but not meat, fish, or eggs. Unquestionably, they injure their health by eating too much at one time; and the ill-selected vegetable diet and enormous dishes of soup produce stoutness without strength. The Dominican diet seemed to me singularly conducive to pure health and mental vigour, but the young men looked pale and delicate, as if they would fail in continuous physical energy. The Dominicans, Franciscans, Carthusians, and Trappists are amongst those who endeavour to observe literally the practical doctrines of the Sermon on the Mount. Protestant theologians regard all the sayings of Christ as precepts, and therefore binding all. Roman Catholic theologians invent a somewhat arbitrary distinction, and characterise some as precepts, others as counsels. The precepts bind all; the counsels only those who aspire to perfection. Thus they say that St. Paul advises the state of celibacy, but does not absolutely forbid marriage; that Christ enjoins benevolence on all, but to those who would be perfect, the practice of giving to every one who asks. Thus at Woodchester we never refused food to any

human being. We often gave 800 dinners to tramps in the course of a month. The Trappist Monastery, though in a sequestered locality, is visited by countless numbers, who invariably obtain relief, and, so far as there is space, lodgment in the guest department. Those who can afford it are invited, but not obliged, to contribute to the monastic alms-chest. This promiscuous almsgiving is unquestionably injurious, but it is the consistent and conscientious carrying out of Gospel teaching. Experience has proved the Oriental idea to be a mistake. For myself, I confess to a greater respect for those who consistently act out a false theology honestly believed, than for those who are always parading their allegiance to Christ as of divine obligation, and yet do not attempt to obey the most marked of his precepts.

The Leicestershire Trappists, through benevolent motives, undertook the charge of a reformatory; but in spite of their personal kindness and anxiety, it never really succeeded. Indeed, the most experienced Roman Catholics generally admitted that for all worldly purposes, schools and other institutions were better under laymen and laywomen than under the "Religious" of either sex. The "Religious" have only one real object, the endeavour to keep those submitted to their care in a frame of mind which shall induce them to a frequent and docile reception of the sacraments, and thereby to secure their salvation. Now God has not made us solely for the sacraments and for a secure death-bed, but for the healthy development of our complex nature. The monastic and conventual guardians of virtue can, by anxious vigilance, shield off many moral temptations, and produce a home of child-like innocence; but, alas! the characters so trained, though often graceful, tender, simple-hearted, and pure, are morally feeble and dependent as children. Hence the Roman Catholic training has been proved by experience to be a failure; and where there is comparative success, it is in institutions wherein the English national characteristics

specially co-exist, as at the colleges of Ushaw, Oscott, and the Birmingham Oratory. But those colleges, as also the grand Seminaire de S. Sulpice at Paris, of which, and of Ushaw, I was an alumnus after leaving the University of Cambridge, do not belong to my present subject, though I am glad to render a passing homage of respect to the blameless men whom I learned to esteem and love in those and cognate institutions, as also in the "Religious" Houses to which I have previously alluded. It is my sad duty to add that the experience of my Roman Catholic ecclesiastical friends abroad, especially in countries wherein the Roman Catholic system has had full exercise, unchecked by Protestant environments, was in numerous instances utterly opposed to my experiences in England, at Issy, and at St. Sulpice. The evidence from abroad thus painfully forced upon my knowledge made me fully appreciate the observation addressed by Pius the Ninth to a Roman Catholic Bishop after the suppression of "Religious" Houses by the late King of Italy—"It was the devil's work, but the good God will turn it into a blessing, since their destruction was the only reform possible to them." Blanco White, in his profoundly impartial narrative of Roman Catholic institutions in Spain, testifies to a similar fact, showing convents of women not to have been exceptions to the widespread moral depression. It is needless to say that exceptions must have been numerous, but it is unquestionable, by the evidence of fervent Roman Catholics, that the ecclesiastical state of Italy was to a wide extent so flagrantly corrupt, so grossly immoral, that I can well conceive the otherwise doubtful allegations of Henry VIII.'s Commissioners to have been truthful expositions of facts. Those who in the Church of England are endeavouring to create fancy imitations of Papal institutions, ought to be warned by the patent fact that these have failed even from the Roman Catholic standpoint, unless when kept in check by

an overwhelming Protestant or Free Thinking majority; whereas, if these institutions are really beneficial, they ought to have made Italy, Spain, and Monarchical France into terrestrial paradises. Whilst thus slightly glancing at the existence of widespread and deep moral evil and at that of much personal and hopeless misery throughout the Roman Catholic ecclesiastical and conventual bodies in Roman Catholic Europe and in South America, I must emphatically state that such remarks do not apply to the convents of women in England and Ireland. Indeed, the statements received from fervent Roman Catholics as to the moral corruption abroad, would not have commanded my belief if made by Protestants or Free Thinkers, so little are they in harmony with my personal experiences in our happily Protestant England. In English convents of nuns, there are some who lament the state to which they have committed themselves, but when belief in a false theology retains them, no legislative enactments could liberate them. In this matter I can speak with knowledge; having been "Extraordinary" to many important convents, it was my duty to see every member of the community alone, whether she wished it or not. I have known nuns unhappy in their life and in consequence of their life, but they could not be induced to apply for a dispensation from their vows, lest they should "lose their souls in the world." Convent life unquestionably for the most part narrows the character; but I feel it almost an insult to the blameless and innocent women I have known intimately, peopling our English and Irish convents, even to name for repudiation the gross calumnies so unworthily and falsely cast upon them by vulgar and ignorant people.

I do not wish to imply any base insinuation when I add that in my opinion there should be a legal obligation, under pain of fine, binding every community to keep a register, in which should be entered the real name and previous

address of each inmate, and also the real name and address of visitors who sleep within the convent walls. In many "Religious" houses of women, and in some of men, the real name of the inmate is never used, not even known to the community. I have known cases wherein parents and others have tried ineffectually to discover whether an individual missing was in a "Religious" house, or dead. If a register, such as I propose, were kept and periodically sent to a registry office for reasonable inspection, no insult would be implied, but a safeguard obtained; and it must be remembered that occasionally nuns partially insane are kept virtually imprisoned in good and kind communities, but under circumstances not always satisfactory. In France, when the Senate refused to adopt the Ministerial measure approved by the Assembly, and thus drove the Government to fall back upon the existing law of France, requiring all communities to apply for Government recognition, the "Religious" houses refused to obey the law, acting upon the Roman Catholic theory that the Church is above the State, and obeys no laws but her own, or those laws of the State which she consents to tolerate. Such a position no State can recognise; but, as a matter of prudence, it would have been a wise course to avoid enforcing obedience in a manner apparently harsh and affecting those who had no voice in the illegal disobedience. The Pope and his prefects, the Bishops, are the real offenders. Obedience could have been gently and quietly obtained if the Government had signified to the Bishops that all ecclesiastical salaries provided by the nation would cease until they had caused the "Religious" bodies to obey the law. Should the ecclesiastical authorities have elected through political motives to continue to foster disobedience so as to make the "Religious" houses the permanent citadels of Napoleonic or Bourbon reaction, the laity who approved their disaffection could have subsidised

a Church, thus making it independent of the State. In England, wherein the Papal Church is in some particulars more favoured politically and socially than in any Roman Catholic country, it seems to me quite practicable to secure obedience to any reasonable law not accompanied with any conditions implying an insult. Those who hear of foreign legislation in Roman Catholic countries and marvel at its impetuosity, are apt to forget that it is not necessarily animated by the spirit of persecution, but rather of self-protection on the part of those who have but recently escaped an almost successful conspiracy of Imperialists and ecclesiastics. When these ecclesiastics were in full power, no murmurs of opposition, no accents of freedom could have been uttered or published with impunity. No political party desires to deprive Roman Catholics of their religious rites; but it ought to be remembered that there are millions of men and thousands of women who feel that a nation does not exist merely for the sake of a Papal theory. It is said that one thing or another is not possible because a few years since the Pope forbade it. Then let the Pope withdraw his mandate. Roman Catholics understand full well, when it is for their own convenience, that the Pope can dispense with all enactments and all laws and all bonds but those of clearly natural obligation.

It is patent to all observers of events in modern Europe that the public opposition to Roman Catholicism is more political than theological. If Roman Catholics contented themselves with administering the sacraments, working miracles, interviewing the blessed Virgin Mary, preaching the dogmas of piety and morals according to their ecclesiastical convictions, and endeavouring to convert others to such views, no Government would interfere with them. But now Roman Catholics delight to make it prominent that a foreign and hostile power is not only theoretically

but practically superior to the State. A conquered nation is made to feel its yoke when it cannot make laws without having first to consult the wishes of its conquerors, and the humiliation is intensified when, should such consultation have been neglected, the conquerors set aside the laws, enforce contradictory mandates, and enjoin disobedience to the laws of the conquered race. Surely a nation must be lost to self-respect ere it will tamely yield to such an oppression. When a nation is well established in liberal thought and action, it refrains from the exercise of authority theoretically just, and, therefore, refuses to punish audacious proclamation of theories of rebellion, or to enforce against the theorists existing laws for the protection of national dignity. The Government limits its action to the suppression of deeds of illegality calculated to disorganise society. The question at present before the French nation is, whether or not the scornful rejection of the French law requiring communities to seek for Government recognition constitutes an illegality compromising the public peace as well as outraging the national dignity. It is admitted on all sides that the open disobedience of the Religious Orders was meant to demonstrate that the Pope is superior to the Republic as well as hostile to it. The revival of a disused law in France reminds us that in the English Act of Parliament which emancipated Roman Catholics in the year 1829, a limitation was established, affecting Jesuits and other Religious Orders of men bound by monastic or religious vows. To provide for the gradual suppression and final prohibition of such, it was ordained that any such persons coming into the realm without a licence, which can only last six months, are declared guilty of a misdemeanour, and may be sentenced to be banished for life. Similarly, any persons admitted within the kingdom to membership in any of the Orders in question may be sentenced to banishment for life. If, although banished,

they do not go out of the country, the sovereign in council may have them conveyed to some place abroad. Moreover, if they are found in the country at the end of three months, they may be convicted again and transported. Penal servitude is now substituted for transportation.

True Liberals should move for the repeal of these enactments. A time will probably arise when some line of action adopted by the Roman Catholic Bishops, some ordinance from the Pope, will justly irritate the public mind; and then the Government may be compelled by the popular voice to punish the innocent for the sake of the guilty. We have (happily) no laws against the Papal Bishops, but we could banish or imprison a few hundred harmless Trappists, Dominicans, Franciscans, and Carthusians. It may be replied, "But the law will at least get hold of the Jesuits." And if it did, what then? Our real dangerous enemies are the Bishops. The great political and moral mischief is the system of "direction" exercised by means of the confessional now permeating the Roman Catholic Church. But surely we are not to be asked to legislate against the Papal Sacraments. The Jesuits are quite as much a source of weakness to Romanism as of strength. They are scheming for power for themselves and their General; the Bishops are scheming for power for themselves and the Pope. The two objects frequently harmonise, but not unfrequently are antagonistic.

If Liberal thinkers in England made themselves acquainted with the Canon Law and the existing Papal claims, and even still more with the mode in which those claims are being forwarded to the detriment of domestic happiness, of social peace, and of many phases of personal virtue, they would recognise that able politicians on the Continent are not all the victims of mere vulgar bigotry and causeless panic. There must be some valid reason for the hatred animating three-fourths of the Roman

Catholic laity against what they affirm to be a widespread domestic as well as political conspiracy, combining, against the interests of society, the prying surveillance of the Jesuits and the organised absolutism of the Bishops.

The defenders or palliators of modern Roman ecclesiasticism are to be found amongst English Ritualists and a section of English Liberals. The hostile opponents of Romanism are foreigners who, in Roman Catholic countries, have made their first Communion and been confirmed in the Roman Catholic Church, are still nominally in the same, and have wives and daughters reared in convents and subject to "direction." When I have spoken with French, Belgian, and Italian Roman Catholic laymen, of the cheerful goodness pervading such institutions as Ushaw and Woodchester, and the innocent and inoffensive lives of so many English priests, my words have been met with expressions of indignant disagreement. As a Belgian Roman Catholic professor said to me, "If you were to reside amongst us a few years, and see behind the scenes in domestic life and in political life, you would see why we hate the confessional and all who sit in it—each confessional is the detestable symbol of the humiliation of the parent and of the State."

The casuistry of the Jesuits has now established itself throughout the Roman Catholic Church; what it is like can be learned with perfect accuracy by procuring the small volume published by Charpentier, Paris, and, after a few months, already in its fourteenth edition, entitled, "*La Morale des Jésuites, par Paul Bert.*" Each year of my life makes me realise more profoundly the moral injury produced by absolutism and "direction," and by the errors essentially interwoven with Papal monasticism and Papal casuistry. The French are justly alarmed at the enormous wealth of the Ecclesiastical institutions—a wealth untaxed, and in the possession of those who are opposed to the best interests of the nation. England is now incurring a similar

danger. Liberals will not invoke laws to remove the growing evil, but, if wise in time, they will urge upon society and upon the Government not to foster it by patronage, not to encourage it as a fashion, not to palliate it by untruthful courtesies.

Let no picturesque or poetic associations make us blind to the fact that the monastic and conventual life is not the highest life, is not the highest ideal, or that the English home is more full of unselfish virtue, of genuine piety, of pure, tender sympathy, of the true poetry and pathos of the finest human life, than the Papal convent with its false asceticism and its ethics opposed to the laws of nature and of God.

Then, has it all been for nought? All those generous youths, those fervent women, who, mantled with charity, and marked with the wounds of penance, tore themselves from their homes and flung themselves into the arms of Jesus Christ,—was it all an illusion? That Aquinas, who fled from the castle of his ancestors, cast away the diadem of earth, preferred the royalty of thought to the royalty of gold, clothed himself in the white wool of St. Dominic, sought a solitude which had inspired poets, created artists, animated genius,—was it all an illusion when he trampled beneath his feet the passions of youth, and gathering around him the white folds of purity, received poverty as his possession, and from the hands of an ideal Christ the sceptre of meekness, and calmly ascended the throne of philosophy to rule over the empire of mediæval thought? Was it all an illusion, whatever imparted to him the privilege of preserving to his last breath that earnestness of purpose, that generosity of soul, that strength of affection, that simplicity of heart, which often are reserved to the first dawn of youth? Was it all an illusion when there clustered around his solemn lessons the listening hearts of the pure and the young? I trow not. It is no illusion when we follow the highest

ideal that we know. Those great memories belong to our common humanity. Monastic Houses cannot be fairly or beneficially put down by legislation; in spite of what they may frequently have become, they originally sprang out of the enthusiasm of the human heart. They must be confronted with an enthusiasm as noble, as pure, and as beneficent. They presented to a credulous age an ideal, wearing that triple aureola so revered by youth, of charity, of chastity, and of poetry.

In an age when the credulities are fast becoming impossible, Piety, Humanity, and Science, the trinity of the nineteenth century, will conquer a threefold enthusiasm if again crowned, as in the best days of old, by Charity, by Chastity, and by Poetry.

R. RODOLPH SUFFIELD.

THE REASONABLENESS OF EVOLUTION.

A REPLY TO DR. ELAM.

CCRITICISMS of the doctrine of Evolution are by no means so numerous as they used to be. This diminution of critical activity is due chiefly to the fact that most of the demands of the Evolutionist have been admitted by biologists to be reasonable and just. Otherwise it is impossible to account for the favourable reception which the hypothesis of descent has met with at the hands of the biological world at large. There are, however, still some persons who remain, in accordance with the theory of averages, unconvinced on the subject of Evolution. These persons may be divided into those who "don't know," and those others who "won't know." The scientific objector to Evolution *in toto*, is somewhat of a *rara avis* in these latter days. But one stumbles across him now and then, and mostly in the pages of evangelical magazines, whose readers are only too thankful to be told by some one that man is descended not "from the monkey, but from mud." A review of what has been written on the "other side" during the past year or so, reveals a paucity of material for criticism. One of the most recent declarations appears in the *Contemporary Review* for May, 1880.

In a paper entitled "The Gospel of Evolution," Dr. Elam, criticises, from the standpoint of the "Opposition," the leading doctrine and idea of the present decade of learning. Needless to remark, Dr. Elam writes strongly, even if he is a somewhat biassed critic, as I shall presently strive to

show. But whilst he deprecates Evolution, tooth and nail, he is, at the same time, justly mindful of the claims which its foremost advocates possess upon the hearing ears and understanding minds of the age. With the tenor of his opening remarks upon the value of the labours of Darwin and Huxley, all will agree. The labours of these biologists in extending the bounds of knowledge, and in making large the dwelling-places of wisdom, Dr. Elam would assert—and practically does say—are beyond all commendation or praise. Most biologists, and not a few non-technical readers likewise, may, however, be inclined to supplement the preceding remark by another—namely, that it had been more to the purpose could the researches of these leaders of biological thought have inspired Dr. Elam with a belief in the reasonableness of the doctrines they teach. Still, conscientious objections to this theory, or to the interpretation of that fact, must be respected. If over and over again in Dr. Elam's article one is inclined to mentally ejaculate, "that strain again," and if our author harps pretty persistently on the same strings throughout his criticisms of Evolution, we must not, in barest justice, forget that certain of his opponents are given to a similar repetition of facts which they conceive support and prove their case. Readers of Dr. Elam's earlier papers in the *Contemporary Review* will not find much that is new in the article under notice; but the latter demands special attention as being, *de facto*, a concise enough summary of his previously expressed opinions against the doctrine of Descent. Dr. Elam, one must admit, is an antagonist whom one may well feel pleased to meet, and with whom one may break a lance in fair contest. If in his papers one hears just a little too much of the "learned and modest Dr. Büchner," whose name seems to inspire in our author the feelings excited by the proverbial red rag of bovine philosophy, we must not forget that, on the contrary, the epithet "weather-cock head" is by no

means a flattering appellation as bestowed from the opposition camp. The exchange of scientific sentiment is proverbially acetic, if one may so term it; but the demolition of an adversary may be accomplished without the concomitant attributes of Donnybrook, and *minus* the phrase "you're another" presented in sarcastic guise. If Evolution and its acceptance or its rejection be, as it unquestionably is, an all-serious matter, let us dispense with the frivolity of cleverness, and eliminate objurgatory from our list of arguments. Sensible people may well grow weary of the most dexterous word-fencing, when the question at issue is of grave and portentous kind.

A careful perusal of Dr. Elam's paper leaves upon the mind, as the leading idea of the author's case, that he objects throughout to the status of Evolution as a rational theory of life and nature. He denies that the evolutionists have made out a case worthy a patient scientific hearing. Evolution to Dr. Elam is all theory—all subjective projection of ideas, without any objective correspondence. He is the sworn foe of hypothetical phylogeny and ontogeny likewise. After a perusal of Dr. Elam's demands for proof, indeed, one is tempted to ask in despair, "What science shall delight him, and wherewithal in modern learning shall he be satisfied?" For him the question of "missing links" remains where it was years ago in the eyes of the Cuvierian philosophy. "Amongst animals," says Dr. Elam (p. 731), "we observe at least five distinct types, between any two of which there is no known or suspected transitional form." * Biologists, and especially zoologists, may

* Dr. Elam may not, perhaps, be aware that his "five distinct types" do not include the entire animal population of the globe. Where would he set the Starfishes, Sea-urchins, and their neighbours? These are not Protozoal, they are not Cœlenterates nor Mollusca, and they are neither Annulosa nor Vertebrates. Our author must renew his acquaintance with elementary zoology. Naturalists who teach that there are types, at least teach us that there are six, and not five, divisions—the missing division in Dr. Elam's list being that of the Echinozoa or Annuloida.

well be inclined to read this sentence over again amid some degree of wonder and surprise when they reflect upon Kowalewsky's researches into the history of the Ascidian-larva—the true bearing of which discovery Dr. Elam does not seem to comprehend (*vide* p. 732). With Dr. Elam's disclaimer of "missing links" in view, zoologists may well be inclined to say, Have *Lepidosiren* and the frog existed in vain? have Protozoan sponges exhibited the *ectoderm* and *endoderm* of *Coelenterates* for naught? and do birds and reptiles remain distinct—Professor Marsh and the *Hesperornis*, *Ichthyornis*, and *Compsognathus* or the *Archæopteryx* notwithstanding? So firmly fixed, indeed, are Dr. Elam's opinions, that no such thing as Evolution is possible, far less probable, in his view. With Dr. Elam it is not a question of the factors which have inaugurated, guided, and modified the process of Evolution. He does not require to enter into the details and comparison of "Natural Selection" *versus* an "Internal Force" as the ruling idea and power in Evolution; since for him Descent is unproved and, one may add, unprovable. His is the attitude towards Evolution of the modern physiologist towards phrenology. The physiologist denies the groundwork and status of the "science" of brain-pans, because he finds no support for that "science" in the physiology and anatomy of the brain. And so with Dr. Elam and Evolution. It is not, therefore, surprising to find our author objecting to Haeckel when he does not recognise Darwin. His horror of Haeckel's phylogenies can be understood, when we know how closely he questions the *raison d'être* of their construction. His attitude towards Evolution, in a word, is that it is irrational and inconsistent with the facts of nature. Thus starting with the assumption that the doctrine in question has no existence in fact, that it is "an unverified theoretic conception," and, by syllogistic inference, "a mere figment of the intellect" (p. 740), we can perfectly under-

stand how proofs and facts, plain to others as facts can be, are of no weight, and find neither favour in the eyes nor mercy at the hands of our author.

I think it needful to remark the personal attitude of Dr. Elam to the theory of Descent, because I am of opinion such standing towards Evolution is a fact of primary importance in determining the scope and bearing of any man's convictions towards belief of any kind. And I may be permitted to add, likewise, that the fact that Dr. Elam is not a professed naturalist, must count for much in the settlement of the question before us. True it is, that every man of culture is perfectly able to appreciate and understand the general grounds on which belief in Evolution is based. But, at the same time, the exact determination and influence of new facts upon our theory of nature, is a matter in which the trained mind of the biologist counts for much—I would fain add, means everything. For instance, how can any one who is not conversant with the facts of hybridity, or with the definitions and constitution of "species," duly understand the weighty nature of Darwin's remarks on the evidence in favour of the modification of species and of the occurrence of well-nigh illimitable specific change? Am I overstating the case when I say, that the experience of those biologists who, as lecturers and teachers, come most frequently in contact with the public, is all in favour of my contention that only after the lapse of one or two generations will such evidence as is derived from the development of animals and plants be capable of being estimated at its true worth? And, therefore, as a biologist, I appeal to my scientific brethren at large to say, whether or not such facts as development evinces—to select one department of science alone—if properly appreciated, are more than sufficient to establish the innate truth of Evolution as a consistent theory of the origin of the living hosts of to-day? To zoologists such evidence is simply irre-

sistible. It is the knowledge of this single fact which causes me to dwell so strongly upon Dr. Elam's persistently sceptical attitude to the theory of Evolution, and to question, in no offensive sense, Dr. Elam's capacity, as not being a professed biologist, for estimating the bearing and teaching of these developmental facts. If we find Professor Allen Thomson in his Presidential address to the British Association (1877) saying plainly and well, "I consider it impossible, therefore, for any one to be a faithful student of embryology, in the present state of science, without, at the same time, becoming an evolutionist," we may well be inclined to think twice before rejecting the opinions of authority with reference to the theory which best explains the facts biology discovers.

Dr. Elam is perfectly right and just in his assertion when he says that "authoritative assertion" or "felicitous phrasing" cannot settle the grave question before us. "*Evidence*, and evidence alone, must be our guide," says Dr. Elam, "to acceptance or rejection" (p. 721). Exactly so, I reply; but Dr. Elam's remarks on authority cut both ways. If meant to incise evolutionists, they may likewise and more probably divide his own case. Nobody cares for mere "authority" in science, except where authority has given reason for the exhibition of such respect, and has constituted itself a power and influence by its discovery of facts and truths. For the facts of development, for instance, authority of one kind or another in biology must be responsible—let us say, Huxley, Allen Thomson, F. M. Balfour, Kowalewsky, Haeckel, and others. These facts remain as facts; it is only the interpretation of the facts which can be a matter of difference or dispute. But are not the discoverers of the facts of embryology the persons most likely to form correct judgments concerning the bearing of this phase of development or that? Who is most likely to know best the

meaning of a gastrula-stage in sponges, or of skull-formation in vertebrates—Huxley, Haeckel, and Allen Thomson on the one side, or Dr. Elam on the other? I do not think the scientific or cultured world will hesitate in its reply. Reject "authority," as I have defined it, in matters biological, and whom or what have we left as an ultimate court of appeal? That it is a question of evidence, I fully admit; "*Evidence*, and evidence alone, must be our guide to acceptance or rejection." These are Dr. Elam's own weighty and reasonable words; and I repeat, the facts of zoology and botany interpreted by the light of Descent—and discovered and decided by those best qualified to pronounce upon their merits—are all in favour of Evolution and its rational nature.

The question between Dr. Elam and the evolutionists is, therefore, of the widest possible nature. It is not a quarrel over the rights or wrongs of Haeckel's "*Monistic Philosophy*," or over those of any other modification of Evolution. There are ardent evolutionists who would probably argue against Haeckel in the matter of Evolution. Nor is it a question—as in the present stage of things such matters often become—of how much of "*Natural Selection*" is true, and how much incorrect. On the broader basis of the entire right or wrong of Evolution, Dr. Elam takes his stand. Logically, Dr. Elam will have nothing whatever to say to this theory of nature. Hence it becomes the duty of his opponent, without entering too minutely into detail, to attack our author on the ground whereupon the latter chooses to dwell. There is neither "*Natural Selection*" nor any other evolutionary tendency in the world, says Dr. Elam. All evolutionary conceptions are mere figments of the intellect, according to our author. Hence I shall join issue with him on his own terms. I shall not attempt to disguise our difficulties, but I shall formulate, to begin with, my belief in a single sentence—namely, that admitting gaps in our knowledge (and these

are year by year being lessened in a marvellous fashion), there remains above and beyond these deficiencies, an amount of evidence which is amply demonstrative of Evolution as the great law in virtue of which the living nature we see has been produced. I may add that by "Evolution" I mean, as Dr. Elam himself implies (p. 714), that general and universally understood idea of the origin of species of animals and plants from pre-existing species through natural laws of reproduction, modified by various external and internal circumstances—the "Natural Selection" of Darwin, the "internal force" of another, or the operation of "a law of progressive development" of a third. I am not so much concerned in demonstrating the factors and powers to which Evolution is due, as in showing that it is neither scientific nor logical (in the face of *facts*) to deny the existence and operation of the process. And I may lastly state, that I shall hold the idea of Evolution to be opposed to the only other formulated hypothesis of the origin of species, that of "special creation." The details of this latter "theory" are still writ large enough in our temples to obviate the necessity for specifying its teachings or its authority.

Selecting for criticism, on account of its highly important and fundamental nature, what Dr. Elam (p. 722) styles "the broad principle . . . that all living beings are connected together by the ties of relationship and descent from a common ancestry," let us endeavour to see whether this leading doctrine of Evolution is capable of such proof as will satisfy the rational and unprejudiced mind. Dr. Elam, after stating as above the principle involved in Evolution, criticises Haeckel's phylogeny of the animal world, with the view of showing the entirely hypothetical nature of the Jena philosophy. This philosophy we have had criticised before by Dr. Elam, and the familiar strains of scepticism over Haeckel's construction of man's pedigree—

or of that of any other form, indeed—meet us once again. Dr. Elam calls for proof of this genealogical ramble on the part of Haeckel, and with his demand it behoves evolutionists to deal. Not that we are concerned here with the probability or improbability of Haeckel's phylogeny. That is mere matter of detail. Every evolutionist, it will be admitted, must postulate a connected series of forms. The exact order in which the organisms of present and past epochs are correlated to form a great tree of life is a secondary matter. That order may not be approachable in any exact fashion for years to come; but no evolutionist doubts that the development of living nature has followed some such method as indicated by the phylogeny we endeavour to construct to-day. Dr. Elam's quarrel with Haeckel is that the Jena phylogeny is as mythical as Mrs. Gamp's matter of fact details concerning Mrs. Harris; and Dr. Elam's criticism exactly parallels that of Mrs. Gamp's somewhat acidulous colleague: for as she believed "there ain't no Mrs. Harris," so our author maintains that Haeckel's *Gastræada* and *Chordonia*, his *Sozura* and *Planæada* alike, are mere figments of the Jena intellect.

As a first remark, it should be noted that apart from any particular system of phylogeny, the results of recent researches have certainly warranted the evolutionist in seeking to construct a genealogical tree of the animal world as part and parcel of the belongings of the doctrine of Descent. For instance, where, in any system of classification, would Dr. Elam place *Archæopteryx* with its plain bird-characters united to as marked a reptilian organisation? Not in the birds, for wholly bird *Archæopteryx* is not; not in the reptile class, for wholly reptile it is not. *Archæopteryx* must—as a matter of "*Evidence*" let us note—be placed, by common consent, as an intermediate form; and if intermediate, then, by universal admission, as part of such a connected tree of descent leading from reptiles to birds as the evolutionist

desires and expects. Dr. Elam might, it is true, object to this statement, as he objects to Haeckel's phylogeny, by saying that the intermediate position of Archæopteryx is all theory. If so—and one need not trouble to deny the assertion, in face of the opposing "theory" of "special creation"—it is a theory which perfectly accords with, and also explains, the facts of the anomalous character of Archæopteryx. The evolutionist's theory, moreover, is one which is, besides, contrary to none of the other known facts of bird-life on the one hand, or reptile-existence on the other. If Dr. Elam should elect to regard Archæopteryx as a "special creation," in lieu of an "evolved" organism, he may, if he pleases, postulate such a belief. But of Dr. Elam, in such a case, science and scientific authority would say, as our author himself says of Haeckel, he "is one of those fortunate men to whom nothing is doubtful and nothing is obscure" (p. 722). For Dr. Elam's belief there would be no scientific sanction, warrant, or proof of any kind whatsoever. For Haeckel's dictum, or for the evolutionist's assertion that Archæopteryx is one term in the series of intermediate forms connecting birds and reptiles, there is the fullest justification in the facts of nature.

Nor do the "Gastræada" of Haeckel appear so utterly devoid of foundation as Dr. Elam supposes. Persons who teach, and persons who make it their business to acquire a knowledge of, biology, look upon *Gastræas* and *Gastrulas* with a large modicum of respect. The reasons for this regard are not difficult to trace. When we inquire of the biologist what a *Gastræa* is, we are not left in doubt for a moment on this point. In all animals above the *Protozoa* (or very lowest) a certain early stage of development results in the division of the *germinal membrane* or *blastoderm* of the developing egg into two layers, respectively named *epiblast* or *ectoderm*, and *hypoblast* or *endoderm*—the *serous* and *mucous layers* of past decades of physiology. These two

layers sooner or later develop a third, which appears between them, and is named the *mesoblast* or *mesoderm*. At the stage when these layers become first differentiated, the developing embryo appears as a rounded sac, with double walls, these walls enclosing a central cavity. Sooner or later this cavity opens at one extremity of the embryo in the primitive mouth; and when in this condition the embryo is named the *Gastræa*. Now the study of development has taught us that in all animals above the *Protozoa* a *Gastræa*-stage is represented. This, indeed, is the first milestone on the developmental journey. Here and there it is imperfectly represented; now and then it is almost suppressed or even obliterated altogether; but the facts remain, firstly, that all animals (above *Protozoa*) pass through a *Gastræa*-stage, and secondly, that some animals remain before our eyes to-day as *permanent Gastræas*. For example, there are some sponges (*Hali-physema* and *Gastrophysema*) which actually remain in the *Gastrula* or *Gastræa* condition. There are also certain lower worms which represent animals that remain as permanent *Gastrulas*; and the common fresh water polypes or *Hydræ* in one sense, are likewise to be regarded as stable *Gastrula* forms. With these facts fairly in view, does Haeckel's contention that the root-phylum of the higher animals is to be witnessed in the *Gastræada*, appear to be an illegitimate or unwarrantable suggestion after all? Is Dr. Elam correct in any sense when he says (p. 722) that as regards the *Gastræada*, "it appears, however, ultimately, that they belong to a purely imaginary world"? We must apprehend that Dr. Elam has never seen a cup-sponge, and that he is unfamiliar with the *Spongida* and with the first pages of comparative embryology, otherwise he could never have penned the words last quoted. It is this ignorance of embryology which accounts for his further statement that "there is no evidence whatever of their (*Gastræada*) exist-

ence at any period ; " and again, that " they are placed here to fill a gap which would otherwise sadly have spoiled the symmetry of the theory." So far removed are these latter statements from the real facts of the case, that an emphatic denial may be given, as I have shown, to each and all of them. Gastræas *do* exist; they belong to the world of living beings; they are likewise placed to fill a gap, and they very fully, in the eyes of all competent biologists, succeed in demonstrating to us the first beginnings of higher life. Possibly Dr. Elam may refuse to credit Carl Gegenbaur's views with importance. But if so, that is Dr. Elam's matter and misfortune, and neither the fault of Evolution nor of biology at large. Gegenbaur, in speaking of the Gastrulas and Gastræas, in whose existence Dr. Elam disbelieves, says :—

Starting from the hypothesis that forms, agreeing with a Gastrula in all essential points, were the precursors of all the higher forms of animal organisation, a Gastræa-form, resembling the Gastrula, has been regarded as the primitive ancestral form of all animals. This Gastræa-theory is based, first, on the existence of independent animal forms which resemble the Gastræa; secondly, on the fact that the embryonic body, which commences with a Gastrula, does not, in the lower divisions, rise very much above it, so that even, apparently, considerable complications of the organism can be traced back to the existence of these two layers of the body; thirdly, the presence of these two layers (epiblast and hypoblast) of cells, forming the ectoderm and endoderm, as a general, constant, and, therefore, regular phenomenon, even in the higher divisions of the Animal Kingdom, as well as their constant relation to the same functions, is a fact of the greatest importance for the hypothesis in question; indeed, the occurrence of these layers as the so-called germinal layers which make up the embryonic body, cannot be rightly understood without a reference to a hypothetical Gastræa-form. This hypothesis," concludes Gegenbaur, " may therefore be regarded as justified.*

These are weighty words as coming from one entitled

* Elements of Comparative Anatomy. By Carl Gegenbaur. London: Macmillan. 1878. P. 35.

to speak with authority. If we reject these views of Evolutionists, what explanation is left to us of the occurrence of the Gastræa-stage in the animal world at large? How, otherwise, are we to explain the occurrence of useless Gastræa-stages in the development of the highest animals? It is for Dr. Elam to reply; but one may be excused for saying of this fact, as of many others in development, that to take any other view than that the development of an animal repeats with modifications the Evolution of its race, "is to admit that the structure of animals, and the history of their development, form a mere snare laid to entrap our judgment."

In the face of the evidence afforded by embryology, regarding the literally amazing likeness between the development of the Lancelet (as the lowest fish and Vertebrate), and that of the Tunicata or Sea-Squirts, the problem of the origin of Vertebrates does not seem very difficult of solution. Dr. Elam attempts to make light of Haeckel's *Chordonia*, the primitive possessors of notochord or spine. Chordonians are not known certainly; but what has Dr. Elam to say of *Appendicularia*? which represents the permanent larval form of an Ascidian-stock, and, therefore, may be taken to represent an example of an unmodified and primitive Sea-Squirt? Let us, however, hear Dr. Elam's criticism of evolutionary views of the origin of Vertebrata (p. 732):—

When the period arrives when the Vertebrata *must* be introduced, there is no craning before he [Haeckel] leaps, no pusillanimous hesitation. He takes a worm, and, with a stroke of his pen, endows it with a spinal marrow and a chorda dorsalis on 'mechanical principles'; and having further improved it, he calls it *Chordonia*—the parent of all the Vertebrata—and a sort of distant relative, perhaps second cousin, of the Ascidian. It is placed in its natural (*sic*) order as though it had a legitimate claim to be there; and it never seems to have occurred to the author that, even were it true, this process, in no one respect, resembled Evolution. I feel some reluctance to speak of this as

it deserves ; but I consider it as little short of a monstrous literary (*sic*) fraud, as it would be a commercial fraud to pass a forged note in a packet of real ones. I may add that if there be any truth or reality whatever in the principles of the science of Embryology, it is as impossible for the Ascidian to stand in this relationship to the Vertebrata as it would be for any member of a genealogical tree to be represented at one and the same time as his own grandfather and his own grandnephew.

There is something undeniably specious about Dr. Elam's style of writing as displayed in this passage. The introduction of the Vertebrata is surely a fact for which Nature and not Haeckel is responsible, even if we admit that the Jena zoologist, or any other naturalist, endeavours, as a scientific duty, to trace their origin. Dr. Elam, however, seems not merely to indicate that as we have got the Vertebrata—by special creation or otherwise—we should rest content with that fact, but likewise insinuates that Haeckel (and, presumably, any one else) is taking a great liberty in meddling with the highest type of animal life at all. Now, there is nothing sacred or untouchable about Vertebrate animals. No special divinity, so far as I can see, hedges a lancelet, a frog, a cow, or a catarrhine ape, any more than a halo of sanctity pervades a Protozoön or a worm. I suppose Dr. Elam admits *Amphioxus* (the Lancelet) to be the lowest Vertebrate ; and even on the strict Cuvierian principles he professes to admire, he will be forced to own that the body of this lowest fish is built up on a type precisely similar to that of the author of "The Gospel of Evolution." But *Amphioxus* is a transparent fish, an inch or two in length, burrowing in sand-banks, and—tell it not in Gath!—destitute of skull, brain, heart, eyes, ears, kidneys, and of the other and typical belongings of Vertebrate existence. Instead of a skeleton it has a *notochord*, or *chorda dorsalis*. This is a soft cellular rod, lying in its back region, supporting its simple spinal cord or nervous axis, and appearing, curiously enough, in the early

life of every Vertebrate, man included, but being in most cases replaced and superseded by the spine. In the Lancelet, however, as well as in some other fishes (*e.g.*, Sharks, Dogfishes, &c.), and especially the *most ancient and primitive* fishes, the notochord remains persistent throughout life, and is never replaced by a spine.

Now, if such is the lowest Vertebrate, it requires no great exercise of zoological knowledge to discover in the *Tunicates*, or "Sea-Squirts," undeniable resemblances to the Lancelet. To begin with the general organisation of the body, there is a striking similarity in structure. Thus the Lancelet's breathing-organ is constructed on a type exactly resembling that of the Sea-Squirt. Both organisms breathe by means of a curious perforated pharynx, or "respiratory sac." It must be kept in mind that Sea-Squirts, until recently, were ranked, as Molluscoids, with the lowest shell-fish, and that in their adult condition the common members of the Sea-Squirt class exist, attached to rocks and stones and shells—each as a veritable "leather bottel," into one aperture of whose sac-like body water for nutrition and breathing flows, to be expelled by a second orifice. But the similarity between the young Sea-Squirt and the adult Lancelet is very marked. The former begins life as a tadpole-like body, which, we must note, becomes such by stages in development (including the despised *Gastrula*-stage) exactly resembling the early stages in the development of the Lancelet. In its tadpole guise, the young Sea-Squirt swims freely in the sea. In its dorsal region, however, a rod-like structure is soon developed. This is the notochord, and the nervous system of the young Sea-Squirt is formed in *an exactly similar fashion to that in which the nervous axis of Vertebrata is developed*. The ordinary Sea-Squirts soon cast off the tail of early life, and settle down to become the bag-like adults; but a few forms (*e.g.*, Appendicularia) retain throughout life their larval and tailed condition, and

present us, as already remarked, with good examples of primitive Tunicates. We have thus to account for, first, the marvellous likeness in structure between the "venerable" Lancelet of Haeckel (as the lowest Vertebrate) and Sea-Squirts; second, for the likeness, equally close, in early and later stages of development between the Lancelet and Tunicates; and third, for the variations between the two classes.

Evolution explains all three points on the belief that the Lancelet represents a Tunicate Mollusc derived at an early period from the primitive stock of the latter class, and from a type of things most nearly represented by the Appendicularians of to-day. The variations between existing Tunicates and Vertebrates are the result of the laws of progressive development and modification, which have produced—firstly, the modern sac-like Sea-Squirts from their original tadpole stock; and which, secondly, have given origin to the higher Vertebrate forms through elaboration of the Lancelet-type. Is there, after all, anything unreasonable in these declarations? Does the logic or sequence of facts supply no answer to Dr. Elam's travesty of this genealogical Vertebrate tree? Why should not the larval Ascidian represent the *Chordonia* of Haeckel? What is there that is illogical or preposterous in the assertion that the Lancelet and the existing Appendicularia are near kith and kin? Dr. Elam's remark regarding the impossibility of an Ascidian standing in relation to the Vertebrate as founder of the latter type, betokens his entire misapprehension of the grounds on which the belief of evolutionists in this matter is based. What is there that is impossible, let me ask, in the idea of the primitive race of Ascidians (represented to-day by Appendicularian-forms) still continuing to exist contemporaneously with the Vertebrate forms (the Lancelet or its predecessors), to which it gave origin, and likewise with the other organisms (Sea-Squirts), which, ulti-

mately springing from the same root-stock, diverged and retrogressed to become the sac-like "bottels" of the dredger's net? It is not the Vertebrate "grandfather," but the representative of the "grandfather's" *race*, that we see in the *larval* Ascidian of to-day. Evolution amply explains the succession as that from "larval" Ascidian (*i.e.*, Ascidian root-stock) to Lancelet, and from Lancelet to man; and unless development again deludes our judgment, I repeat, Evolution, in thus defining the origin of the Vertebrata, but re-echoes the truth as it is in nature.

But Dr. Elam, with a facile stroke of his pen, says Evolution "takes a worm and endows it with a spinal marrow and a chorda dorsalis 'on mechanical principles.'" We are not here concerned with the "mechanical" or other principles on which Haeckel or any other evolutionist postulates the progress of development; but it is easy to show that what Dr. Elam burlesques is, all unknown to himself, a serious reality of nature. Did Dr. Elam ever hear of a curious worm-like organism named *Balanoglossus*, or of its larva, known as *Tornaria*? If, as I believe, he has not, from his omitting any mention of the animal in his criticism of the origin of Vertebrates, let me recommend him to acquaint himself with its structure and homologies, as these facts are set forth in some recent manual of Comparative Anatomy. The biography of *Balanoglossus* will, in all probability, convince our author that his satirical reference to the worm endowed by a stroke of a pen with "a spinal marrow and a chorda dorsalis," actually describes a state of matters demonstrated by the highest zoological authority to occur in nature. He will find that *Balanoglossus* begins life under a worm-guise, but that it soon diverges from the worm-type and develops a peculiar breathing apparatus, the like of which—sad to relate for Dr. Elam's objections to Evolution—is only found, firstly, in Sea-Squirts, and, secondly, in the Lance-

let!* *Balanoglossus* is, in fact, like a tailless Appendicularian, and appears as a natural representative of that worm which, "with a stroke of the pen," one may say, gave origin to Appendicularians, and through these to the Vertebrates by way of the Lancelet. The worm in which Dr. Elam disbelieves and which he despises, has, nevertheless, become, through no fault of its own, an important cornerstone in the Vertebrate type.

The ability of embryologists successfully to defend their conceptions of the evolution of existing forms of life is paralleled by their attempts to account for the origin of various useful structures in animal existence, and likewise for the occurrence, or, it may be, the disappearance, of useless organs and parts. Dr. Elam, in challenging the correctness of "Natural Selection," and in denying that any such principle exists—"a happy phrase for something that has no existence," are his words (p. 719)—exhibits an unfortunate tendency to look at one side of the question only, that side being largely created by himself. Speaking of "Natural Selection" as unable to account for the perpetuation, by *minute variations*, of structures and parts favouring a species in the "struggle for existence" (the existence of which also Dr. Elam denies), our author asks, "Could this principle account for the existence of the weapon of the Swordfish or for the filaments borne on the head of the curious *Lophius piscatorius*, or Angler-fish?" So also, he asks, but to deny, whether "a casually-enlarged cutaneous follicle" could have originated the milk-glands of quadrupeds?

As regards the development of the Sword-fish's snout or the tentacles of *Lophius*, I confess I do not see anything very

* Mr. F. M. Balfour, in his "Comparative Embryology" (Vol. I. p. 484), says: "One of the most important characters of the adult *Balanoglossus* consists in the presence of respiratory structures comparable with the Vertebrate gill-slits." The Tornaria-larva, he says, "is intermediate between Echinoderms and Molluscs." Here is a transitional or common larval form which Dr. Elam cannot deny, even if he would—i.e., if one is to respect his knowledge of biology, and especially of recent embryology.

inconsistent or anything which makes demand upon one's credulity, in the belief that "Natural Selection" could have originated these. Were Sword-fishes, let me ask Dr. Elam always as they now are? Surely our author does not mean to insist upon evolutionists accounting first for a Sword-fish and then for the growth of its weapon. Snout and fish together must have grown and have become developed and modified. There is nothing more remarkable or unlikely involved in the idea that the first beginnings of the snout may have been small and minute and have gradually increased, than in the fact that a Sword-fish begins life as a mere speck of protoplasm, and passes from stages in which there is neither fish-form nor snout, to that in which both are developed and perfected.* So also with *Lophius* and its fishing tentacles. I see nothing more improbable in the development of these tentacles from very minute beginnings, than in the growth of a hair or feather from a very small skin-papilla. I presume both grow by degrees, both must have had a beginning; and unless Dr. Elam is prepared to assert his belief in the sudden and perfect creation of a brand-new *Lophius* or *Xiphias*, like the fabled armed men of old, I cannot conceive of any other explanation of their origin, save that which views their descent from pre-existing forms as a likely, and, if development speaks truly, a correct hypothesis. As Mr. Parker puts it, there exist persons who deny Evolution, in face of the fact that nature does evolve from a little protoplasm and a teaspoonful or two of yolk, the complex body

* If Dr. Elam will take the trouble to turn to Dr. Günther's magnificent "Study of Fishes" (p. 174), he will find there drawings and descriptions which show the gradual development of the elongated weapon of the swordfish. This weapon, it should be noted, is no new structure, but consists of a high development of the maxillary and intermaxillary bones. Is there anything extraordinary, after all, in the idea that by successive stages of increased growth an animal's jaw should have attained such a development? Is it easier, or more rational, to assume "special creation" in such a case than Evolution?

of a bird. With regard to the milk-gland of Mammalia and its origin, one primary and all-important fact Dr. Elam must not neglect—namely, that a milk-gland is a modified skin-gland, just as a serpent's poison-gland is a modified salivary gland. The problem of Mammalian milk-glands is not very hard to solve after such a declaration from comparative anatomy. It seems to me that once you assert the indisputable nature and homology of the mammary gland as a *skin-gland*, you leave its evolution as a fact requiring explanation merely as a matter of detail—the fact of its origin through descent with modification we are not entitled as a matter of bare logic to call in question.

It is hard, if not impossible, to tell what may or may not have been useful to the ancestors of our existing animals and plants. Neither evolutionist nor anti-evolutionist need make too much of the use or uselessness of the first *beginnings* of organs and parts. Indeed, one may be a perfectly consistent evolutionist, even if one regards "Natural Selection" as altogether a secondary agent in the production of new species. Cases, however, like the origin of eye and ear, said by Dr. Elam (p. 721) to be "quite out of reach of any explanation by Natural Selection," are explicable enough on the broad lines of Evolution. For that matter of it, one might maintain that to see and to hear are advantageous qualities. The first beginnings of eyes and ears in the animal world of to-day may not perhaps explain fully how Vertebrate eyes and ears originated. These are the special possessions of higher life, and in their production may have included new modifications, the existence of which the theory of progressive development does not deny. As, however, Dr. Elam should know, they originate by ingrowth from the outer surface and by outgrowth from the brain; and brain and spinal cord themselves, represent simply a pinched-off part of the outer layer (or epiblast) of the Vertebrate body. Admitting these facts of develop-

ment, he cannot well deny that there is represented that gradual development of special parts from general structures on the existence of which Evolution at large takes its stand. Eyes and ears grow gradually in complexity as we ascend the Vertebrate series. The *quadrate bone*, which links the lower jaw of frog, reptile, and bird to its skull, becomes in the quadruped pushed up within the cranium to form the *malleus* of the ear. Will Dr. Elam deny that in this modification of the "quadrate" to form the "malleus"—in this adaptation of an element of lower life to form a structure of importance in higher existence—there is not evidence of ears being formed, like every other bodily structure, by modification? I frankly admit the lines of modification are often difficult to trace, often entirely hidden from us. But well-grounded scientific "faith," the possession of which is no monopoly of anti-evolutionists, bids us discern the general outline of the modification where special knowledge fails; and enables us, from a knowledge of what nature is effecting before our eyes to-day, to postulate the uniformity of her actions from all time past.

Dr. Elam appears to be apt enough in stating the difficulties of Evolution. Let me, by way of conclusion, suggest a few problems for solution from the anti-evolutionist's point of view, and from that standpoint which regards "Natural Selection" as a stumbling-block, and the construction of a phylogeny as extreme foolishness. How, for instance, does Dr. Elam account for the presence of rudimentary organs in animals and plants—such as the teeth of foetal whalebone whales which disappear before birth, or the rudimentary fifth stamen of *Scrophulariaceæ*? Why have the embryos of those Vertebrates which never breathe by gills at any period of their existence (reptiles, birds, and quadrupeds) gill-arches like the *fish*? If the useful first beginnings of organs are, as alleged by Dr. Elam, a puzzle to the evolutionist, I should imagine the lingering existence of once useful structures to

form a veritable dead-wall to the anti-evolutionist. For on no supposition, save on that of Evolution—only under the idea that these rudiments are the lawful heritage of the beings possessing them, and as such were possessed in perfection by ancestors more or less remote—can their existence be rationally accounted for. As Mr. G. H. Lewes remarked, these rudimental organs have a reference to a former state of things. Like the useless gills of the young Alpine Salamander, which passes its gilled stage within its parent's body, they indicate clearly enough the past condition of the species or race. And if so much be admitted—I do not see how such facts and inferences can be denied—the whole subject argues for specific change, for sweeping modification of species, and for the consequent Evolution of new forms through such modification.

Dr. Elam in a foot-note (p. 730), in criticising the now famous case of the horses and their proved descent from three-toed and five-toed ancestors, seems really to join issue with evolutionists upon a question of evidence. He maintains that "the horse, as we know it now, existed contemporaneously with the *Orohippus* in the Miocene period, and that there had been no change from that to modern times." I reply that may or may not be. Even if *Orohippus* did exist in the Miocene period—and Dr. Elam admits of course that there is no evidence whatever of such existence—such a fact would not militate in any degree against the Evolution of the one-toed modern horse with its two rudimentary toes or "splint bones." Nor would the fact in question serve to explain the very pregnant fact that existing horses are occasionally born with three toes; whilst the origin of *Orohippus* itself would again face Dr. Elam and his theory of creation. In face of the fact that existing horses are occasionally born with three nearly equal toes, Dr. Elam's criticism seems to me of no avail. On what scientific theory—if not on Evolution—can he then support, firstly, the

production of our existing horse with two rudimentary and useless toes, and likewise its occasional reversion to the three-toed type? If "special creation" be adopted here, such a view of nature is at the least degrading to the Power which may be regarded as initiating the laws of animal development. In other words, has the Creator, like a mundane architect with his blank windows, thrown in these useless rudiments by way of maintaining some fanciful notion of symmetry? The "creation" of such useless parts is susceptible of no explanation whatever. Their "production" or "persistence" as a part of the scheme of Evolution is a plain fact of nature which harmonises with our knowledge of the laws of heredity and development. And so clearly demonstrable is this latter fact, that one is tempted to regard opposition to its bearings as the fruit of an anti-Evolution tendency, which, like the reading and writing of Dogberry, comes by nature, and which as a natural but erratic characteristic, may be susceptible of explanation on the hypothesis of "reversion" to ancient forms and types of belief. So clear is the evidence of Evolution, as derived from the pedigree of the *Equidæ*, that Huxley's statement regarding Evolution as a proved fact, and not merely a hypothesis, is fully justified thereby. Whilst concerning those, who, with the evidence not merely of equine descent before them, but with the pregnant evidence drawn from animal development at hand, still deny Evolution, one may perchance most wisely follow the well-known advice of the apostolic philosopher anent forbearance with the foolish as a duty of the wise.

At page 728 of Dr. Elam's article, the question of Palæontology and Evolution is briefly touched upon. No criticism of Evolution could be complete in any sense without a reference to the bearings of fossil testimony upon "missing links" and the evolution of new species. Dr. Elam has, no doubt, read Mr. Darwin's chapter on the "Imperfection of

the Geological Record," but he does not condescend to make any remark upon Mr. Darwin's argument contained therein. We find Dr. Elam, however, quoting from an address by Sir Charles Lyell, of date 1859—the year in which the "Origin of Species" was published!—to the effect that "the advocates of progressive development have *too much overlooked* the imperfection of these records;" the quotation proceeding to maintain that "a large part of the generalisations in which they [the advocates of Evolution aforesaid] have indulged in regard to the first appearance of the different classes of animals, especially air-breathers, will have to be modified, or abandoned." Sir Charles Lyell is said by Dr. Elam to have been "a geologist at least as eminent as any who have succeeded him," and with this statement, of course, all will agree. But surely Dr. Elam, in common fairness to his own powers of discernment, as well as to Lyell's views on Evolution, should have selected opinions expressed by the late distinguished geologist of more recent date than 1859. An opinion expressed concerning Evolution in 1859, bears to the exact facts of Evolution in 1880, well-nigh the same relation that the views of the Early Fathers on fossils as inventions of the devil bear to modern geological opinion. Dr. Elam's quotation from Lyell, writing in 1859, and his application of the opinions of 1859 to the knowledge of 1880, are illustrations of a Rip Van Winkle tendency in science, which must appear astounding to everybody but Dr. Elam himself. If Dr. Elam had taken the trouble to ascertain the opinions of Sir Charles Lyell on Evolution, expressed, say, in the eleventh edition (1872) of his "Principles of Geology," our author would never have committed the error of citing the great promoter of Uniformitarian Geology as a witness against either imperfection of the geological record or Evolution at large. Indeed, so thoroughly natural is the parallelism between

Uniformity in Geology and Evolution in Biology that it is surprising to find Dr. Elam for one moment attempting to rank Lyell as against Evolution. Dr. Elam's quotation from Lyell affords evidence that he is not acquainted with the history of the late eminent geologist's change of opinions with reference to the theory of Descent. As Huxley says (Royal Institution Lecture, March 19th, 1880): "The progress of scientific geology has elevated the fundamental principle of Uniformitarianism, that the explanation of the past is to be sought in the study of the present, into the position of an axiom; and the wild speculations of the catastrophists, to which we all listened with respect a quarter of a century ago, would hardly find a single patient hearer at the present day. No physical geologist now dreams of seeking outside the ranges of known natural causes for the explanation of anything that happened millions of years ago, any more than he would be guilty of the like absurdity in regard to current events. The effect of this change of opinion upon biological speculation is obvious. For, if there have been no periodical general catastrophes, what brought about the assumed general extinctions and re-creations of life which are the corresponding biological catastrophes? And if no such interruptions of the ordinary course of nature have taken place in the organic, any more than in the inorganic, world, what alternative is there to the admission of Evolution? The doctrine of Evolution in Biology," concludes Huxley, "is the necessary result of the logical application of the principles of Uniformitarianism to the phenomena of life. Darwin is the natural successor of Hutton and Lyell, and the 'Origin of Species' the natural sequence of the 'Principles of Geology.'"

Place side by side with the sentence quoted from Lyell (of date 1859) by Dr. Elam (p. 728), another sentence from the "Antiquity of Man" (Fourth Edition, 1873, p. 451)—"It would be an easy task to multiply objec-

tions to the theory now under consideration ; but from this I refrain, *as I regard it not only as a useful, but rather, in the present state of science, an indispensable hypothesis, and one which, though destined hereafter to undergo many and great modifications, will never be overthrown.*" And if further testimony were required as to the support which Lyell affords to Darwin on the question of the imperfection of the geological record, such evidence will be found plentifully scattered through the "*Principles of Geology.*" There are very many passages which breathe the spirit of the following :—"To one who is not aware of the extreme imperfection of this record, the discovery of one or two missing links is a fact of small significance ; but to those who are thoroughly imbued with a deep sense of the defectiveness of the archives, each new form rescued from oblivion is an earnest of the former existence of hundreds of species, the greater part of which are irrecoverably lost." It is thus sheer misrepresentation to cite Lyell as against Darwin. Dr. Elam's quotations from uniformitarian geology, must, I repeat, to do himself and Evolution full justice, be taken from the geology of to-day, and not from opinions which the march of progress has rendered obsolete.

The function of the critic, from the general standpoint of the existence or non-existence of Evolution as a law of nature, may well be suspended at this point. Into the special questions of man's origin and into the origin and development of ethics, treated by Dr. Elam in the concluding pages of his essay, I cannot at present enter. Neither subject can be exhaustively treated, either in its *pros* or its *cons*, in a few pages of a magazine article. But this much one may add, that it appears to me the difficulties of man's origin, or those besetting the evolution of morals, are certainly no greater or more formidable from the evolutionist's standpoint than on the "special creation"

hypothesis of Dr. Elam. Indeed, I would maintain that physically man's origin is an easier conception on evolutionary grounds, than on the theory of Moses or on the hypothesis which has been dubbed the "Miltonic theory" by Professor Huxley. And the difficult question of an ethical code is likewise one which appears certainly more feasible of explanation on principles of progressive development, than upon the hypothesis of a mystic perfect nature, once degraded, and only now struggling to free itself from the swaddling-clothes of original sin. But I fully admit the difficulties of both subjects. I only record my objection to the often-repeated dogma that Evolution is less competent to explain man's physical and mental origin, than systems of thought which are most notable for their entire disregard of science, and for their proclivities in the way of leaning upon an unquestioning faith and its attendant and not over-intelligent dogmas.

Drawing rein thus, a survey of our position leaves one, without a show of over-confidence, in no fear that Dr. Elam's assault is in the least degree likely to carry even the remote outworks of Evolution by storm. If we turn to "missing links," *Archæopteryx* and a hundred other examples will satisfy the demand of reasonable opponents. If they ask us for "transitional forms" between sub-kingdoms, we shall point to Sponges and to other groups which find a home in no one type of animal life. If they demand of us evidence as to the connected series of forms, the *Equidæ* are at our beck and call; *Pauropus* has been discovered to connect Arthropods and worms; whilst the Lycopods, Rhizocarps, and Gymnosperms link the Cryptogamic plants with their flowering neighbours. If further evidence in favour of Evolution be required, we shall cite the great army of facts brought to light by embryology. We shall demonstrate the Echinoderms with their common larval root-stock; and we shall call into court the Crustaceans—that

large and motley group of crabs, shrimps, lobsters, water-fleas, barnacles, and fish-parasites, all arising directly or indirectly from a "Nauplius" with its three pairs of legs, its oval body, and its median eye. There is a perfect cloud of witnesses in favour of Evolution, in the province of Development alone. All the facts tell in favour of Evolution; and our difficulties arise, not from the opposing logic of facts, but from the mere uncertainties and limits of our present-day knowledge. Professor Allen Thomson's testimony, already cited (British Association Address, 1877), may again be appealed to on this head, when he says:—

I regard it, therefore, as no exaggerated representation of the present state of our knowledge to say that the ontogenetic development of the individual in the higher animals repeats in its more general character, and in many of its specific phenomena, the phylogenetic development of the race. If we admit the progressive nature of the changes of development, their similarity in different groups, and their common characters in all animals, nay, even in some respects in both plants and animals, we can scarcely refuse to recognise the possibility of continuous derivation in the history of their origin; and however far we may be, by reason of the imperfection of our knowledge of palæontology, comparative anatomy, and embryology, from realising the precise nature of the chain of connection by which the actual descent has taken place, still there can be little doubt remaining in the mind of any unprejudiced student of embryology that it is only by the employment of such a hypothesis as that of Evolution that farther investigation in these several departments will be promoted so as to bring us to a fuller comprehension of the most general law which regulates the adaptation of structure to function in the universe.

My contention in this paper has been that, allowing for deficiencies of knowledge, erroneous deductions, and mistaken inferences, there remains a relatively immense bulk of solid facts which Evolution alone is competent to explain in a fashion satisfactory to the rational mind and to the

demands of biological consistency. Dr. Elam remarks (p. 740) that there is "much *philosophy* afloat, which, if freed from nebulosity, and translated into the vernacular, might easily be mistaken for what is often called by a very different name." This oracular deliverance is, of course, capable of translation in either way—for or against Evolution. But unless I grossly mistake the tendency and teaching of the best and wisest minds of our day, I should say that the "philosophy" which may be replaced by a less complimentary convertible term, is that which denies Evolution and opposes Development. Unless we suppose Dr. Elam to possess some special gift of prescience—and to my mind our author certainly does not seem to be in possession of the latest biological facts and data of observation—warning him of the future overthrow of Evolution, it seems hard to account for opposition at once so strenuous and so futile in the face of the facts of life and nature.

His concluding syllogism may bear quotation here :—

"Without *verification* a theoretic conception is a mere figment of the intellect."

[This is Tyndall's declaration.]

"The theory of Organic Evolution is an unverified theoretic conception.

[Dr. Elam in a foot-note to his second term, says :—
"Inasmuch as the 'only' recognised proof has not been furnished,—viz., that arising from 'observation and experiment on existing forms of life' (Huxley)—and no other even plausible one has been offered"]

"Therefore, ORGANIC EVOLUTION IS A MERE FIGMENT OF THE INTELLECT."

This seems at first sight a ponderous missile; but it explodes when you touch its second term. Evolution is *not* an "unverified theoretic conception." What Huxley said

in 1862, holds perfectly true to this day, and will, it is probable, hold true everlastingly of Evolution. "Observation and experiment upon the existing forms of life" (Lay Sermons, 1862, p. 226) are the guides to further knowledge, as they have been the ways of wisdom in the past. Dr. Elam says this proof "has not been furnished." Can he maintain this in view of observations upon Development, or experiments upon Hybridization? Has he never heard, for example, of plants whose own pollen is absolutely useless to fertilise their ovules; or of others on whose pistil their pollen acts as a poison? Will he deny the hundreds of observations made year by year in biology, most or all of which go to support Evolution? Surely Dr. Elam's conceptions of "observations" must differ from those of biologists at large, and from those of ordinary persons as well, when we find him seriously telling us, in 1880, that no "recognised proof" of Evolution has been furnished. Recognition of proof may be, and very likely is, a relative matter. But the common-sense of mankind, and the consensus of biological opinion as to what proof of Evolution is, are worth heeding in a matter of this kind, and I maintain that both sources of culture have pronounced for Evolution as a great law and reality of the universe. It is the misunderstood facts of nature or the unappreciated because absurd statements of the anti-evolutionist, which form the real "figments of the intellect" in the biology and science of to-day.

I know of no plainer or franker statement of the value and place of Evolution than that of Sir Joseph D. Hooker, given in his school "Primer of Botany" (Macmillan, 1876, p. 100), and I can find no fitter words wherewith to conclude this article, or which I could with greater satisfaction recommend to the notice of Dr. Elam and anti-evolutionists at large. "There are," says Sir Joseph Hooker, "two opinions accepted as accounting for

this (the Origin of Species); one, that of *independent creation*, that species were created under their present form, singly, or in pairs, or in numbers; the other, that of *Evolution*, that all are the descendants of one or a few originally created simpler forms. The first doctrine is purely speculative, incapable from its very nature, of proof; teaching nothing and suggesting nothing, it is the despair of investigators and inquiring minds. The other, whether true wholly or in part only, is gaining adherents rapidly, because most of the phenomena of plant (and animal) life may be explained by it; *because it has taught much that is indisputably proved*; because it has suggested a multitude of prolific inquiries, and because it has directed many investigators to the discovery of new facts in all departments of Botany."

ANDREW WILSON.

GEORGE ELIOT AND THOMAS CARLYLE.

WHILST England was still brooding over the death of George Eliot and the wealth of wise words that bear her name, Thomas Carlyle at last passed away. They were not writers whom one would naturally have thought of together, but since death put them uppermost in our minds, many of us must have been startled by a similarity in their aim and drift that had not suggested itself before. Unlike as their voices are, so that we may almost say,

One is of the sea,

One of the mountains; each a mighty voice;

one the watchful woman whose world-embracing heart loves most to linger about the home, the other the man-prophet who makes himself heard in the market-place, and gathers a crowd in the desert; yet they often say the same thing, for each is speaking to children of the same generation and speaking out of a very sensitive and responsive heart, and out of a brain brimful of the lore of the same forefathers and teachers.

Though the molecules which were to produce the works of Carlyle were arranging themselves and being impinged upon a quarter of a century earlier than those of George Eliot, yet, owing probably to his far-reaching imagination, he almost as much as she is under the powerful sway of the prevailing methods and tenets of modern science. Slightly altered circumstances might have made either of them a Tyndall or a Herbert Spencer. All those ideas that may be lumped together roughly under the heading

of the solidarity of the universe seem ever present to their consciousness. We can never forget as we are reading them that we are within the relentless grasp of the "not-ourselves." With her the forces that have moulded us and claim us as their own take more definite form than with him, as they would do for one writing those twenty-five years later; but the forces are as real for him as for her. Teufelsdröckh in 1831 feels their might as intensely as Theophrastus Such, whose utterances came even half a century later. On the other hand, Theophrastus resents as peremptorily as Teufelsdröckh, those over-claims of mere physicists which hint to man that he is an automaton, and consciousness a queer, fishy excrescence. For how many of us has "Sartor Resartus" simply smashed the tyranny of the dogmas of the Everlasting No, so that

Like a man in wrath the heart
Stood up and answered, "I have felt."

Theophrastus Such has furnished pellets of pert, maiden-like repartee, that must for a long time act as dissolvents of the influence of those dogmas in as far as they usurp the kingdom of life. Here are instances of the two styles of dealing with the negations of some teachers with whom, as far as their constructive work goes, each writer is thoroughly *en rapport*; it would be difficult to say which is more effective.

"Has the word Duty no meaning? Is what we call Duty no divine Messenger and Guide, but a false, earthly Phantasm, made up of Desire and Fear? Happiness of an approving conscience! Did not Paul of Tarsus, whom admiring men have since named Saint, feel that *he* was 'the chief of sinners;' and Nero, of Rome, jocund in spirit, spend much of his time in fiddling? Is the heroic inspiration we name Virtue but some Passion; some bubble of the blood, bubbling in the direction others *profit* by? I know not: only this I know—if what thou namest Happiness be our true aim, then are we all astray! With Stupidity and Sound Digestion man may front much. But what,

in these dull, unimaginative days, are the terrors of Conscience to the diseases of the Liver? Not on Morality, but on Cookery, let us build our stronghold: there, brandishing of our frying-pan as censer, let us offer sweet incense to the Devil, and live at ease on the fat things *he* has provided for his Elect!"

In "Shadows of the Coming Race," Theophrastus says:—

"I, for my part, cannot see any reason why a sufficiently penetrating thinker, who can see his way through a thousand years or so, should not conceive a Parliament of machines, in which the manners were excellent, and the motions infallible in logic. . . . For every machine would be perfectly educated, that is to say, would have the suitable molecular adjustments, which would act not the less infallibly for being free from the fussy accompaniment of that consciousness to which our prejudice gives a supreme governing rank, when in truth it is an idle parasite on the grand sequence of things."

Theophrastus goes on to imagine the pitiable condition men will be in, as compared with their machines, through the incubus of this "fussy accompaniment of consciousness."

"One sees that the process of natural selection must drive men altogether out of the field; for they will long before have begun to sink into the miserable condition of those unhappy characters in fable, who, having demons or djinns at their back, and being obliged to supply them with work, found too much of everything done in too short a time. What demons so potent as molecular movements, none the less tremendously potent for not carrying the futile cargo of a consciousness screeching irrelevantly, like a fowl tied head downmost to the saddle of a swift horseman. . . . Thus, the feebler race, whose corporeal adjustments happened to be accompanied with a maniacal consciousness which imagined itself moving its mover, will have vanished, as all less adapted existences do before the fittest—i.e., the existences composed of the most persistent groups of movements, and the most capable of incorporating new groups in harmonious relation." . . .

"Absurd," grumbled Trost.

"The supposition is logical," said I. "It is well argued from the premises."

"Whose premises?" cried Trost, turning on me with some fierceness. "You don't mean to call them mine, I hope!"

"Heaven forbid! They seem to be flying about in the air with other germs, and have found a sort of nidus among my melancholy fancies. Nobody really holds them. They bear the same relation to real belief as walking on the head for a show does to running away from an explosion, or walking fast to catch the train."

These writers could never have commanded or deserved the attention and admiration our age has accorded them unless they had been sympathetically penetrated and thrilled by the labours and generalisations of modern science. Each has touched many of the truths of our physicists with a new light and fire for the multitude, and has so speeded the message of physical truth; and consequently each voice has been doubly potent when it has had to say, "Thus far and no further." Though Carlyle jeers at the "Arithmetical Understanding" as a "shallow, superficial faculty" in which, if you plant, it will be "but for year and day," yet his first work was one on the Calculus, and he has left the John Welsh Bursaries for Mathematics in memory of his "dear, magnanimous, much-loving, and inestimable wife," in the assurance that mathematical training is of perennial value. Mill was, as it were, the antithesis of Carlyle, yet he says of him (*Autobiography* v.) I felt that Carlyle "not only saw many things long before me, which I could only, when they were pointed out to me, hobble after and prove, but that it was highly probable he could see many things which were not visible to me even after they were pointed out." In Carlyle's fiercest denunciations of "the dismal science" of political economy (in "Chartism"), he shows a thorough acquaintance with and perception of the force of the facts on which the science builds.

To miss the constant though not superficial indications that Carlyle was touched by all the truths of dry science, is to miss, perhaps, the chief key to his influence, and the great secret of his power in his own particular dominion. He and George Eliot were both so influential because they

both started, as it were, from the laboratory of life, and not from the tip-top of a magnificent system. For them there were no short cuts to truth's goal. Near the commencement of his latest and most voluminous work, Carlyle describes "genius" to mean "transcendent capacity of taking trouble, first of all;" "given a huge stack of tumbled thrums, it is not in your sleep that you will find the vital centre of it, or get the first thrum by the end!" We have the very same lesson amongst George Eliot's last words. Klesmer says, "Genius at first is little more than a great capacity for receiving discipline."—(Daniel Deronda, xxiii.) And Theophrastus, "One cannot give a recipe for wise judgment; it resembles appropriate muscular action, which is attained by the myriad lessons in nicety of balance and of aim that only practice can give."

"A fine imagination . . . is always based on a keen vision, a keen consciousness of what *is*, and carries the store of definite knowledge as material for the construction of its inward visions. Witness Dante, who is at once the most precise and homely in his reproduction of actual objects, and the most soaringly at large in his imaginative combinations! . . . In this sense it is as true to say of Fra Angelico's Coronation that it has a strain of reality, as to say so of a portrait by Rembrandt. . . . It is worth repeating that powerful imagination is not false outward vision, but intense inward representation, and a *creative energy constantly fed by susceptibility to the veriest minutiae of experience*. which it reproduces and constructs in fresh and fresh wholes; not the habitual confusion of provable fact with the fictions of fancy and transient inclination, but a breadth of ideal association which informs every material object, every incidental fact, with far-reaching memories and stored residues of passion, bringing into new light the less obvious relations of human existence." (Theophrastus Such, xiii.)

So much as an account of the attraction of these two for an age of minute and sweeping research. They have shown "science" that she need not and cannot rob herself, and the world, of faith. And the votaries of science have welcomed

their addenda to her dicta. For they have not given us all that the majority of those who specially pose as the votaries of faith could have wished. Neither of them has a theology or a philosophy. But for this reason, perhaps, they have been more powerful as allies of faith. They have been reconcilers. They have given us holy ground on which antagonists *must* meet. They have compelled the physicist to admit that the aim of faith commands reverence. They have illustrated for theologians the humbling uniting fact, asserted by St. Paul at Athens, that men who can rear their altar only to the Agnostic's God may be worshipping the Most High unknowingly. With them we are in the presence of the Most High in whom "we live, and move, and have our being." They, too, like the ancient poets, enforce the Christian message, "For we are also His offspring." I believe the main Christian ideas breathe through both of them, for those who can see and are capable of being influenced. She does not shout them aloud as he often does, but they speak through the life she portrays, because it is true human life with its human loves and human struggles and sorrows.

Certainly, neither of them has formulated a system of sanctions for duty or anything else. Carlyle has endless scorn for "the folly of that impossible Precept, '*Know Thyself*,' till it be translated into this partially possible one, '*Know what thou canst work at*.'"

His ethical philosophy is summed up in the precept, "*Do the duty which lies nearest thee*, which thou knowest to be a Duty! Thy second duty will already have become clearer." He could least be claimed by the Utilitarians. But it would be impossible to rank him in any school except the unlettered school of daily life. And yet although no special school could claim him, none would wish to repudiate him, for his philosophy is that which every earnest, duty-loving man adopts, whatever be his formulated sanction. And that

is why it is his philosophy. He must have one which accounts for every dutiful deed, whether of the tinker or the sage, and one which will be a sure guide for both. If you ask him why you are to do *the duty that lies nearest to you*, you ask a question which bears on its own face its condemning reply, whatever your creed or system may be. He may fairly claim to have summed up his ethics in an indisputable, unquestionable formula. True, he has himself started from something more primal and majestic, and, for him, more elementary, more vital, than any precept; but it seems as if he would not risk morality by making it dependent on his own most supreme conviction. "Conviction, were it never so excellent, is worthless till it convert itself into Conduct." Teufelsdröckh asks, "Is the God present, felt in my own heart, a thing which Herr von Voltaire will dispute out of me, or dispute into me. . . . One BIBLE I know of whose Plenary Inspiration doubt is not so much as possible; nay, with my own eyes I saw the God's-Hand writing it." We are not told more definitely to what he refers. It is something, as he puts it, that you cannot "dispute out of," or "dispute into" any one. But "all speculation is by nature endless, formless, a vortex amid vortices; only by a felt indubitable certainty of experience does it find any centre to revolve round, and so fashion itself into a system. Most true is it, as a wise man teaches us, that—Doubt of any sort cannot be removed except by action. On which ground, too, let him who gropes painfully in darkness or uncertain light, and prays vehemently that the dawn may ripen into day, lay this other precept well to heart, which to me was of invaluable service: '*Do the duty which lies nearest thee*,' which thou knowest to be a Duty! Thy second Duty will already have become clearer." . . . "Your America is here or nowhere. The situation that has not its Duty, its Ideal, was never yet occupied by man." —(Sartor Resartus; The Everlasting Yea.)

George Eliot's ethical system is as rudimentary as Carlyle's. The practical impression that her portraiture of life leaves upon us might be summed up in the last few sentences that I have quoted from "Sartor Resartus." She, too, has her scorn for the failure of the pretentious systems. She does not, like Carlyle, lay bare an inmost heart, with its vision and conviction of God. Nay, there is a sorrowful blank and silence to which we find no parallel in him. She is to be numbered amongst those of whom she says, "In those times, as now, there were human beings who never saw angels, or heard perfectly clear messages." We shall dwell on this contrast hereafter. But we feel that *he* would almost blame us* for noticing this in her, so radically has she seized, so persistently does she press home, his fundamental and all-embracing law of duty. She declines to exonerate any one, however great, from its imperative claims. Indeed, in her pictures of life, great and small, happy and unhappy, seem to have no colour, or size, or meaning. The difficulties in the path of duty, the character for confronting these difficulties, are of all-absorbing interest and worth. Except in the light of this clue to her works, there is an inexcusable melancholy about them. We are told that she was much distressed to hear them called depressing.† This can only be accounted for by what I am now saying. Her interest in the happiness or unhappiness of her characters was as nothing compared with her absorption in the subtle workings and opportunities and difficulties of duty, predestined or unexpected, from within or from without. She was watching over the growth of duty as over a process of steady and glorious evolution. What to the common eye is striking and dazzling is, as it were, lost upon her—somewhat as the 4,000 feet of moun-

* Or should have felt so, did we not now know that he could write of "all the Sands and Eliots and babbling *cohue* of 'celebrated scribbling women,' that have strutted over the world in my time."—(Reminiscences.)

† By "One Who Knew Her." *Contemporary Review*. February.

tain, or the stretching acres of plain, are lost upon the botanist in his search for a lichen. As beneath an irresistible spell her sympathetic vision wanders and pauses—

“ To trace love’s faint beginnings in mankind,
To know even hate is but a mask of love’s,
To see a good in evil, and a hope
In ill-success ; to sympathise, be proud
Of their half-reasons, faint aspirings, dim
Struggles for truth, their poorest fallacies,
Their prejudice and fears and cares and doubts ;
Which all touch upon nobleness ; despite
Their error, all tend upwardly, though weak,
Like plants in mines which never saw the sun,
But dream of him and guess where he may be,
And do their best to climb and get to him.”*

She says, speaking of Mr. Riley, one of her objectionable Mudport Philistines—

“ Plotting covetousness and deliberate contrivance, in order to compass a selfish end, are nowhere abundant except in the world of the dramatist ; they demand too intense a mental action for many of our fellow-parishioners to be guilty of them. It is easy enough to spoil the lives of our neighbours without taking so much trouble ; we can do it by lazy acquiescence and lazy omission, by trivial falsities for which we hardly know a reason, by small frauds neutralised by small extravagances, by maladroitness flatteries and clumsily-improvised insinuations. We live from hand to mouth, most of us, with a small family of immediate desires—we do little else than snatch a morsel to satisfy the hungry brood, rarely thinking of seed-corn or the next year’s crop.”

This is the secret of the sympathy which, almost against our will, we have throughout for Tito and Gwendoline. But there is with her no obscuring of the fact that men do, by their own deliberate choice, place their hands within the iron grip of the circumstances that seem almighty and inevitably predestined. Amid all our sorrow with Tito and Gwendoline, we are not allowed to forget that “ our wills

* Browning’s “Paracelsus.”

are ours." On the other hand, Dorothea and Maggie are so great in the supreme moments, because of their inheritance from the past. The struggles that mark human life are also the marks of its majesty. The perception of the environment that almost makes us all that we are is a tremendous call to duty, a call whose power must grow with the ages. Yet not the most powerful call, else were some beyond the reach of the Most High. George Eliot's highest sanction to duty is one of which she might say, as Carlyle of his, you cannot "dispute it out of," or "dispute it into" any one. She describes "the hard, bold scrutiny of imperfect thought into obligations which can never be proved to have any sanctity in the absence of feeling."—(Romola, xi.) "The sympathetic impulses that need no law, but rush to the deed of fidelity and pity as inevitably as the brute mother shields her young from the attack of the hereditary enemy."—(Romola, ix.)

Amongst the last words in "*Romola*" are these. She is speaking to Tessa's boy:—

"The highest sort of happiness often brings so much pain with it, that we can only tell it from pain by its being what we would choose before anything else, because our souls see it is good. . . . Remember, if you were to choose something lower, and make it the rule of your life to seek your own pleasure, and escape from what is disagreeable, calamity might come just the same; and it would be calamity falling on a base mind, which is the one form of sorrow that has no balm in it, and that may well make a man say, 'It would have been better for me if I had never been born!'"—(Epilogue.)

"What is love itself—for the one we love best? An enfolding of immeasurable cares, which yet are better than any joys outside our love."—(Daniel Deronda, lxix.)

The very striking piece of information that George Eliot was distressed, and even apparently surprised, that people should think her works depressing, is full of suggestion. It makes us see how likely we are to have missed the meaning

of her works ; for, certainly, to ordinary people they are beclouded with sadness. But so, too, is daily life, and if we have not felt this sadness about life, her works must be inexplicably depressing. If we have faced the hard facts of life, we may find her influence elevating. Not that she would admit that life is a poor, sad thing. She would have the worldly and the other-worldly shift their standpoint, and see things in their true proportions, see what is most precious. "One who knew her," tells us pathetically how she said of a great contemporary genius, "*I always think of him as the husband of the dead wife.*" Intellect, success were, in her sight, tiny, compared with affection, sympathy, dutifulness. If one marked in red letters all the touches of these throughout her works, one would probably be struck with the comparative insignificance attached by her to what one had been thinking greatest. An exquisite patch of moss was as beautiful for her on some tumble-down hovel as on a mountain crag ; what she deemed most lovely grew everywhere, like the simplest herbage, and, in truth, grew often in swamp and foul corners. Life need not be a desert. "It is in those acts called trivialities that the seeds of joy are for ever wasted, until men and women look round with haggard faces at the devastation their own waste has made, and say, the earth bears no harvest of sweetness—calling their denial, knowledge."—(Middlemarch.)

In these lines, from "*Janet's Repentance*," almost her earliest story, we find what was to be a guiding principle in her view of life. "How hard it is to kill the deep-down fibrous roots of human love and goodness, how the man from whom we make it our pride to shrink, has yet a close brotherhood with us, through some of our most sacred feelings." Her secret of morality and life is in susceptible sympathy.

"Yet surely, surely, the only true knowledge of our fellow-man is that which enables us to feel with him, which gives us a fine ear

for the heart-pulses that are beating under the mere clothes of circumstances and opinion." "Do not philosophic doctors tell us that we are unable to discern so much as a tree except by an unconscious cunning which combines many past and separate sensations; that no one sense is independent of another, so that in the dark we can hardly taste a fricassee or tell whether our pipe is alight or not, and the most intelligent boy, if accommodated with claws or hoofs instead of fingers, would be likely to remain on the lowest form? If so, it is easy to understand that our discernment of men's motives must depend on the completeness of the elements we can bring from our own susceptibility and our own experience. See to it, friend, before you pronounce a too hasty judgment, that your moral sensibilities are not of a hooped or clawed character. The keenest eye will not serve unless you have the delicate fingers, with their subtle nerve filaments, which elude scientific lenses, and lose themselves in the invisible world of human sensations."—(xi.)

What tenderness in that often-repeated touch in her picture of Tulliver—"This is a puzzlin' world;" "This world's been too many for me." She must have been always feeling for the brilliant, elegant, and scented, as well as for the other failures of life, what it was Lydgate's ruin not to have realised concerning Rosamond.

"Poor Lydgate! or shall I say, Poor Rosamond? Each lived in a world of which the other knew nothing. It had not occurred to Lydgate that he had been a subject of eager meditation to Rosamond, who had neither any reason for throwing her marriage into distant perspective, nor any pathological studies to divert her mind from that ruminating habit, that inward repetition of looks, words, and phrases, which makes a large part in the lives of most girls."—(Middlemarch, xvi.)

"That element of tragedy which lies in the very fact of frequency has not yet wrought itself into the coarse emotions of mankind; and perhaps our frames could hardly bear much of it. If we had a keen vision and feeling of all ordinary human life, it would be like hearing the grass grow and the squirrel's heart beat, and we should die of that roar which lies on the other side of silence. As it is, the quickest of us walk about well wadded with stupidity."—(xx.) "Lydgate was at present too ill acquainted with disaster to enter into the pathos of a lot where everything is

below the level of tragedy except the passionate egoism of the sufferer."—(xlii.)

There is a fine instance in "The Mill on the Floss" of how an indestructible germ of hereditary duty-power may lie, though choked and spoiled, beneath a mechanical and Phari-saical exterior. Who more odious and more dangerous to society than Mrs. Glegg, nipping life with her hoard of petty Dodson maxims? Yet for the first time in her life she was kind to Maggie when the girl had disgraced the family in the eyes of all St. Ogg's. She "had always augured ill of Maggie's future at a time when others were perhaps less clear-sighted;" but, "if you were not to stand by your own 'kin' as long as there was a shred of honour attributable to them, pray what were you to stand by?" And this hard, repulsive Dodson pride in its own respectability and rectitude is seen in two successive stages of its upward struggle in Tom and Maggie. In Tom it still retains its narrow blindness. But what in Mrs. Glegg was odious has grown in him into something that wins our admiration. But how wretchedly this rigid sense of right and wrong fails to show him his highest duty towards Maggie! And yet again we cannot perhaps overestimate the influence which that Dodson blood had in bringing Maggie to right herself in the supreme moment, when her doing right would have seemed to almost every one the choice of the worse of two evils. We can forgive even Mrs. Glegg.

Yet along with all this insight for the precious amongst the vile, for the minutely majestic amongst the magnificently small, there is not a syllable of condonation for vice or for indifference to elementary duty on the subterfuge of intellectual superiority. She has a fire of scorn in her remarks on "*Moral Swindlers*" for "the supposition that the ablest intellect, the highest genius, will see through morality as a sort of twaddle for bibs and tuckers, a doctrine of dulness, a mere incident in human stupidity." Such

words as the following make us long that she could have left us an autobiography, and wonder whether it may not have been on this account that her sorrow for the work that she must leave unaccomplished seemed a call to almost heroic resignation.

"Let our habitual talk give morals their full meaning as the conduct which, in every human relation, would follow from the fullest knowledge and the fullest sympathy—a meaning perpetually corrected and enriched by a more thorough appreciation of dependence in things, and a finer sensibility to both physical and spiritual fact—and this ridiculous ascription of superlative power to minds which have no effective awe-inspiring vision of the human lot, no response of understanding to the connection between duty and the material processes by which the world is kept habitable for cultivated man, will be tacitly discredited, without any need to cite the immortal names that all are obliged to take as the measure of intellectual rank and highly-charged genius."—(Theophrastus Such. Moral Swindlers.)

For this vision of the glory of the minute elements in life I know only one name. It is simply Christ-like. I have no wish to shirk the fact that she was not what would be technically termed a believer; nor was there in her that conscious looking upward which distinguishes Carlyle. The word "God" is as conspicuous by its absence from her pages as by its frequency in his. It has been said that her characters with soaring aims are her pictorial failures. We should expect this. For her they were on the highest mountain-top who saw most vividly into the plains and valleys of earth. For the loftiest souls there is most, not least, looking upwards; because they only can see how much, on this common earth, is above and beyond them. This is the essence of the central Christian idea. She brings us to the very feet of Christ. It was when the Word was *made flesh* that God dwelt, as in the *σκηνή*, or Shekinah, amongst us. Here Carlyle and George Eliot are seen to be at one. "Well said Saint Chrysostom, with his

lips of gold, 'The true Shekinah is Man.' Where else is the God's-Presence manifested not to our eyes only, but to our hearts, as in our fellow-men?" . . . "Bending before men is a reverence done to the Revelation in the Flesh. We touch Heaven when we lay our hands on a human Body."

"Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the Kingdom of Heaven. Blessed are the meek for they shall inherit the Earth."

GEORGE SARSON.

NOTES AND NOTICES.

THE English version of Max Duncker's great work* has now reached its fourth volume, which deals with the ancient history of India down to the time of Asoka. It is an instructive sign of the times to find the whole of a large volume devoted to the history of a country which was scarcely mentioned in the older manuals of so-called Universal History, and to the history of that country at a time concerning which nothing, or next to nothing, was known but a very few years ago. It is a sign that the cultivated world is beginning to enter upon the fruits of Oriental research in Indian matters, and that the habit of Western historians of considering all things at any distance from the basin of the Mediterranean as beneath notice, and of thus practically ignoring the existence of about two-thirds of the human race, is beginning to be broken through. It would be useless to attempt to predict the measure of the influence which this change of standpoint will eventually have upon our ideas of history: but it may be compared to the results which followed inevitably on the discovery that this earth was not the centre of the universe. And when we call to mind how closely intertwined are religions with historical beliefs and arguments, we may realise in some degree what effect may follow upon the unveiling of a long history of civilisation, independent of Egyptian, Jewish, or Greek thought; upon the curtain being drawn back from a new drama of struggling races and rival religions, filled with ideas strangely familiar and as curiously strange. It is not too much to say that a New World has been once more discovered by adventurers as persevering as Columbus, and perhaps at present earning as little gratitude as he did from his contemporaries: and that the inhabitants of the Old World cannot, if they would, go back again to the quiet times when the New World was not, because it was unknown. Every one to whom the entrancing story of man's gradual rise and progress has charms peculiarly its own, will welcome the new light; others will have to face the new facts, and find room for them in their conceptions of the world's history; and all alike will be glad to have the results of these latter-day inquiries summed up and put before them by so competent a hand as that of the author of the work before us. It is true that in the field to which the present

* The History of Antiquity. By Max Duncker. Translated from the German by Evelyn Abbott, M.A., LL.D. London: Bentley. 1881.

volume is devoted he has no special knowledge, does not attempt to refer to the original sources, and bases his summary upon translations, where they exist, and more often upon second-hand authorities. But the deadly virus of the examination poison has not as yet gained the mastery over the university bodies of Germany; the student is trained there with especial reference to the rules of critical judgment and the methods of research; and no one is better qualified than a distinguished master in such a school of training to distinguish, among translators or writers about a subject, who can be safely depended upon and who can not. In one way, also, such a writer as Max Duncker, with other departments of history familiar to his mind, has an advantage over even those who can consult the first authorities in their original languages. He obtains a point of view from which the various details of the story assume their due proportions; and his attention is not drawn off by those philological and chronological puzzles which it is the especial virtue of the specialist to solve. The faults of the work are of a very natural kind. When a geographer of the time of Columbus combined the various accounts of the discoverers into a description of the New World then discovered, he would perhaps have given an account better, on the whole, than any one of them would have been able to give, and accurate enough on the points on which they were all agreed. But he would scarcely have been the best judge on points where they differed; and it might well happen that in following writers of established reputation, he might neglect corrections since made by less-known men. It would be impossible within the limits of this review to point out the cases in which a similar fate has befallen our author; but a single subject may be selected as an instance. The chapters on Buddhism are an admirable summary of the results arrived at by Burnouf and Lassen, and in a lesser degree of the works of Köppen and Gutschmid. It is no crime to err in such company; but the works of Burnouf and Lassen here depended upon were written thirty or forty years ago, and "a good deal has happened since then." Max Duncker (p. 364) places the date of the death of the Buddha in 543 B.C. No Pali scholar now living would place it earlier than 477 B.C., and the most recent researches would place it somewhat later even than that. Max Duncker (p. 332) speaks of the cruel heaviness of the taxation in the time of the Buddha, giving Burnouf as his authority. But Burnouf is quoting the *Divyavadāna*, a work written about 1,500 years after the time to which Duncker applies its words. Max Duncker (p. 322) takes for granted that the Aryans went from Surāshtra to Ceylon in 500 B.C. But Burnouf, whom he quotes, does not go so far as this, and no scholar would now advance such a proposition with certainty. The whole discussion of Nirvāna (pp. 348—351) teems with misconceptions; and when Max Duncker ventures upon statements for which he gives no authority he falls into grievous errors, such as that the Buddha "called himself Sakyamuni" (p. 339); that he "turned to the heterodox doctrine of Kapila" (p. 341); that "according to Buddha's view the castes must fall to the ground" (p. 361): and even that he

"agreed with the doctrine of Kapila that the soul must be separated and set free from the body" (!). But it would be unreasonable to expect the historian of so large a subject to be abreast of the latest information in each special department of the field. The value of the work is in the breadth and general accuracy of the bird's-eye view which it gives of a very important chapter in human history; and in the sense of proportion by which the description is harmonised. The translation is singularly clear and readable, and we heartily commend the work to the attention of those who wish to know something of what mankind has been outside the range of those influences which have made the Europe of to-day what it is.

T. W. RHYS-DAVIDS.

IT would have been an unquestionable literary loss if the late Mr. Walter Bagehot's miscellaneous writings had not been collected and republished in the volumes which have been edited by Mr. R. H. Hutton. They possess far more than the merely personal interest which is often the main charm of volumes brought out after death. The "Biographical Studies" which have now followed the "Literary" and the "Economic Studies," are delightful reading. Mr. Bagehot owned the faculty of keen perception, and also that of exquisite precision of style, which enables a writer to impart a peculiar charm to biographical articles. He wrote at once with the zest of a man who is deeply interested in his subject, and with the power to reflect his own impressions upon the minds of his readers. These biographical Studies appeared, most of them, in the "National Review" and in the "Fortnightly." A few shorter papers are taken from the "Economist." The paper on Mr. Gladstone, which was written in 1860, has peculiar interest at the present time, seeing that we can read the estimate and conjectures formed of this statesman by an exceedingly able politician and writer more than twenty years ago. Mr. Bagehot regarded Mr. Gladstone at that time as "a problem;" and affirmed with manifest point, that it was remarkable he should be a problem, from the circumstance that even then more than ordinary means of judging him were at hand. He had then been in Parliament for seven-and-twenty years, and had been a distinguished member of the two great political parties. And yet, Mr. Bagehot contended, there was great uncertainty as to his future course. His "gifts at first sight marked him out to be our greatest statesman," but yet it was uncertain what he might do, or become. "Whether below the gangway, he will utter unintelligible discourses; whether he will aid in destroying many ministries, and share in none; whether he will pour forth during many hopeless years a bitter, a splendid, and a vituperative eloquence?" Mr. Bagehot lived long enough to witness the fulfilment of some of his best hopes for this foremost man in the sphere

* Biographical Studies. By the late Walter Bagehot, M.A., and Fellow of University College. Edited by Richard Holt Hutton. London: Longmans and Co. 1881.

of politics, and to rejoice that any possible fears which may have haunted his mind in 1860 had all passed away. The criticisms of Mr. Gladstone in this article are so remarkably suggestive and vivid, that they might well form the subject of lengthy consideration. The writer of this "biographical study" indicates with accurate discrimination the peculiar quality in the great orator which has contributed so largely to mark him out as one of the most illustrious speakers in the British Senate. Beyond any other man of the generation, Mr. Bagehot remarked, Mr. Gladstone has the oratorical *impulse*. In addition to his fine intellectual gifts, and his splendid education, he has a vehement longing to convince other people of the truthfulness and wisdom of his own convictions. It is his resolve, if it be possible, to *convince his audience*.

Many readers will turn from the "study" of Mr. Gladstone to that of Sir George Cornewall Lewis. This is as fine a piece of criticism, as, in its own way, we have ever met with. Mr. Hutton points out in his preface, that Sir George Lewis "comes very near to being, in Mr. Bagehot's mind, the ideal statesman;"—but he, nevertheless, reveals an almost perfect comprehension of the defects as well as the excellences of the political and mental qualities of a man who occupied a unique position among the statesmen of his generation. Most of us are aware that his apophthegms are being continually quoted; and that his impeccable sincerity and undoubted clear-headedness have been attested by all political parties. No fairer estimate of the man can be written than that which Mr. Bagehot wrote shortly after his death, in 1863. It should be said, that these "Studies" include, among others, criticisms of William Pitt, Lord Brougham, Bolingbroke as a Statesman, and Adam Smith as a Person. Altogether the book is rich in the best sort of criticism.

Not a few persons expressed some natural surprise when it was known that another Life of Livingstone was to be issued from the Press.* And yet, why? For in truth no authentic and comprehensive review of the man's personal life had ever been published. We had read much of his travels, and had been furnished with some details of his earlier career, but his really personal life had not been given to the world. Dr. W. G. Blaikie, an author of repute, and at one time editor of the *Sunday Magazine*, has accomplished this useful task with conspicuous energy and skill. He has, as he says, taken much pains to show the unity and symmetry of Livingstone's character. He has been aided in this work by several members of the great Traveller's family, and by many of his old friends. His materials were ample, and he has made admirable use of them.

Dr. Blaikie has unequivocal sympathy with Dr. Livingstone's character and career, such as no man could feel who only knew him and appreciated him as a distinguished explorer. The mere scientist and naturalist could no more measure the greatness of his aims than could

*The Personal Life of David Livingstone, LL.D., D.C.L. By William Garden Blaikie, D.D., LL.D. London: John Murray. 1881.

the merchant or politician. From first to last Livingstone was on fire with the true enthusiasm of humanity. He could furnish materials for thought and inquiry to the most eminent members of our learned societies, and touch the springs of popular sympathy with a career of daring and self-sacrifice, but he was only partially known by these people. Before all things David Livingstone was an earnest Christian missionary. It was the one passion of his life to do all he could to bring the African race under the gracious influences of Christianity. It is a pity that there were good men living then (some may still survive) who deemed it unworthy of his early religious consecration that he should have severed his connection with the London Missionary Society, and have gone forth as a traveller through the African wilds and swamps in search of geographical facts and materials. The readers of Dr. Blaikie's deeply-interesting book will feel that he was as much a missionary in the latter part of his career in Africa as in the former. He had but one aim, and that was to help and bless the natives of those vast, untravelled regions. His methods were different from those prescribed by the great missionary organisations, but none the less powerful for the achievement of the objects which all profess to seek. It is a grim and dreary mistake to suppose that Livingstone was a merely restless man who had the travel-fever upon him. He was indeed one of the world's most celebrated explorers, but he did not travel for the love of it, much less for the gain accruing to it. His heart had far other and higher motives within it; and all along, until the end came, he travelled, he observed, he wrote his journals, he plied his great endeavour, that he might thereby serve the highest welfare of a race for whose good he gave his life. All Christian philanthropists must be deeply grateful to Dr. Blaikie for having helped us to understand this more clearly, through a fuller acquaintance with the personal life of one, who "ranks with the greatest of our race, and shows the minimum of infirmity in connection with the maximum of goodness."

WILLIAM DORLING.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MODERN REVIEW.

DEAR SIR,—I beg to thank you for the leave granted to say a few words in your pages in defence of my rendering of Galatians ii. 1, in opposition to your Reviewer, who, when noticing my work on the "Journeys and Epistles of the Apostle Paul," had said that my "rendering is quite inadmissible from every point of view. For one thing, the Greek does not allow of it." There were other parts of my work to which he also objected; but they are of less importance. I confine myself, therefore, to the above, and the more so because a large number of critics are in agreement with your Reviewer; and those who deny the trustworthiness of the Book of Acts, and the genuineness of many of Paul's Epistles, very much rely upon this text. The words in the Authorised Version are:—

Then, after fourteen years, I went up again to Jerusalem, with Barnabas, and took Titus with me also.

These words I render :—

Then, in the course of fourteen years, I again went up to Jerusalem with Barnabas, taking also Titus with me.

The difference turns on the force of the preposition *ἕως* when followed by a genitive case, as to whether it means *after*, or *in the course of*. There are eleven passages in the New Testament in which this preposition is followed by a genitive case of time. These we must consider; and they are, I think, quite enough to establish the meaning of the word.

In Mark ii. 1, the time is of indefinite length, and, therefore, this text is of no use to us in our inquiry, for we may read equally well, "In the course of a few days," or, less accurately, "After a few days." The meaning is the same in either case, and the passage proves nothing.

In Acts xxiv. 17, also, the time is indefinite, and the passage, taken by itself, would prove nothing; but not so if read in connection with the history, and if we allow the writer to say what meaning his words should bear. The Authorized Version has :—

Now, after many years, I came to bring alms to my nation.

This I render as follows, remembering that the Greek for alms is in the plural, which seems to point to more journeys than one :—

And during several years I came bringing gifts of charity to my nation.

These words are part of Paul's speech when he was a prisoner at Caesarea, after the Book of Acts had narrated five journeys to Jerusalem since his conversion. The writer, therefore, did not understand them otherwise than I have rendered them, nor as contradicting his own narrative.

All critics are, I believe, agreed about the following eight passages as requiring our preposition to be rendered *during*, or *in the course of* :—

Matt. xxvi. 61.—I am able to destroy the temple of God, and to build it *within* [or *in the course of*] three days.

Mark xiv. 58.—I will destroy this temple made with hands, and *within* [or *in the course of*] three days I will build another not made with hands.

Luke v. 5.—Master, we have toiled *through* [or *during*] the whole night.

Acts i. 3.—Being seen by them *for* [or *during*] forty days.

Acts xvi. 9.—And a vision was seen by Paul *in* [or *during*] the night.

Acts xxiii. 31.—Took Paul, and brought him *by* [or *during*] night to Antipatris.

Heb. ii. 15.—*During* the whole lifetime.

Moreover, in Gal. i. 3, only a few verses above our disputed passage, Paul had written, "Then, after three years," using not the preposition *ἕως*, but *μετά*. This, of itself, is no little proof that he knew the different force of the two prepositions.

There is one passage in the Septuagint which may be quoted against me. In Deut. ix. 11 (rendering *ἕως* *in the course of*) we read, "It came to pass in the course of forty days and forty nights that Jehovah gave to me the two tables of stone." But, if the Alexandrian is to be relied on as a careful translator, we must read "after forty days," for the Hebrew has

"at the end of forty days." But we should not place much reliance upon one passage in the Septuagint against those which the New Testament has supplied, and those which classical Greek would supply; while I fancy that the whole range of classical Greek would hardly supply half-a-dozen passages to support the less accurate meaning given to the preposition in the Authorised Version.

The proper rendering of our passage, Gal. ii. 1, must, for the most part, be settled by such evidence as I have produced; but, in addition, there remains the inquiry what the Apostle is likely to have written. Let it be observed that, while claiming for the Gentiles liberty from the bondage of the law, he does not claim it himself; therefore he is little likely to have let fourteen years pass between any two visits of religious duty to Jerusalem. From that consideration alone it is more probable that the fourteen years relate to the date of the Epistle than to the second journey.

Now, leaving the inquiry into the meaning of a single passage, and turning to the Journeys and Epistles of the Apostle Paul, my point is that the Epistles may be placed in such an order that there is no contradiction whatever as to the facts related in the Epistles and the Acts. I do not speak of the colouring which each writer puts upon the facts, but of the facts themselves. My book is not in a controversial form, but it was written with the hostile criticism of Baur and his followers always in my mind; and I am grateful to any Reviewer, who points out such contradictions as he may think that I have overlooked. By so doing truth is the more likely to be reached. But, in order to make such criticism useful, it should be accompanied with evidence and reasons; and my translation of any passage can only be shaken by the critic producing against me passages more numerous and more to the purpose than those which support me, or reasons to show why my authorities are not to the purpose.

Yours truly,

SAMUEL SHARPE.

DEAR SIR,—I also beg to thank you for the opportunity of replying to the remarks of Mr. Sharpe in the above letter. His diligence in defending his position is worthy of praise, and the point which he has raised has important bearings.

That *διὰ* with the genitive, in cases of time, often means *after*, is stated in every Greek grammar and dictionary. The root meaning of the word is *through*; used with a genitive of time it indicates motion through—*through and out of*, as the German grammarians and Dr. Ellicott in his Commentary on Galatians ii. 1, have it. The action is viewed in relation to the whole of the time spoken of. It is thus translated:—1, *during, throughout*, when the action involves duration; 2, *after*, when the action is one occurring at a point of time. The sense 3, *within, at some time during*, is more remote from the root meaning of the word, is, as Dr. Ellicott says, a laxer one, and is a rare one, but to be recognised in the phrase *διὰ νυκτός*. In Fritzsche's Commentary on

Mark, page 50, and in Winer's Grammar, page 356, a sufficient number of passages will be found to show that the usage of *διδ* with the sense *after*, though not perhaps a frequent one (for the Greeks had many other ways of expressing an interval of time), was yet a recognised one, and is to be found in nearly every Greek classic from Æschylus downwards while it often occurs in connection with a number of years to fix a date just as in Gal. ii. 1, according to the authorised version. Compare the characteristic phrase, *διὰ χρόνον*, which occurs frequently. *Διὰ χρόνον ἰσάμενα αὐτόν*, near the beginning of the Republic, means, I saw him after a long time (during which I had not seen him).

To apply Mr. Sharpe's rendering of *διδ*, which he seeks to impress on several of the New Testament passages, to this passage of Plato would obviously destroy its meaning entirely; and this is exactly what Mr. Sharpe has done to the three passages, Mark ii. 1, Acts xxiv. 17, Gal. ii. 1. In these passages it is natural to take *διδ* in the sense which yields the clearest meaning, that sense being one which is current in classical Greek, and the occurrence of which in the Septuagint Mr. Sharpe does not deny. As they stand, these three passages are simple historical statements, that after such an interval such a thing took place. Mr. Sharpe says they are not to be taken in this way, and has then to find for each of them another meaning, and to obtain a *terminus ad quem* in place of that which he has taken away. If the spaces of time do not fix the date of the action in connection with which they are mentioned, why are they mentioned at all? In Mark ii. 1 Mr. Sharpe fails to explain this, and leaves the phrase *δι' ἡμερῶν* entirely idle. The statement, "he entered the house during some days," means nothing if we are not told what days these are. It is to be remarked that the English reader of Mr. Sharpe's translation of this passage would naturally take his phrase, "in the course of," to mean "at the end of."

In Acts xxiv. 17 Mr. Sharpe has no *terminus ad quem* of the several years, which are thus left entirely vague, so that months or decades might be placed instead of years, and leave the sense unaffected. Here, to get a tolerable meaning out of the words, Mr. Sharpe gives the aorist *παρεγέρθη* the force of an imperfect, and makes the novel suggestion that the plural *ἀνεμυστρῶναι* points to more journeys than one.

The attempt to show that *διδ* does not mean *after* in these passages cannot be thought successful, and we may regard them as examples of this use of the word in the New Testament. I should be inclined to add to these the passages, Matt. xxvi. 61 and Mark xiv. 58. If the Synoptic Evangelists considered the saying to have referred to the resurrection, they must have used *διδ* with the sense of *after* (compare Mark viii. 31). The English *in* (not *within*) of the authorised version answers exactly to the Greek preposition in all its shades of meaning.

If *διδ* can be translated *after* in the New Testament, it must certainly be so translated in Gal. ii. 1. Mr. Sharpe does not deny this, and will allow that his rendering of the passage has an awkwardness and difficulty which the authorised version avoids. How can the words,

διὰ δεκατεσσάρων ἐτῶν, mean "at some time during the fourteen years previous to the writing of this Epistle"? If the Apostle had meant this, would he not have said so? Do the words as they stand admit of such an interpretation? They clearly do not. No definition of the fourteen years is given by the use of the article, or by any hint at any other way in which they could be calculated, and their *terminus ad quem* must be given in the interval with διὰ. As the words of Socrates in the Republic διὰ χρόνου ἰώρακα αὐτόν, mean, "I had not seen him for a long time, but I saw him now," so Paul's words here must mean, "For fourteen years I did not go up to Jerusalem, but at the expiry of that interval I went there." Is the proposed rendering, or is the proposed theory of the meaning of διὰ, derived from anything but a preconceived chronology which is to be supported at all hazards? I submit that the Greek does not allow of the proposed translation.

Yours truly,

ALLAN MENZIES.

A^T first sight it seems a little strange that a complete critical edition of a masterpiece of French literature, should be offered to English readers in the English language; * and so, to a certain extent, withdrawn from the critical cognizance of those who are best qualified to estimate its merits and defects. From internal evidence, however, we should be inclined to suppose that Mr. de Soyres was equally at home in both languages; and we can only rejoice that he has thought fit, for whatever reason, to enrich our literature with what will probably prove to be a standard work. In some respects this edition leaves little to be desired. The text of the Provincial Letters is carefully reprinted, and the variations of the first four editions, noted at the foot of the page. To the end of each letter is affixed a body of explanatory notes, which the careful reader will find of great use. Mr. de Soyres has a large and accurate knowledge of the voluminous literature of the Jansenist Controversy, while, from the general stores of his theological erudition, he is able to adduce much of an illustrative kind. But the fact is that Mr. de Soyres' learning has a little run away with him. His book is exceedingly interesting and valuable to those who already know much, or all, about Pascal, Port Royal, and the Jansenist Controversy. Such readers will find in it some things of which they may have been ignorant, and fresh light thrown upon others, with which they were already familiar. But this is hardly enough. The editor of a literary *chef d'œuvre* is not entitled to rely on the erudition of his readers. He is bound to find them, in succinct if not in extended shape, all the knowledge requisite for their understanding of the text. Now, a reader of Mr. de Soyres' *Introductions* might get to the end of them, without knowing what Port Royal was, who were the Solitaries of Port Royal, what was the connection of Port Royal with the Jansenist Controversy, who Pascal was, or

* The Provincial Letters of Pascal. Edited by John de Soyres. London: George Bell and Sons. 1880.

how he became involved in the fray. All these things are of course alluded to; but the story is nowhere clearly told. We could not put Mr. de Soyres' book into the hands of a student who had not already graduated in the lore of Port Royal, in the expectation that it would answer its own avowed purpose. In the absence of this necessary information, the learned and accurate disquisitions with which Mr. de Soyres' pages are undoubtedly enriched, would confuse rather than instruct him. The book before us is a valuable contribution to the library of an expert in Jansenism: it would greatly assist any one who wished to study the Provincial Letters as a masterpiece of French prose; but we cannot commend it as a complete edition, containing within itself everything necessary for the full comprehension of the author.

CHARLES BEARD.

MR. GERALD MASSEY has given us an extraordinary book.* If its conclusions are true they are most important. The question whether they are true or not will have to be carefully cogitated by the Christian teacher, by the Hebraist, the Egyptologist, the ethnologist, and the student of mythology and folk-lore. Mr. Massey has been chiefly known to the public as a poet and lecturer, but henceforth he will be known as the author of this book. Ten years ago he retired from the public gaze, as Livingstone disappeared into the heart of Africa; and now he emerges laden with manifold information which he has collected. Stranger than "travellers' tales" are some things which he has to tell us, yet not on that account to be summarily rejected. Nor is Mr. Massey a mere collector, but his vast accumulations of fact and statement are sorted, sifted, questioned, and made to serve as the basis for theories which are new and astounding. The axe is now laid to the root of the tree in very different fashion from what was done by Bishop Colenso, or the author of "Supernatural Religion." Evolution and the comparative method are here applied, with the greatest boldness, to the study of language, typology, myths, the genesis and succession of the gods, the antiquities of the Jews, and subjects which touch us more nearly still. The evidence may not seem in every case conclusive; but the author always speaks as one who knows, and as though he had abundance of proof forthcoming by-and-by.

"One object of the present work is to interpret the primitive history and sociology from their reflections in the mirror of mythology and symbolism." It seems (quite in accordance with Darwin's conclusion, arrived at from other data) that Africa is the birthplace of us all. In the far-off past a Central African race got on to the Nile, in its upper course, and gradually descended towards the Delta, halting in Ethiopia, but

* *A Book of the Beginnings.* By Gerald Massey. Two Vols. Containing an attempt to recover and reconstitute the lost *Origines* of the Myths and Mysteries, Types and Symbols, Religion and Language, with Egypt for the Mouthpiece, and Africa as the Birthplace. London: Williams and Norgate. 1881.

finding it impossible to stop, on account of the pressure of population behind. Thus the Central Africans became Ethiopians, and the Ethiopians became Egyptians. The continuance of the slow, glacier-like motion and squeeze, launched them from the land altogether, and sent them over the water as colonists. All the ends of the earth were peopled from Africa; and the Egyptian origins are still traceable in Britain, on one side of the globe, and New Zealand on the other—in words, water-names, symbolical customs, and almost-forgotten deities. The Kymry are from Kam (Cham, Egypt), and in Wales the ancient cult has never been altogether extinct. Even the language and cult of the Babylonians are traced to Egypt. This early colonising from Africa has to be borne in mind in reading the book, or else it will seem like insanity for the author to pass, by a quick transition, from the Eight Gods of Egypt to the British Arthur and his seven companions, and to illustrate Egyptian mythology and the meaning of Hebrew words, by instances drawn from the Fiji Islands or North America. "We have to dismiss from our minds the crude notion that the same myths have sprung up independently in various parts of the world. . . . Much that is missing in Egypt is recoverable in the Mangaian and Maori treasury of the mythos" (Vol. II., p. 559). What is it, then, that is at last recovered from Egypt and her ancient colonies put together? It seems that the Egyptian mythology and worship passed through a succession of phases—stellar, lunar, and solar—the two former having been superseded before the monumental records begin. The pre-monumental condition of things, our author has been digging for, as Mr. Pengelly digs for relics of pre-historic man in Kent's Cavern. He is enabled, he believes, to reproduce for us the most obscure cults—namely, the Sut-Typhonian and that of Atum and his son, Iu-em-hept, "the Egyptian Jesus." The first object which arrested the attention of the early observers was the revolution of the Great Bear constellation, with which they connected the star Sirius. The Bear was the first measurer of time, and the Dog-star, as we know, announced the annual inundation. The Bear was the Great Mother, Typhon, and the Dog-star was her son, Sut. The seven bright stars of the Bear, together with the Dog-star, supply the Seven and Eight which are found in so many mythologies. In process of time the Sabeian system or stellar reckoning was superseded by the lunar, which advancing astronomical knowledge had rendered more exact; and the Mother and Son were degraded. Sut, the Dog-star, was followed by Taht, the lunar reckoner and announcer of time. Lastly comes the solar dynasty, and the adaptation to the solar mythos of the symbols and imagery previously extant. This development occupied a great length of time; and Taht had superseded Sut (Ritual, ch. xlii.) when the monuments begin. The symbolism, in fact, points to a birth and origin in *Pisces*; and since it is impossible that this should relate to the last occurrence of the equinox in that sign (B.C. 255), it follows that it must have been 21,000 years earlier, through the precession of the equinoxes. The gods were time-keepers; the first time observed and registered was

Sut-Typhonian, and the writer maintains that the Typhonian religion and types are the oldest extant, whether in Egypt or out of it.

At this point the interest of the book for many students will only begin. The author maintains the Egyptian origin of the Jews, and argues that they were Sut-Typhonians, expelled on account of their adherence to the earliest cult. They were Ius, worshippers of Iu, the black god of Inner Africa. The Exodus was a going out of unclean Typhonians, moral lepers, accursed heretics. Hence it can be understood that there was more than one exodus; and thus Manetho and Josephus are reconciled. Evidences or relics of this Egyptian origin of the Jews the author believes he finds in the Old Testament Scriptures, the Hebrew writings being largely a restatement of the Egyptian myth as actual history, and containing reproductions of the most ancient Hermean matter. The Creation story belongs to the mythological astronomy. In the beginning the Great Bear, by its revolution, created the first circle, and put a boundary to the boundless. The plural "Elohim" refers to the first revolvers, the seven great stars of the Bear—seven stars but one constellation, plurality in unity. "Jehovah" also is the divinity of the number seven, and feminine in character. The feminine terminal *He* indicates this origin, and on this account, in later times, it was considered blasphemy to pronounce the name. Reverting to the Book of Genesis, Seth is the same as Sut here identified with Taht, and Enos the son of Seth is identified with Sut-Anush, of the Dog-star. In like manner, Abram, Isaac, and Jacob are resolved into divinities, and specifically Jacob is an impersonation of the sun-god, and his 12 sons are the 12 signs of the zodiac. There is much more to similar effect about Adam and Eve, Moses and Joshua, and "David the Hebrew Taht," though it is admitted that there is some slight historic nucleus in the Hebrew narrative. The curious student will also find here new readings of what is recorded about the serpent of Eden and the serpent of the wilderness, about the ark and the deluge, the cherubim, the teraphim images, the Book of Jasher, the Qodeshoth and the monthly prognosticators, the expected Shiloh, and the Messiah son of the coming age. Even the virgin and child of Rome, our author holds, had their origin in Egyptian mythology. Some of the profoundest work in the book relates to burial customs, circumcision, and the practice of tattooing, the results being arrived at by delving to the root-meaning of the hieroglyphics which preceded alphabetic language.

There is very much in these volumes which will be questioned, and there are a few obvious mistakes, but only profound scholars will be competent to question or capable of fairly judging the author's main results. I, for my part, content myself with introducing Mr. Massey's work to the readers of the MODERN REVIEW. They will find in it evidences of wide study, and will, at least, value it for its store of detail, the accumulation of which would have been worthy the industry of a Darwin or a Buckle. The comparative vocabularies—of Egyptian words corresponding with English, with Hebrew, with Assyrian, and with Maori—have themselves been the work of years. They contain three-fourths of the Egyptian

lexicon; and as that is difficult of access (Birch, in Bunsen's "Egypt," £8 8s.) they will be invaluable to students who may seek to apply the same comparative process to other languages. It may be a defect of the author's method that he starts with his own results full in his mind, and frequently alludes incidentally to conclusions not worked out till afterwards, or not attempted to be proved at all in these volumes. The reader cannot be in the same position; but, in arrest of hasty judgment and summary condemnation, it should be understood that these two volumes are but part of an intended whole, and two more will hardly afford room for what the author has to say. He intends to treat of the "Science of Typology"—the typology of the Genesis, of Eden, the tree, the fall; the typology of the deluge and the ark; of the gods and of the Great Mother; the Mother and Messiah-Son; the "two truths" of Egypt; the biune deity, the triads and the trinity; the typology of time and number, and of the Word or Logos; the typology of the cross and the crossing; of the mummy, of naming and of sounds; of the astronomical allegory, the great pyramid, and the great year of the world. The last volume of the series is to be devoted to tracing the current theology and eschatology as the deposit, development, outcome, and final form of the ancient typology and mythology!

GEORGE ST. CLAIR.

NOTHING is more difficult than to obtain just and complete ideas of the men whom the Church has condemned as heretics. With a wisdom which savours somewhat of that of the children of this world, all authentic records of the unorthodox have, as far as possible, been destroyed, and after ages have to reconstruct from fragments in their opponents' writings, and from the scanty remnants of their own works, the thoughts and systems against which ecclesiastical anathemas have been hurled. No one has suffered more from this dearth of information than M. Servetus. But the day has come when justice seems likely to be done to him, and his position as a reformer will be recognised as being side by side with Luther, Zwingli, and Calvin, if not above them in thoroughness of Biblical research and ecclesiastical liberality. The labours of the Rev. H. Tollin, of Magdeburg,* have been unremitting and wonderfully successful in throwing light upon the history of Servetus, and in explaining his theological principles and method. The only regret we venture to express is that the precious results of his unwearied research are scattered in so many periodical publications, and in comparatively brief pamphlets, instead of being collected and arranged in what still is a desideratum—a complete biography of Servetus. No one has such a command of the materials needed for such a purpose, no one has shown greater interest in the subject, and it not common to find in a German author the power of picturesque description and the lucid style which

* *Servet und die Oberländischen Reformatoren. Quellen Studien.* Von Lic. Theol. H. Tollin, Prediger. Band I.—Michael Servet und Martin Butzer. Berlin: H. N. Mecklenburg. 1890.

characterise the writings of M. Tollin. His latest contribution to Servetus-literature is a most interesting work on the relations of his hero and Bucer, a subject of more than usual interest to the English student on account of Bucer's great influence on our English Reformation. This work is very characteristic of Tollin's method. Nothing that has ever been written bearing upon Servetus seems to escape his notice, and his searching criticism finds traces of the Spanish reformer where former students have found nothing. Where direct evidence for his conclusions is not forthcoming—and, naturally enough, in most matters which concern so hated a heretic, direct evidence is often wanting—circumstantial evidence is adduced with such an accumulation of minute detail, and such skilful arrangement, that it needs the most careful watchfulness not to be led to accept as ascertained fact what, after all, is only a very probable hypothesis. For instance, in a letter to Oecolampadius, Servetus says that "he has with his own ears heard faith differently explained by his correspondent, by Doctor Paul, by Luther, and by Melancthon." When and where did Servetus meet Luther? Tollin follows both men on their travels to discover where their paths cross, and shows that the only possible time must have been when Luther was staying in Coburg during the Diet of Augsburg, and where Servetus had in attendance on his patron, Quintana, the Confessor of the Emperor Charles, accompanied that monarch into Germany. Bucer was at the same time in Augsburg, and Tollin points out how many reasons there were why Servetus, with his newly-awakened love of the Bible, should desire to come into intimate relation with Bucer, whose lectures delivered at Strasburg had greatly influenced Servetus, as can be shown by reference to his celebrated work, "*De Trinitatis Erroribus*." Evidence is adduced in favour of this desire having been gratified. It is shown to be very probable that Servetus transferred his service at this time from Quintana to Bucer, and that as his secretary he accompanied the Strasburg clergyman on his well-known visit to Luther; so that at last we come to fix the very date of the interview between Servetus and the great German Reformer as the 19th, 20th, or 21st of September, 1530. This brief summary does nothing like justice to the careful reasoning of our author, nor does it give the faintest conception of the picturesque style in which the accumulating evidence is marshalled and made to produce conviction.

To the student of the history of doctrine, this work will be a storehouse of suggestion. M. Tollin traces the gradual growth in Bucer of orthodox Trinitarianism, showing how he begins in Erasmian freedom from its fetters, but is gradually led rather by political considerations than real conviction into conformity with symbolical orthodoxy. The picture drawn of Bucer is hardly a pleasing one, but it cannot fail to help us in understanding his conduct in England, where his influence was so great, and must have helped in the establishment of our Reformed Church on such unstable foundations. No injustice seems to be done to Bucer by Mathew Alberus, who (when noticing how among Zwinglians he was a

Zwinglian, and among Lutherans a Lutheran) spoke of him as "an amphibious creature." But it is not only about Bucer, Servetus, and Luther that we receive information in this valuable work. By brief but wonderfully suggestive descriptions, we learn more of the true character of the many sects which divided the Protestant world than in many far more pretentious volumes. The Waldenses, the Anabaptists, the Free Baptists, &c., are described, and their points of contact with Servetus shown. Strasburg, at the time when Servetus took up his abode there, under the protection of Bucer and Capito, seems to have been the very hotbed of sectarian division, and Servetus, if he had been the ambitious self-seeker, full of vanity, whom some writers describe, would have had no difficulty in becoming a most dangerous antagonist of Bucer. But he quietly submitted to his criticisms, and left Strasburg without provoking any open conflict. Indeed, he retracted several things, in accordance with Bucer's request, in his next publication. Bucer did not publicly attack Servetus while the latter was in Strasburg; indeed, Tollin calls special attention to the remarkable fact that no one ever publicly controverted Servetus face to face, till at last, in Geneva, supported by the whole band of preachers, the Senate, and the Public Prosecutor, Calvin assailed the captive Spaniard, worn with illness and persecution, and deprived of the aids which freedom would have offered him. It was only after Servetus had left Strasburg that Bucer is said by Calvin to have declared that "a man who could hold such opinions deserved to have his bowels plucked out, and to be torn limb from limb." Tollin gives good reason to believe that the Strasburg lecturer only spoke of Servetus's works deserving destruction, and that it was the stern spirit of the Genevan Inquisitor which applied the cruel phrase to the Spaniard's body. On his trial in Geneva, Servetus confessed that Bucer "lui était contraire;" but his generous spirit never led him to speak with harshness of the man whose early lectures on the Gospels had largely influenced the formation of his opinions. In concluding this brief notice, I can but repeat the wish I expressed in the beginning, that M. Tollin would before long give to the world a biography of the great Spaniard, as there is no one who can equally do justice to so great a theme.

S. A. S.

MR. OVERTON, who is already favourably known as the joint-author with Mr. Abbey of "The English Church in the Eighteenth Century," presents us with a thoroughly good and conscientious monograph on William Law.* To say that Law is remembered as the author of the "Serious Call to a Devout and Holy Life," would probably be to overstate the case; for though most people have heard of the book, it has long ceased, we fear, to be widely read. Probably this is largely due to the fact that Law during his lifetime outlasted his chances of popu-

* William Law, Nonjuror and Mystic: A Sketch of his Life, Character, and Opinions. By J. H. Overton, M.A. London: Longmans, Green, and Co. 1881.

larity, and broke with those who, like the Wesleys, directed the supply of religious reading in the great Evangelical revival. His High-Churchism cut him off on one side, his Mysticism on another. His own life of retirement and isolation, only diversified by controversies in which he fought for the most part, like Hal of the Wynd, "for his own hand," was not of the sort to found a school, or to ensure intelligent and appreciative presentation of his views after his decease.

The Hanoverian succession found Law a young Fellow of Emmanuel College, Cambridge, and his refusal to take the Abjuration Oath ranked him with the Nonjurors, at a time when whatever savour of romantic loyalty had characterised their cause seemed to have departed, and their schism was regarded as an eccentricity that had ceased to be dangerous. Law does not seem ever to have been numbered among the clergy of the Nonjuring church, or to have had any dealings with its bishops or prominent members. During the "ten years' occultation" which followed his leaving Cambridge, he appears to have served curacies and taken pupils in London. To this period we owe his "Three Letters to the Bishop of Bangor" (Hoadley), which established his character as a High Churchman and his reputation as a controversialist; his "Remarks on Mandeville's Fable of the Bees," of the first section of which, John Sterling said, "I have never seen in our language the elementary grounds of a rational ideal philosophy, as opposed to empiricism, stated with nearly the same clearness, simplicity, and force;" and the "Christian Perfection," in which Law displays that power of keen observation and analysis of character applied to the commendation of personal religion and practical piety which forms so much of the charm and value of the "Serious Call." *Eusebius* and *Siccus* in the one give a foretaste of *Flatus* and *Matilda*, of *Calidus* and *Succus* in the other—portraits sketched with a hand so true and in a style so transparently natural that we are reminded alternately of Mr. Spectator's acquaintances, and of the Talkatives and Littlefaiths whom Bunyan drew from the life. But in the time which elapsed between the appearance of the "Christian Perfection" and the publication of the "Serious Call," a material change had taken place in Law's circumstances. In 1727 he went back to his old college as tutor to rather a graceless pupil, Mr. Edward Gibbon, who, when he quitted the University in order to make the grand tour, left Law installed in his father's house at Putney. There he remained for at least twelve years, in a position which it would be derogatory to call that of a chaplain, if the name suggests to us the idea of the poor dependent whose calling it was—

With holy words to consecrate the meat,
But hold it for a favour seldom known
If he be deigned the honour to sit down.

Law was certainly, as his pupil's son, Edmund Gibbon, the historian, relates, "the much-honoured friend and spiritual director of the whole family." At Putney, Law was the centre of a congenial circle, to one member of which, Dr. Cheyne, he appears to have owed his introduction to the writings of the continental mystics. Here, too, he was free to receive

visitors from a distance, among whom were his life-long friend, Dr. John Byron, to whose journal we owe much of our knowledge of Law's life and thought; and the two Wesleys, who seem to have retained a sincere respect for Law, even after they were constrained to testify against him as "an eloquent but erring man." Here, besides the "Serious Call," were written the "Case of Reason" (against Matthew Tindal), and "Letters to a Lady Inclined to Enter the Church of Rome." But on the death of old Mr. Gibbon, in 1739, the household at Putney was broken up, and Law retired to his native village—King's Cliffe, in Northamptonshire, where he was joined soon after by a widow lady, Mrs. Hutcheson, and his patron's daughter, Miss Hester Gibbon, both of whom desired to pass their days in retirement and works of charity under Law's spiritual direction. In this retreat, in which he lived without a change until his death, in 1761, occupied only in caring for schools, which the worthy trio founded and endowed—and, we must add, in such lavish and misdirected almsgiving as drew forth warm protests from the rector of the village and his parishioners—he was free to practise that ascetic piety which his early writings had enjoined, and to follow that bent of his mind towards mystical theology, which his study of Behmen had done so much to confirm. Mr. Overton appropriately prefixes to his analysis of Law's later theology, three interesting chapters on "Mysticism," which we hope may receive the wide attention they deserve, seeing that in our day preachers often use *mystical* as if it were a synonym for *mysterious*, and their hearers generally suppose it to be classical for *misty*. Law seems to be pre-eminently the writer through whom the English reader may arrive at some comprehension of what mysticism is. He is never visionary, and hardly ever fanatical; he deals with religious subjects in language which seems singularly *adequate* to them; and even his devotion to Behmen could not impart a touch of turgidity or obscurity to his style. It is a perfect instrument wielded by a competent hand. With all his contempt for "human reasoning," and his disparagement of classical studies, he was, nevertheless, a master of controversy, and an over-match for those "who, from long labours in restoring the grammar, and finding out the hidden beauties of some vicious old book, set up for qualified artists to polish the Gospel pearl of great price." The very gist of his mysticism and the solemn secret of his nervous eloquence is to be found in the words with which he continues (in his "Address to the Clergy," *qu. Overton*, p. 436):—"Speak, Lord, for thy servant heareth" is the only way by which any man ever did, or ever can, attain Divine knowledge and Divine goodness. . . . Show me a man whose heart has no desire or prayer in it but to love God with his whole soul and spirit, and his neighbour as himself, and then you have shown me the man who knows Christ, and is known of Him, the best and wisest man in the world. Not a single precept in the Gospel but is the precept of his own heart, and the joy of that new-born heavenly love which is the life and light of his soul. . . . That Love which fulfilleth the Law and the Prophets, that Love which is God and Christ, both in angels and men

(as he says in another place, 'Love is my God and wrath my devil') is the love that gives birth and life and growth to everything that is either thought or action in him; and if he has no share or part with foolish errors, cannot be tossed about with every wind of doctrine, it is because to be always governed by this love is to be always taught of God."

Besides Law's truly mystical works, "An Appeal to All that Doubt," "The Spirit of Prayer," and "The Spirit of Love," some of his most powerful *Adversaria*, against Bishops Hoadley and Warburton, and Dr. Trapp, belong to his later days. He retained to the end his scrupulous fairness in debate, his scorn of a merely verbal advantage, and his desire to "posit" rather than deny; and he still had his provoking way (we think the words are Mr. Overton's) of putting his opponent in the wrong. That he drew the same sword against the Freethinker and the contemporary Low Churchman (of whom Hoadley was the type) is obvious, for both started from the premisses of Locke, to contend for the prize of *Reasonableness*; and the thought of competition between Churchmen and Deists for so worthless a guerdon was as smoke in the nostrils of Law.

If, in thinking of William Law, we have too little commended his biographer, it is solely because Mr. Overton has so well realised his own wish in rendering attractive and instructive his sketch of "one of the finest minds and most interesting characters of the eighteenth century."

J. E. O.

THE critic who should undertake to give a distinct and impartial estimate of each of the numerous volumes of verse which are published, or even of those which make their way to the editorial table, would find his task by no means one of the easiest, and it would be, on the whole, a thankless one. Those pretty, attractive-looking volumes, so tastefully bound and nicely printed, contain a great deal that must be allowed to be of very fair poetical quality; and they do credit to their authors as men of culture and intellectual tastes, and as careful and intelligent students of our best poetical literature. It must be said, however, that a good deal more is needed than the fluent expression of excellent sentiments, or the drawing of pleasing pictures, or the treatment—for the thousandth time—of the "Old, old story," to attract much notice in these days of superabundant literary wealth. In the absence of any special mark of originality, or any special skill in the music of words, the most generous critic, if he be also just, will be compelled to award only that faint praise which may be said to bless neither him that gives nor him that takes. He might be able honestly to compliment the authors on having produced creditable literary exercises, which, it may be hoped, have been their own reward in the doing; but it is not often that he could fix upon any characteristic marks which would distinguish one from another, as regards real literary value, or entitle its author to be "placed" among the successful candidates for poetic honours. Sometimes, how-

ever, it will happen that out of the crowd of aspirants for the favour of the muse, and of the public, the voice of some singer of more than average skill and power is heard; and it would not be difficult to make out a good list of minor poets, belonging to quite recent days, who have fairly won a hearing, and who may reckon on an ungrudging welcome from the critics, and from a more general audience, whenever they have anything fresh to say or sing. In such a list the name of Mr. Walter C. Smith would unquestionably be found. He gained a recognised place in it when he published, some eight or nine years ago, his clever and original poem, "Olrig Grange." Since then he has enlarged the scope, and varied the theme of his poetic teachings in "Borland Hall," and "Hilda"; and now, in "Raban; or, Life Splinters," he discourses again in eloquent verse of many things which come very near to the heart and conscience of earnest and thoughtful men. He is broad-minded, charitable, and sympathetic as ever, and, in his sketches of character, and his treatment of those problems of life on which he touches, he shows a kindly wisdom and shrewd insight, and a genial, hopeful spirit, which always make him a welcome companion and a helpful one. Mr. Smith's verse is always easy and fluent, and with this fluency there is an occasional element of weakness. He lets his words run on sometimes in too careless a measure, missing the subtler harmonies which he not unfrequently proves to be quite within the compass of his art. Probably, however, he would say that the more homely and familiar style has been chosen as most suitable, in its place, fitting the particular mood of the author—that is, of "Raban," the supposed writer of the pages to which the somewhat artificial title of "Life Splinters" has been given. This Raban, whose character and experiences, we should say, are not altogether the product of the author's imagination, is described with a firm and sympathetic touch.

Trim and erect, with locks of iron-grey,
A large eye full of light, and features thin
That grew with age in beauty; a manner brisk
And breezy; ready of speech for sharp retort,
Or flowing period; given to dainty humour,
Where delicate touches of quaint character
Flitted like smiles upon his words; he knew
Affairs and books and men, and it was like
Great music just to sit beside the fire,
And hearken his discourse.

He had started life as a licentiate in theology, but was unfitted for the preacher's calling, being unable to satisfy himself with any cut-and-dried scheme of salvation, or to satisfy his hearers without one; and at times—

He seemed to assail their most secure beliefs,
And sap the main foundation of their hopes,
When he was merely setting free the soul
Of Truth, on which they lived, and which he loved.

Accepting the fact of his failure with sadness, but without losing heart for the future, he takes to literary work, and through the press,

and also on the platform, gains a hearing for the truths which he had attempted in vain to preach from the pulpit; and so, with ripening experience, and a wider range of thought and speech, he gets some fruitful work done, and leaves a record of his life in the papers entrusted to the friend who is supposed to edit them, and who in the introduction gives us the picture of Raban himself. This plan of the poem allows of considerable variety of subject and treatment. It includes some clever and interesting sketches of friends and acquaintances, passages from Raban's personal history, meditations on various problems of faith and conduct, and not a few lyrics which make pleasant music. There is a section called "Crystallised Sermon," supposed to contain some of the truths he had attempted to get into the minds of his rustic congregation in his preaching days. Of these the "Parabolic Discourse" strikes us as the most successful. In the two sections, "Stray Leaves" and "Endings," we have some of the author's best work, some specimens of which we should have been glad to find room for. It would, however, have been difficult, after all, to detach any shorter passages for quotation without spoiling their meaning and interest; and we are content to conclude our brief review of a very interesting book by cordially recommending our readers to make acquaintance with it at first hand.

R. C. J.

MR. MORRIS'S *Studies*,* which are, in main, a reproduction of a course of public lectures, cover a wide range both in time and matter, from Roger Bacon, William of Occam, Edmund Spenser, Richard Hooker, and Shakespeare, to Lord Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Hamilton, J. S. Mill, and Herbert Spencer. They are largely biographical, aiming at showing the connection between a man's life and his thought, and often narrate facts of interest for the ascertainment of which wide reading must have been required. With the general spirit of the criticism we are in cordial agreement. Professor Morris is by no means enamoured of the present domination of physical conceptions over philosophic thought and the current negation of all but phenomenal truth. He has studied the best German literature to good purpose, and holds a high place as an interpreter of European ideas to his own countrymen. But, if not he himself, his advertising agent, is under an extraordinary delusion in regard to the supposed excellence of his style. We fail to perceive "the union of *conciseness* with *attractive grace*," and would strongly recommend Mr. Morris, if he desires many readers on this side of the Atlantic, to adopt a simpler and less ambitious way of stating facts and any comments he may wish to make upon them.

The title of Mr. Duncan's little book† clearly indicates its aim and scope, it being understood that it is feeling, not intelligence, which he

* *British Thought and Thinkers: Introductory Studies—Critical, Biographical, and Philosophical.* By George S. Morris, A.M., Lecturer on Philosophy in the John Hopkins University, Baltimore. London: Trübner. 1880.

† *Conscious Matter; or, the Physical and the Psychical universally in Causal Connection.* By W. Stewart Duncan. London: David Bogue. 1881.

predicates of all matter. We have here a really noteworthy attempt to bridge the chasm which successive Presidents of the British Association and other leading evolutionists have confessed their inability to cross—viz., that which separates mind and matter. To Professor Tyndall, and, still more recently, to Professor Allman, the gulf which separates physical and psychical phenomena seemed impassable, and many a defender of religion thought that here at least had been found an impregnable barrier to the further inroads of Evolution. The book before us clearly indicates that the insurmountableness of this barrier will no longer be admitted by many scientific men, but that sufficiently daring assumptions will be made and bold hypotheses ventured, to render the subject at least an open question. Of course, when the ordinary conceptions of mind and matter are fully developed, no step from the one to the other is conceivable; the connection between the prick of a pin and the feeling of pain, between vibrations of air or ether and sensations of sound or light, is then an ultimate fact, capable of no explanation. But if you begin lower down, and put into your fundamental conception of matter the germ from which you can educe all the known phenomena of conscious life, and resolutely face all the logical consequences of such a proceeding, then you can soon attain some magnificent generalisations embracing the entire universe, inward and outward, in their sweep. These logical consequences are truly paradoxical, but what of that? The fact that the earth goes round the sun while the sun seems to go round the earth can always be quoted to prove how misleading are mere empirical notions and associations of ideas. So we shall have to admit as conceivable the hypothesis that there exists one homogeneous omnipresent matter; "that what we call Body is but a group of forces more or less complex, in equilibrium;" that every exercise of force has feeling for its counterpart, imparting influence being the mark of energy, receiving influence, the corresponding mark of sentience; that Motion is "not really a translation of Matter, but simply a translation of force-groups throughout continuous and universal matter;" that the Ego is the compound of feelings connected with every body, organic or inorganic, the persistence of the Ego in living bodies being dependent on the continual flux and change of forces. We cannot here dwell on the arguments by which these conclusions are reached, or we would gladly have pointed out the ingenious analogies established between force and feeling, and the way in which a *locus* in time is secured for the feeling which perpetually alternates with force. Nor can we go into criticism further than to say (1) that Mr. Duncan's homogeneous omnipresent matter has a perfect sinecure, and might safely be dispensed with so long as he retains his twin force-feeling and space in which it may be localised; and (2) that, considering how soon monotony turns consciousness into unconsciousness, the feeling which he predicates of the inorganic world must be wholly different from that which belongs to the organic, and surely deserves a different name. These points, however, do not touch the main theory, and could easily be incorporated in a slightly altered hypothesis. The real point at which

the theory becomes wholly inadequate is, we believe, when it meets the fact, old as truth itself, of the freedom of the will. Mr. Duncan, however, is a very modern psychologist, and has advanced till quite out of sight of so antiquated a controversy as that which once concerned the nature of the will.

H. S. S.

IT has become so much the fashion to speak in a patronising way of Jesus as "this young Jewish Rabbi," that few persons will be surprised to find that "Rabbi Jeshua"* is simply the title of the last new life of Christ. But the book is not likely to throw much light on the life or character or work of Jesus. The author, doubtless, found its composition an interesting occupation, and there is a certain amount of entertainment to be got out of the detection of familiar characters and writings in disguise. John the Baptist appears as Haman, the Gospel according to Mark as "the quaint chronicle of Simeon has Saddik," Luke's gospel as "the chronicle of Saul," Matthew's as "the Jerusalem chronicle," &c. A work of this kind has no value unless it gives the authority for every statement and is strictly accurate in all its details. We find here no reference given to any authority; and as for its accuracy, the Gospel according to Matthew (to drop the strange names) is referred to as stating that Jesus was born in a stable (p. 18), and as giving no explanation of the fact that, though he was born in Bethlehem, the scene of his earlier ministry was in Galilee (p. 19); the birth of Christ is represented as taking place in the winter, the shepherds being kindly sheltered from a snowstorm in a cave; and St. Paul is made responsible for the anachronisms of the early chapters of the third gospel. After this, how is the reader to know whether the author has or has not any ground whatever for the statement that "the Pharisees crowded each Sabbath in the squalid synagogues of the villages; but on the mountains, and beneath the shady terebinths, the poor bowed down in ignorance to the primeval powers of the stars in heaven" (p. 100)? The authority for the statement that the rich Jews wore gaberdines (p. 100) we should take at a guess to be Shakespeare; but as to the grounds on which the gaberdine is described as "closely fitting," we are quite at a loss. Probably the more important statement, that Jesus enjoined celibacy upon the apostles (p. 100), may be derived from some authority of about the same date. The idea of giving an account of the life of Jesus just as one might of any other Jewish teacher appears at first to be a fruitful one; but the attempt must fail from the very simplicity and familiarity of the gospel narratives, and the strangeness to the general reader of everything else that the writer requires for his purpose. Either the reader must know pretty nearly all that is in the book to begin with, or it will all be hopelessly unintelligible and confusing to him.

Less pretentious, with no claim to originality, yet, after all, more valuable as a contribution to Christian thought and an estimate of Christ's

* Rabbi Jeshua : An Eastern Story. London : Kegan Paul and Co. 1881.

life and character, are Dr. Fairbairn's "Studies in the Life of Christ." * Dr. Fairbairn has no need to magnify his own learning at his readers' expense, by omitting to give references to easily accessible books from which he has derived his facts, and whether he quotes from the Gospels, from the Pirke Aboth, from Delitsch, Renan, or any other source, he gives us chapter and verse, or page, that we may verify his statements without unnecessary labour. These studies are written from what is called the orthodox point of view. But though the author apparently regards the subject of them as God Himself, he is content in the opening chapter to say, "In Him the Christian ages have seen the manifested God . . . their faith has glorified His sufferings into a sacrifice by the Creator for the creature," and he then proceeds to add that all this makes it necessary that we should see him, "not as He lives in our faith and reverence, but as He lived on our common earth; a man looking before and after, speaking as a man and spoken to by men." The irresistible change which is coming over religious thought is shown again by the fact that while Dr. Fairbairn believes in the miracles, he still says, "The early use of the miracles was an abuse, and almost exact inversion of the truth. Events that were by their very nature sensuous and transitory were made proofs of a faith that is essentially transcendental and permanent." . . . "The claims of truth on belief increase with time, but those of miracles decrease" (p. 150). Though our author apparently fails to see that the two accounts of the birth and infancy of Christ, which he distinctly recognises as very different in sentiment and purpose, are not only different, but in their literal and historical sense quite inconsistent with one another, we forgive this ignoring of the principles of criticism in consideration of the keen appreciation of the poetic and religious truth of the narratives. In the chapters on "The Historical Conditions" and the "Growth and Education of Jesus," we find thoughtful suggestions as to the circumstances amid which the character of Jesus developed to its full perfection, and the stages of the development itself, and we do not feel it necessary to spend much time in wondering how Dr. Fairbairn can speak of any being as "God blessed for ever" and then invite attention to "the political and social conditions that allowed Him to reach His end," and say that without Judaism he would have been "without an arena on which to live and develop and act" (p. 19); or, again, that "His manhood developed out of a youth that had beneath it boyhood, childhood, and infancy" (p. 49); or, strangest of all, perhaps, that "His study of the Scriptures must have been an eminently educative study" (p. 53). Dr. Fairbairn writes as one who seeks to know Christ, not as one who has an image of Christ to defend. He has partly, at least, drawn aside the veil which is upon the hearts of so many when the evangelists are read. And perhaps he will carry more readers with him than he could have done if he had himself moved more rapidly.

F. H. J.

* *Studies in the Life of Christ.* By the Rev. A. M. Fairbairn, D.D., Principal of Airedale College. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1881.

DR. HAUSERATH'S "New Testament Times"* is a book which it is equally pleasant and profitable to read. The author's bright and graphic descriptions and narratives carry the reader with a delightful sense of ease and freshness over the wide field of research which he commands; and the material, social, political, and religious antecedents and concomitants of the ministry of Jesus, together with the main course and purport of that ministry itself, are delineated with the rapid strokes of a master of form. It is true that many readers may complain that Dr. Hausrath's Gospel criticism is not as severe as might be wished, and that great, not to say insuperable, difficulties often lie concealed, except to the eyes of the initiated, beneath the smooth and flowing narrative that seems to make everything so simple. This is no real defect, however. The purpose of the author would have been defeated if he had impaired the vividness of his pictures by interposing elaborate discussions and defences of every position he lays down. His work presents an admirable compendium of the results arrived at by a school of criticism that lies far removed from the orthodox or apologetic position, but declines to follow the "Tübingen" criticism into its detailed consequences. Either as an introduction to the study of New Testament criticism and history for those who are about to enter on it, or as a book to be read by busy men who are not likely to pursue the subject much further, Dr. Hausrath's work may be heartily recommended.

A careful and elaborate essay† on the external evidences of the authorship of the Fourth Gospel only serves to deepen the conviction that the really essential and interesting points concerning this Gospel must be decided on *internal* evidence. The external evidences are insufficient and uncertain, and even if one party or the other were to gain a complete victory and establish all its claims as far as these evidences are concerned, it would still be possible to maintain either of the conflicting hypotheses of authorship. But this does not touch the fact that the question of the external evidences has an interest and importance of its own, though strictly secondary, and that every contribution to its discussion (we can hardly say settlement), bearing the stamp of serious study, deserves a welcome.

P. H. W.

NO revolution in modern society is proceeding more rapidly than that in the social and civic status of women. It is well that one who has rendered such effectual service as Miss Cobbe, in forwarding the best aspirations of her sex, should lift up her genial voice to warn that

* A History of the New Testament Times. By Dr. A. Hausrath, &c. The Time of Jesus. Vols. I. and II. Translated by Charles T. Poynting, B.A., and Philip Quenzer. Williams and Norgate. 1878, 1880.

† The Authorship of the Fourth Gospel: External Evidences. By Ezra Abbott, D.D., LL.D., Bussey Professor of New Testament Criticism, &c., in Harvard University. Trübner and Co. 1880.

there are dangers besetting this, as every other, emancipation.* Very appropriately does Miss Cobbe place upon her title-page the motto from "Marcus Aurelius":—

Whatever any one does or says, I must be good; just as if the emerald were always saying this: Whatever any one does or says, I must be emerald and keep my colour.

Miss Cobbe's lectures are an appeal to women to "be good"; only she understands by goodness something larger and stronger than the commonly-preached duties of women. "In addressing my country-women in this way," says Miss Cobbe,

I have aimed at inciting them, in the first place, to give deep and well-ordered reflection to the subject of morals in general, and of their own duties in particular; trusting that I might help them to see the fallacy of several errors which have hitherto misled us, and to recognise how noble and brave and beautiful is the ideal of womanly virtue, to which we are bound to lift ourselves up. And, in the second place, I have striven to warn my hearers against the neglect of social *bien-séances*, that adoption of looser and more "Bohemian" manners, and, worst of all, that fatal laxity of judgment regarding grave moral transgressions, which have appeared of late years amongst us as the inevitable extravagance of reaction from earlier strictness. These faults and mistakes constitute, I conceive, deadly perils to the whole movement for the advancement of women, and, with all my strength, I would implore every woman who sympathises with that movement to set her face like a flint against them. It is our task to make society more pure, more free from vice—either masculine or feminine—than it has ever been before, not to allow its law to become one shadow of a shade less rigid. (Fp. iv., v.)

The purpose so clearly stated is admirably carried out, and all who are sensible of the current changes in society must be aware how opportune that purpose is. The recent extraordinary vote at Cambridge is but one of the multitudinous signs that men are, at last, becoming conscious that they have dealt unfairly by women, and that the time is at hand when the daughters of England will receive that justice which the wisest and best of them feel to be so much more wholesome than any amount of capricious and unstable favour. We are among those who profoundly believe in the beneficence of the impending change. But we cannot conceal the fact that the movement involves great root-changes in social relations, and that those changes involve pregnant dangers. If the women of England will take to heart the counsels of their gifted sister, those dangers will be safely passed. We purposely refrain from any analysis of these earnest and impressive lectures, believing that we shall best serve our readers—men as well as women—by urging them to read and ponder Miss Cobbe's volume for themselves.

"THEOLOGY dies hard," wrote Mr. Grant Allen in some recent review in a contemporary literary organ. Mr. Allen belongs to that type of philosopher to whom Theology and Evolution appear

* The Duties of Women. A Course of Lectures. By Frances Power Cobbe. London: Williams and Norgate. 1881.

mutually exclusive terms. Two volumes lie before us, which strikingly display the two distinct intellectual tempers in which the great modern doctrine may be accepted. Mr. Grant Allen himself reprints the charming little essays which he has contributed to the *St. James' Gazette* under the title of "The Evolutionist at Large;"* while Mr. Savage, of Boston, deals with "The Religion of Evolution,"† in a series of very remarkable chapters or lectures. For Mr. Allen, nature is full of wonderful revelations. The humblest leaf in the running stream tells him the story of its ancestry, and the paddock sheep balancing itself on some bare tree-stump, hints to him of the old mountain life in which its forefathers sought ever the vantage ground of the highest peak. No one could more delightfully teach us to trace the records of primeval times and of age-enduring habits in the sights and sounds of the simplest country ramble; and probably no one could more effectively bring home to the minds of non-scientific readers the actual meaning of Evolution. But this fulness of animal and vegetable life of its own far-back story is to Mr. Allen the negation of all divine energy and the testimony of nature's own self-sufficiency.

Very different is the interpretation which Mr. Savage puts upon the new philosophy. Mr. Herbert Spencer, so far as he goes, has no more eager disciple than Mr. Savage. Theologian though he be, he accepts, not with reluctance, but with enthusiasm, the whole body of the teaching of the evolutionists. But therein he sees only the larger and sublimer revelation of God-action which is vouchsafed to this modern age. We do not agree with Mr. Savage throughout his book. We regret, for instance, that he condemns the language which speaks of conscience as the voice of God. We should have thought that his philosophy, which recognises the constancy and pervasiveness of God's direct action with a completeness with which none of the old philosophies could possibly recognise it, would have adopted with alacrity an expression which forcibly represents the directness of the divine energy in the motions of the human mind. But we rejoice to welcome a writer who, with precision of reasoning and more than ordinary eloquence, vindicates the consistency of the master-thought of our time with the imperishable faiths of humanity, and expounds the enlarging science which alarms so many, as a sublime expansion of that God-idea which has struggled through the ages towards its robust maturity. Radical to the last degree, fearless and free as the wind, Mr. Savage is yet in the profoundest sense conservative, and builds up religion and the Christian reverence on surer foundations than any Bampton or Boyle or Bohlen lecturer with whom we are acquainted.

* *The Evolutionist at Large*. By Grant Allen. London: Chatto and Windus. 1881.

† *The Religion of Evolution*. By M. J. Savage. Boston: Lockwood, Brooks, and Co.; London: Trübner and Co.

IT has been reserved for a lady to offer to parents counsels which should long ago have been familiar to every thoughtful father and mother.* The terrible physical and moral evils arising from sheer ignorance of fundamental physiological laws on the part of the young, and from the absolute silence of their guardians concerning dangers of which every youth should be plainly warned, are only now beginning to be recognised in their true magnitude and moment. Deep gratitude would be due to any competent writer who should attempt to point out the true path of reform. Dr. Blackwell has amply earned such gratitude. The delicacy with which she treats the most difficult of all subjects in social economy would be possible only to one who, like her, believes profoundly in the perfect harmony between true sanitation and true morality and religion. The solemn and urgent teachings of this little volume should be known to every parent and schoolmaster; and though it be not written with a view to such readers, we believe that few young men could peruse it without a quickening of conscience and a truer sense of the obligations of the moral law.

EVERY attempt to draw the affections of the young towards the venerable literature of Israel, while leaving their judgments free from traditional prejudices of interpretation, deserves recognition and encouragement. Such an attempt Mr. Bartram makes.† His little volume is but of modest pretensions, yet its method and its spirit should make it useful in many homes and schools. The old stories are told in the old words, but each is preceded and followed by commentary of the best kind for little children. They are told as *stories*, which, like the child's other story-books, may be true or untrue, or partly true and partly untrue. But their morals are freely drawn. Where these are true, as they generally are, they are carefully pointed out. Where, on the other hand, Abraham or Jacob has conspicuously failed in rectitude, the dereliction is not slurred over, but receives unhesitating exposure and comment. Miss Cobbe somewhere tells how a little six-year-old lad, brought up on tales from Genesis and tales from Homer, without being told that he was bound to like one set better than the other, showed full appreciation of the wonderful, simple, human interest of Genesis. Mr. Bartram will help other boys and girls to do the same.

* *The Moral Education of the Young, &c.* By Dr. Elizabeth Blackwell. Second Edition. London: Hatchards.

† *Stories from the Book of Genesis.* By Richard Bartram. London: Sunday School Association. 1881.